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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the impact of financial incentives on non-profit organisations delivering 
outcomes-based contracts in UK public services to understand how they affect intra-organisational 
behaviour and the motivation of staff members.  These issues are examined in comparative case 
studies of two non-profit organisations delivering public services through a Social Impact Bond (SIB), 
an outcomes-based payment for results (PbR) contract.  In a SIB, government purchasers collaborate 
with private investors or social investors (seeking a blend of financial return and social value) to fund 
interventions tackling social problems. The SIBs generated direct financial incentives to the 
organisation and indirect financial incentives for managers and front line staff.   
 
This thesis examines the impact of these incentives on organisational, team, and staff behaviour at 
the managerial and front-line level.  This analysis draws on economic theory about the agency 
relationship, incentives, and non-profit organisations to understand the impact of these direct and 
indirect incentives on the behaviour of providers delivering outcomes-based contracts.  The research 
examines the applicability of theories of intrinsic motivation crowding from the economics and social 
psychology literature to understand the impact of indirect financial incentives on the staff’s intrinsic 
motivation.   
 
The analysis of the SIB contracts identified the potential for unintended consequences and 
suboptimal allocations of resources.  The strategic importance senior leadership placed on direct 
financial incentives influenced how team managers organised staff structure and service delivery.  
Front line staff understood and prioritised the preferences of their team managers in their choices to 
apply a client- or outcomes-centred approach to the client group.  Incentives ‘crowded in’ intrinsic 
motivation for staff that supported the outcomes targets and had autonomy over their work. This 
study argues that the highly-geared incentives in these outcomes-based contracts had complex 
effects on public services delivery.   
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 Introduction  
 
This thesis explores the impact of financial incentives on non-profit organisations delivering 
outcomes-based contracts for public services, and how they affect intra-organisational behaviour and 
the motivation of staff members.  This will be examined through comparative case studies of two non-
profit providers delivering Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), a relatively new type of outcomes-based pay for 
performance (p4p) contract.  In a SIB, government purchasers partner with private, for-profit, or 
social investors (who seek a blend of financial return and social good) to fund interventions by non-
profit, voluntary, or private sector providers tackling social problems, and are repaid if predetermined 
outcomes metrics are met.  In the two non-profit case studies, the SIB contracts introduced direct 
financial incentives for each non-profit organisation, and indirect financial incentives for the managers 
and front line staff involved in service delivery.  This thesis examines the impact of these direct and 
indirect financial incentives on organisational, team, and staff behaviour at the managerial and front-
line level.  
 
This introductory chapter describes the policy background for the introduction of SIBs, a variant of 
p4p, for public services delivery in the United Kingdom (UK). The relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature on incentives and non-profit organisations is discussed to identify the limitations of the 
existing literature.  Next, the context for the comparative SIB case studies is described.  This chapter 
then presents the research questions for this thesis and the aims and objectives of this study, 
followed by a description of the contents of each chapter in this thesis.  
 
1.1.  Policy context 
1.1.1.  Shifting provision of public goods and services  
In the post-Second World War period, Western European countries embarked on a mass top-down 
reconstruction effort to address societal issues through increased investments in social welfare 
(Beveridge, 1942) leading to substantial gains in educational attainment and more equitable 
distributions of income.  By the 1980s, there were concerns about the inability of mature welfare 
states to continue to reduce socioeconomic and other inequalities, as well as concerns about the 
efficiency of delivery of key public services.  To counter this, policy makers turned to the public choice 
school of economics and political science to argue for less government action or top down 
interventions to counteract ‘government failure’ and a new approach to the welfare state.  This trend 
was manifested in the shift to targeted welfare interventions aimed at specific sub-groups, and often, 
the problematization of embedded social groups and their problems (Le Grand, 1997).  
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There has been a shift in the direction of public policy and service planning in Western democracies in 
recent decades towards a more market-driven approach to the provision of public services.  This 
ideological shift was not limited to recipients of public services but accompanied by a shift in the 
focus and style of public administration in general in the 1980s toward New Public Management 
(NPM) (Le Grand, 1997).  NPM is an approach to public services that focusses on lessening or 
removing differences between the public and private sector, and emphasising the value of 
accountability framed by results (Hood, 1995).  This perspective emphasises the role of financial 
incentives and performance management schemes as key drivers of improved productivity, efficiency, 
and increased choice for service recipients.  In the UK, policymakers advocated for mixed-market 
provision, resulting, for example, in the introduction of the NHS internal market reforms of the 1990s, 
that separated providers and purchasers in a still very largely publicly owned and financed health 
system (Mays et al., 2011).   
 
In the mid-2000s, supply-side reforms expanded the market for public services with an emphasis on 
consumer choice, provider diversity and activity-based payment by results (PbR) schemes (Mays et al., 
2011) to improve broader aspects of public services provision, such as schools, hospitals, and welfare 
benefits (Cashin et al., 2014).  This was a departure from the earlier NPM-focus on performance-
based public servant remuneration (OECD, 2005).  These changes reflect NPM’s focus on greater 
choice and provider competition (via contracting out to the private or independent sector), and, 
importantly, a focus on performance assessment and incentives to improve value for money (Hood, 
1995, Hood and Peters, 2004).  This approach has since been applied to public service provision 
contracts with the third sector, defined broadly as including non-profits, social enterprises and 
voluntary organisations (Allen et al., 2011).  It is important to locate the emergence of incentives and 
p4p as part of a marketised approach to public policy that has used supply-side policy mechanisms as 
the preferred motivational strategy for public services reform in recent decades, particularly in UK 
health and social care.   
 
The Conservative-led Coalition (2010-2015) and Conservative (2015-2017; 2017-present) 
governments have followed this trend in policy making and public administration by strengthening 
rhetoric about the importance of value for money, especially following the 2008 global financial crisis.  
The Coalition government’s reforms were rooted in the need for new approaches to public services 
financing, and reasonable concerns about the sustainability of public services with an aging 
population (Dowling and Harvie, 2014, HM Government, 2011).  Within public services delivery, the 
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importance of value for money and payment by results gained increasing prominence for policy 
makers and application by commissioners of public services (HM Government, 2011).    
 
1.1.2.  Social Impact Bonds and outcomes-based commissioning  
One form of payment by results1 that emerged in this period were SIBs, a novel outcomes-based 
financing and funding model.  SIBs were initiated in 2007 as a variant of p4p that uses private 
investment to fund interventions, where investors are wholly repaid by public commissioners if, and 
only if, the intervention they funded achieved predetermined outcomes.  SIBs are outcomes-based 
p4p contracts for public services where government purchasers partner with investors to fund 
interventions that are delivered by a non-profit, voluntary, or private sector organisation.  In a SIB, 
investors are repaid by public commissioners if, and only if, the intervention achieves predetermined 
outcomes.  It is claimed that SIBs offer a ‘win-win’ policy solution for all stakeholders, where socially-
minded investors can foster promising preventative interventions, providers receive upfront funds to 
scale up existing work, and government purchasers only pay for successful programming (Fraser et al., 
2018b, Fraser et al., 2018a).  SIBs have been promoted as a way for policymakers to commission 
public services for difficult social problems that may otherwise be seen as high-risk or untested 
interventions (Tan et al., 2015).   
 
SIBs are a manifestation of the move toward outcomes-based contracts that emphasises greater 
performance management, and the adoption of private sector management techniques. They are 
part of a wider policy shift that promotes the market-oriented management of the public sector via 
incentives and competition to increase efficiency, productivity, and value for money (Hood, 1995, 
Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996).  Advocates argue that SIBs will focus providers on the outcomes of 
services, increase accountability (between governments or grant-making organisations and service 
providers), improve performance management, and shift financial risk to investors and the provider(s) 
of services (Buse et al., 2012, Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011, Callanan et al., 2012, Fraser et al., 
2018b), and bring about more rigorous, data-driven monitoring and evaluation to ensure that 
governments only pay for ‘what works’ (Liebman, 2011, Mulgan et al., 2011).  Critics warn that actors 
from intermediaries or investment managers introduce a competitive ethos through performance 
management schemes that can diminish or erode a non-profit organisation’s social mission or 
commitment to service recipients (Fraser et al., 2018b, Joy and Shields, 2013).  SIBs necessitate closer 
                                                          
 
1 In this thesis, the terms ‘outcomes-based commissioning’, ‘pay for performance’, and ‘payment by results’ are 
defined as reimbursement mechanisms where a percentage of payment is conditional on the achievement of 
predetermined metrics.  In all these schemes, there can be varying levels of rewards.   
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examination to understand the potential risks they present for providers and policymakers given the 
complexity of public services delivery. 
 
The United Kingdom has emerged as a pioneer in the use of SIBs as a financing mechanism to deliver 
public services in the last decade. The world’s first SIB was launched at HMP Peterborough Prison in 
2010 (Disley and Rubin, 2014), and SIBs have since been presented as the answer to some of 
England’s most intractable social problems such as recidivism, youth unemployment, and rising 
demand for health and social care services.  SIBs have held particular salience in an economic climate 
where public services are pressed to ‘do more with less’ – notably in the context of fiscal austerity in 
the UK following the 2008 financial crisis.  The Conservative government (2015-2017, 2017-present) 
has continued to advocate for all government departments to pursue wider application of PbR, 
personalisation, a focus on outcomes and the introduction of SIBs (Conservative Party, 2015).  While 
SIBs are not mentioned in the 2017 Conservative Manifesto, there are multiple references to the 
need to improve outcomes in health and social care through a focus on preventative initiatives 
(Conservative Party, 2017).  The UK Central Government continues to supports the use of SIBs and 
outcomes-based contracts through the Centre for Social Impact Bonds within the Government 
Inclusion Economy Unit in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the 
Government Outcomes Lab at the University of Oxford (HM Government, 2017, HM Government, 
2016).  The DCMS has fostered the development of the SIB market through the Life Chances Fund 
(LCF) through which government has committed £80 million to support locally developed projects 
tackling complex social problems through PbR contracts (Cabinet Office, 2018).  To date, there are 32 
SIBs operating in the UK, 10 SIBs in the United States(US) and 19 SIBs operating in 14 countries that 
include Australia, Canada, Colombia, India, the Netherlands, and New Zealand (Floyd, 2017).   
 
SIBs have emerged as a policy tool within a wider shift towards greater alignment between social 
welfare interventions and economic policy.  This shift includes a new focus on economic policy, which 
suggests that public policy exists to support, stabilise, or expand the economy rather than to serve 
social needs.  In this context, public policy appears to have entered a new era where social policy 
needs should be met by private investment rather than tax revenues (Lake, 2015).    The importance 
placed on demonstrating social value for new public policy interventions has been contested as a 
process of deepening ‘capitalist disciplinary logics’ rather than a way of engaging locally responsive 
social interventions (Dowling and Harvie, 2014). SIBs are a particular manifestation of this trend 
towards NPM and private financing because they value explicit and measurable standards for 
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performance and require diverse, non-state providers, such as non-profit organisations, to enter 
outcomes or activity-based contracts for service provision (Fraser et al., 2018b).   
 
A recent review of the grey and academic literature about SIBs identifies three distinct interpretive 
narratives (Fraser et al., 2018b).  The first, labelled a ‘public sector reform narrative’ is premised on 
the view that public, non-profit and voluntary sector organisations have important shortcomings in 
terms of service design, delivery and accountability, that require private sector management 
techniques and values, such as sharper financial incentives and ‘market discipline’ to remedy these 
issues (HM Government, 2017, Liebman, 2011, Mulgan et al., 2011). The second, labelled a ‘financial 
sector reform narrative’, suggests that private sector actors, in particular, private or social investors, 
management consultancies, and specialist intermediary organisations, can effect socially worthwhile 
change through social entrepreneurship whilst simultaneously pursuing commercial interests 
(Liebman, 2011, Nicholls and Murdock, 2012).  These two narratives have dominated the literature so 
far produced by SIB proponents and are often mutually reinforcing.   
 
By contrast, the third, ‘cautionary narrative’ is more prevalent within the academic literature, and 
diverges from the first two by taking a more critical view of SIBs on pragmatic and ideological 
grounds.  While this narrative identifies potential benefits to discarding the ‘target culture’ of NPM 
and a reliance on process measures through outcomes-based contracts, it also urges caution about 
the introduction of ‘private sector’ values to public services delivery (Fraser et al., 2018b).  For 
example, SIBs have implications for transparency and accountability with public funds given the 
relative ‘openness’ of public sector contracts, compared with the closed nature of private sector 
contracts.  It is important that there is a degree of public oversight over these contracts because of 
the risk that private sector interests may value profit generation over the needs of service recipients 
(Warner, 2013).  SIBs can be especially problematic for non-profits because the introduction of a 
competitive ethos and performance management schemes by private investors and related actors 
may diminish or erode their social mission (Fraser et al., 2018b, Joy and Shields, 2013).  While there 
are benefits to the focus on outcomes over process targets, this third, cautionary, narrative highlights 
important considerations about the potential implications of SIB contracts on public services 
provision.  The focus on measuring end results has the potential to mask, or undervalue, the 
processes and actions undertaken by staff in pursuit of outcomes targets.   
 
The introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives for performance in the non-profit sector 
requires greater examination, especially as non-profit organisations take on an increasingly important 
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role in the development, production, and provision of public services.  This thesis explores the impact 
of the financial incentives related to the SIB contract on non-profit providers delivering outcomes-
based contracts in UK public services to understand how they affect intra-organisational behaviour 
and the motivation of staff members.  
 
1.2.  Incentives in public services delivery 
More research is needed to examine the impact that SIBs, and the incentives embedded in their 
contracts, will have on non-profit organisations delivering services through them.  This is particularly 
salient as incentives have been the preferred supply-side motivational tool among policymakers for 
public services reform in recent decades.  There has been much enthusiasm about incentives because 
they are expected to improve accountability and value for money by aligning a provider’s actions with 
the commissioner’s interests.  Performance-based funding has been widely applied across public 
services through p4p and PbR schemes using a range of activity-based or relative rewards (e.g. 
bonuses that constitute a small percent of overall budgets, or withholding funds unless performance 
targets are met) to try and improve public services.  The empirical evidence about the effectiveness of 
these schemes using individual, team, or organisational rewards is mixed (Lagarde et al., 2013, Van 
Herck et al., 2011).  The evidence from outcomes-based contracts, where all payments are dependent 
on the achievement of predetermined outcomes, is very limited and suggests that unintended 
behaviours to generate performance-related payments are widespread in these schemes (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015, Mason et al., 2015).   
 
Little attention has been paid to the impact of direct and indirect financial incentives within 
organisations, particularly on how incentives are transmitted from managers to teams and front line 
staff delivering public services.  A recent review of p4p schemes in health systems of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries finds that most studies have focused 
on the impact of incentives at the team-level despite growing theoretical interest in the impact of p4p 
on organisations  (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).  While there is some evidence about performance-
based financial reward schemes from the private sector (Bandiera et al., 2009) and the public sector 
(Burgess et al., 2010) about how managers allocate tasks to individuals working in teams, these 
studies are of limited relevance for this study because staff in the non-profit case studies did not 
receive pecuniary rewards. 
 
Further, there has been little work evaluating the unintended consequences (both positive and 
negative) of incentives in public services, especially on the impact that these p4p contracts may have 
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on service providers drawn from the non-profit sector.  There is mixed evidence about the extent and 
prevalence of unintended behaviours in p4p schemes.  A systematic review of the literature finds 
limited evidence of gaming (i.e. massaging progress towards targets in a performance management 
scheme to appear more successful than in actuality).  This finding is attributed, in part, to limited 
contexts for comparison to prove gaming (Van Herck et al., 2010).  One study finds that creaming (i.e. 
choosing to focus on those that are most likely to generate outcomes with minimal effort) and 
parking (i.e. putting aside difficult cases that are unlikely to generate outcomes payments) were 
widespread in an outcomes-based employment program (Carter and Whitworth, 2015).  There is little 
empirical evidence that explicitly explores unintended behaviours, such as gaming, creaming, or 
parking; this suggests that more such research is necessary.  
 
It is unclear how non-profit organisations react to the introduction of incentives and outcomes-based 
contracts.  The introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives for performance in non-profit 
organisations delivering public services requires greater examination as to how incentives will be 
communicated through organisations, especially the impact they will have on managers and front line 
workers.   
 
1.3.  Impact of incentives on staff motivations  
One of the aims of this thesis is to explore the impact of direct and indirect financial incentives on 
non-profit providers delivering SIBs to understand how they might affect the motivation of staff 
members.  This is of interest to this thesis because the impact of SIB incentives on the motivation of 
non-profit staff through p4p (and its variants, such as PbR) have often been used as a policy 
mechanism to increase worker motivation.  For example, incentives have been introduced as 
individual, team-based, or workplace rewards for meeting pre-specified outcome or reward 
thresholds.  Individuals that select into the non-profit sector are assumed to do so because they are 
highly motivated to do the right thing or serve the public good. 
 
In this study, intrinsic motivation is defined as actions an individual undertakes for the enjoyment of 
the task itself, for public service motivation, or out of pro-social motivation to ‘do good’.  Extrinsic 
motivation refers to activities that are not interesting to the individual (i.e., not intrinsically 
motivating), such as externally or internally imposed pressures that do not correspond to an 
individual’s goals, values, or preferences.  For example, incentives for a non-profit worker to record 
their actions with clients on a database that reduces the time that is available to them to do 
intrinsically interesting work with their clients (Lohmann et al., 2016, Gagné and Deci, 2005).  
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Incentives can ‘crowd in’ (i.e. where an individual’s intrinsic motivation to do their work increases as a 
result of the incentive) or ‘crowd out’ motivation (i.e. where an individual’s intrinsic motivation 
decreases because of the introduction of incentives).  Recent theoretical work considers an 
individual’s sense of autonomy in how they respond to incentives and suggests that incentives can 
‘crowd in’ an individual’s intrinsic motivation, so that the incentives provide intrinsic task enjoyment 
or personal meaningfulness where they reflect the individual’s goals and values (Lohmann et al., 
2016).  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of incentives can be met by both positive and 
negative behavioural responses by staff at the individual, team, and facility-based level that depend 
on the design of, and implementation process for, an incentives scheme (Lohmann et al., 2016).  The 
evidence finds that the impact on motivation varies between individuals according to what is 
incentivised, the size of the reward, and how rewards are distributed between staff, teams, facilities, 
or the wider organisation (Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Kalk et al., 2010, Shen et al., 2017, Chimhutu 
et al., 2014).  This thesis explores the impact of the incentives generated through SIB contracts in 
organisations, and how these changes were articulated at both the managerial and front-line level to 
understand the potential implications of incentives on staff’s intrinsic motivations.   
 
1.4.  Research questions and motivation to do this research 
The potential limitations and drawbacks of introducing p4p to non-profit organisations delivering 
public services suggests that the introduction of incentives to non-profits necessitates greater 
examination as they have the potential to change the principal-agent relationship2 and erode intrinsic 
motivation.  The introduction of indirect financial incentives necessitates further examination of the 
impact that p4p contracts have on the behaviour of workers in non-profit organisations.  This thesis 
addresses the research question: “How do workers in non-profit organisations respond to the use of 
direct and indirect outcome-related financial incentives?”   
                                                          
 
2 A principal-agent relationship exists where the principal, who can be an employer or the funder of services 
(e.g., purchaser or commissioner), enlists another party, the agent, who can be an employee or organisation to 
deliver services on behalf of the principal.  The effort the agent exerts is not necessarily observable for the 
principal due to information asymmetry.  In this case, the principal typically has less information about the 
service than the agent does.  As the agent may possess information that they are unwilling to share, they may 
not act in a way that pursues the principal’s best interests.  Agents can be compromised by the conflict between 
their own self-interest and the principal’s needs, short-sighted behaviour, or imperfect information so their 
choices can adversely affect their own, or their principal’s professional or financial outcomes (Prendergast, 
1999).   
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1.5.  Aims and objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore the relationship between financial incentives and organisational 
and team behaviour in non-profit organisations.  This research focuses on the impact of the incentives 
generated under two different Social Impact Bond contracts on organisational, team, and staff 
behaviour, and how these changes are articulated at both the managerial and front-line level.   
 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To understand how new financial incentives are articulated and prioritised within a non-profit 
organisation’s management and how this affects the way that the organisation plans and 
delivers services. 
2. To understand how senior and team managers respond to extrinsic incentives and the impact 
that these have on staff structure, task allocation, service delivery, performance management 
and monitoring outcomes. 
3. To understand how team managers and front line staff perceive incentives and outcome-
related rewards driven by the SIB, and how this affects their attitudes toward outcome 
targets.  
4. To understand the impact that incentives have on the intrinsic motivation of team managers 
and front line staff. 
 
1.6.  Case studies: homelessness and health 
The two SIB projects that are the focus of this thesis were initiated to improve outcomes for homeless 
individuals in London using an outcomes-focused approach intended to promote a move into settled 
accommodation and more stable lifestyles.  In the early 2010s, there were increases in the numbers 
of individuals seen sleeping outdoors alongside a rise in ‘hidden’ homelessness (i.e. individuals not 
seen sleeping rough on the street but who lacked stable accommodation).  At the local authority 
level, these increases in reported rough sleeping were accompanied by increased demand for services 
related to homelessness, such as early interventions for new rough sleepers or access to mental 
health services.  This presented a policy problem for local authorities as a growing, entrenched, 
homeless population presented issues related to anti-social behaviour complaints, increased demand 
and high costs associated with chaotic interactions with A&E, or entry into the criminal justice system 
(The Young Foundation, 2011).  At the practical level, homelessness services were characterised by a 
high degree of fragmentation, with services operated by the private, public, and voluntary sector 
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working in silos.  There was a lack of coordination and accountability among the local authorities and 
service providers that worked in London’s 32 boroughs.  For the homeless population itself, there 
were administrative obstacles to accessing services; for example, an individual had to demonstrate a 
local connection (e.g. previous work or having lived in the area for a set period of time) in the 
borough to be eligible for assistance.  In the absence of an intervention and over the longer term, 
rough sleepers are likely to require more costly interventions and intensive support to maintain stable 
lifestyles (The Young Foundation, 2011, Social Finance and The Young Foundation, 2012).   
 
In this patchwork of services and accountabilities, public commissioners chose to test an 
individualised approach to better enable access to existing services for a group of entrenched rough 
sleepers in London.  The SIB was proposed as a outcomes-based financing mechanism to provide 
personalised, London-wide services for a group of entrenched homeless individuals with the intent of 
facilitating a transition to stable accommodation (Mulgan et al., 2011, Social Finance and The Young 
Foundation, 2012).  The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), a department of 
the UK’s central government, committed to providing central government funding for outcomes 
payments and worked with the Greater London Authority (GLA) to commission two SIBs targeted at a 
defined group of entrenched rough sleepers in London.  The GLA, as the lead commissioner for 
homelessness services in London, commissioned two SIBs to reduce rough sleeping among a group of 
830 entrenched rough sleepers (divided into two fixed groups of 415 individuals) in London in 2012.  
The GLA acted as lead commissioner and contracts manager throughout the duration of the 
interventions. Two registered UK charities, were selected to deliver the SIBs to the two fixed groups 
after a competitive bidding process.  Investors were recruited separately by the provider 
organisations and not part of the competitive bidding process or consultation with the GLA (Mason et 
al., 2017, Tan et al., 2015).   
 
This thesis explores the impact of financial incentives on two non-profit organisations delivering 
outcomes-based SIB contracts to understand how the incentives affect intra-organisational behaviour 
and the motivation of staff members.  The impact of introducing outcomes-based contracts on non-
profit organisations that provide services for vulnerable populations is a shift in the sector that 
necessitates greater examination. 
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1.7.  Contents of thesis 
This section describes the contents of the chapters in this thesis.  
 
The theoretical context of the thesis is explored in Chapter 2.  This chapter presents a summary of the 
potential issues arising from the use of performance-based funding schemes in public services.  It 
explores the potential impact of incentives on the agency relationship between the service provider 
and public commissioner.  It then considers the theoretical work about incentives on the behaviour of 
organisations and teams.  The impact of incentives on intrinsic motivation is then discussed.  Next, the 
organisation and behaviour of non-profit firms are explored to contextualise the potential impact of 
SIBs and outcomes-based contracting.  This chapter closes by presenting the framework for analysis 
used in this study. 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the empirical evidence about the relationship between financial incentives and 
organisational and team behaviour.  It first presents the empirical literature about the application of 
p4p and outcomes-based contracts on public services, the impact on organisations and teams, and 
what is known about unintended behaviour.  Second, it summarises what is known about the impact 
of financial incentives on provider motivation.  This chapter closes with the aims and objectives of this 
study. 
 
The research methods used for the fieldwork are described in Chapter 4.  This chapter summarises 
the rationale for the comparative case study approach and the advantages of using qualitative 
methods in an economic analysis.  This is followed by a description of the process of site selection and 
securing access to the providers, data collection, and the analysis of interview data and documentary 
evidence.  It closes with a reflexive analysis of the research methods that considers the strengths and 
limitations of the research methodologies used.   
 
Chapter 5 presents the study setting.  This chapter describes the rationale for the introduction of SIBs 
in the two case studies.  This chapter then discusses the allocation of risk between different actors to 
understand the incentives in the SIB contracts.  This is followed by an analysis of the contractual 
structure of each SIB and a summary of the financial and reputational risks for each provider.  This 
chapter then presents each provider’s actual performance relative to projected outcome targets to 
illustrate how successful each non-profit provider was in delivering the service.  This is followed by a 
description of each non-profit’s approach to service delivery, staff structure and task allocation.   
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The findings in relation to how the senior leadership team and team managers respond to the 
introduction of financial incentives are presented in Chapter 6.  This chapter is concerned with how 
the case studies organised, managed and staffed their teams, to understand how direct financial 
incentives for the organisation are filtered through a managerial hierarchy and affect service delivery.  
The analysis of senior and team managers’ response to incentives highlights the potential implications 
of outcomes-based contracting for the agency relationship, staff structure, task allocation and service 
delivery.  This chapter explores the meso-level of the organisation to understand how the senior 
leadership team communicated strategic priorities and how they were interpreted by team managers. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the impact of the incentives in the SIB contract on the agency relationship 
between front line staff and their senior and team managers.  It explores how front line staff 
interpreted and prioritised the incentives in the SIB contacts.  It examines the impact of the SIB 
contracts and their indirect financial incentives on the behaviour of front line staff, with attention to 
the potential for positive and negative unintended behaviours.  This analysis focuses on the micro-
level of the organisation to explore the impact of financial incentives for service delivery.  
 
The impact of indirect financial incentives on the motivation of staff working in the non-profit case 
studies is presented in Chapter 8.  This chapter explores how staff members described their 
motivation to do their work, choice to select into the non-profit sector and their views on job 
satisfaction.  The chapter then explores the role of extrinsic motivation for staff and whether, and in 
what ways, it affected how they approached their work.  It closes by exploring whether the 
introduction of financial incentives led to the ‘crowding in’ or ‘crowding out’ of intrinsic motivation 
among staff in the non-profit case studies.  
 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 9.  This chapter summarises and discusses the findings of the 
research relative to the aims and objects of this thesis.  It also discusses the strengths and limitations 
of the research.  The chapter closes with a discussion of the contribution that this thesis makes to the 
existing literature, offers some suggestions as to how the findings are of interest to policymakers and 
highlights areas for further research.   
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 Theoretical background 
 
2.1.  Introduction  
This chapter explores the theoretical implications of performance-based funding and contracting out 
in public services delivery.  To set out the theoretical context of this study, this chapter reviews the 
relevant economic literature about agency theory, incentives, and intrinsic motivation.  This informs 
this study’s research questions by identifying the potential responses to incentives and the 
mechanisms by which they might operate.  Next, this chapter summarises theoretical work from the 
economic and management literature about how non-profits are organised and how they behave to 
establish what is known about the application of direct and indirect financial incentives in the non-
profit sector.  This provides insights about the potential implications for non-profits delivering 
performance-based public services contracts.  This scoping review draws together the literature about 
the impact of incentives on agency, behaviour and motivation, and how non-profits are organised to 
inform the framework for analysis. 
 
First, this chapter presents an overview of agency theory and the potential issues posed by the 
introduction of new principals, for example, when private or social investors are introduced.  Next, 
incentives theory is discussed as it relates to the impact on agents in organisations and unintended 
behaviour.  The theoretical economic and social psychology literature about intrinsic motivation and 
motivation crowding is presented to discuss the potential impact of extrinsic rewards on staff 
motivation.  Next, the literature about non-profits, how they are organised and their behaviour is 
presented to contextualise the potential impact of SIBs and outcomes-based contracting on such 
organisations.  Lastly, this chapter closes with the framework for analysis.   
 
2.2.  Agency theory  
This thesis explores the impact of a new financing mechanism for public services using outcomes-
based contracts for public services delivery.  It is important to discuss the theoretical implications of 
the agency relationship because SIBs introduce new actors, such as investors, to the agency 
relationship between providers and commissioners.  Debates on the optimal structure of public 
services and delivery are strongly influenced by in the principal-agent model of behaviour.  A 
principal-agent relationship exists where the principal, who can be an employer or the funder of 
services (e.g., purchaser or commissioner), enlists another party, the agent, who can be an employee 
or organisation to deliver services on behalf of the principal.  The effort the agent exerts is not 
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necessarily observable for the principal due to information asymmetry.  In this case, the principal 
typically has less information about the service than the agent does.  As the agent may possess 
information that they are unwilling to share, they may not act in a way that pursues the principal’s 
best interests.  Agents can be compromised by the conflict between their own self-interest and the 
principal’s needs, short-sighted behaviour, or imperfect information so their choices can adversely 
affect their own, or their principal’s professional or financial outcomes (Prendergast, 1999).  To 
correct for this, contracts can be designed as a way for the principal to link the agent’s rewards and 
effort to the principal’s objectives, as they are unable to fully observe the agent’s behaviour.  While 
this is possible, the high cost of monitoring providers, outcomes and measurement make it unclear 
whether greater reporting necessarily improves accountability and results (Lagarde et al., 2013, 
Eichler, 2006, Eldridge and Palmer, 2009).   
 
Any organisation can be seen as a network of principal-agent relationships that govern the 
accountability structure, chain of command or formal hierarchy within it.  It is important to note that 
these agency relationships are often more complex than the simple behavioural model above 
suggests.  Agency theory predicts that informational asymmetries and monitoring issues arise that can 
facilitate agents in acting to maximise their utility at the expense of the overall interest of the 
organisation.  In an organisation, coordinating the activities of these agents through the development 
of contracts that govern how staff or third parties will be managed is key to effective and efficient 
organisational operations.  While there are complex principal-agent relationships in private firms, 
(e.g., there can be different types of investors with different time horizons in addition to the board, 
senior management, middle management and the client-facing individuals, all with different goals), in 
private firms, the profit motive serves as the main output and organisational goal.  By contrast, in 
public services, there is not a single principal (such as the owner of a private firm) or a single goal, but 
multiple principals and goals in public and non-governmental organisations (Besley and Ghatak, 
2003).   
 
The differences in organisational goals between the public sector and private organisations illustrate 
the issues underlying the marketization of public services (Stewart and Ranson, 1988).  For example, 
better education services or health care are social goods so agents (employees) are responsible to 
society as a whole (a principal), among other principals, such as their line managers, or service 
recipients (Besley and Ghatak, 2003).  The development and use of contracts to control for, or 
motivate certain behaviours is more complicated in public services, as agents serve multiple principals 
and pursue multiple objectives.  Another example is how doctors (agents) are responsible to several 
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principals: the patient, their hospital administrators, policymakers, their peers or national guidelines 
to reduce costs or improve quality.  While the presence of multiple principals can change the principal 
agent relationship in the private, public and non-profit sector and can be hard to mitigate, this simple 
model provides useful analytical insights about the impact of financial incentives on non-profit 
organisations delivering outcomes-based contracts to understand how they affect intra-organisational 
behaviour and the motivation of staff members.  For example, if an agent’s tasks are complementary, 
issues of free riding in teams will emerge.  If an agent’s tasks are substitutable, the principal must 
calibrate payments, risks, or rewards in such a way as to incentivise agents to do tasks at the desired 
level of output (Besley and Ghatak, 2003). It is important to explore how public sector or non-profit 
organisations contract services with their staff and partners, and to understand the impact this has on 
their agency relationships, especially in the context of performance-based funding.  The next section 
considers the use of incentives as a policy tool to correct for some of the issues raised in this section 
about the agency relationship. 
 
2.3.  Incentives theory 
Policy-makers have turned to the redesign of incentives as a solution for perceived inefficiencies in 
production and in response to low quality.  Outcomes-based contracts, such as SIBs, introduce 
incentives for non-profits to demonstrate that they have achieved predetermined outcome metrics in 
order to trigger performance-related payments.  Although all systems of remuneration contain 
financial incentives, those related to the SIB contract are the focus of this study because the public 
commissioner introduced them to induce non-profit providers to improve service quality for a target 
group of clients where conventional services were seen to be ‘failing.’ This study defines incentives as 
a mechanism that can be used to induce workers into acting in the interests of their employers 
(Prendergast, 1999), or a structure of rewards, encouragement, praise or criticism to promote effort 
or performance (Benabou and Tirole, 2003).  It is, however, difficult to design schemes that link 
performance measures to financial rewards because such incentives can generate unplanned and 
perverse outcomes (Prendergast, 1999).  The introduction of incentives for specific outcomes can 
change the principal-agent relationship by preventing agents from choosing the appropriate provision 
of care for a patient or service recipient as their recommendations can adversely affect their own 
professional or financial outcomes. This can result from information asymmetry.  
 
In the standard neo-classical economics view, it is assumed that actors are rational, selfish, and 
extrinsically motivated.  As such, actors can be expected to respond to extrinsic rewards in a 
predictable way.  This theory relies on stimulus-response theory (which sees behaviour in a black box 
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way) so that observable changes are based on restrictions on behaviour rather than preferences (see 
(Stigler and Becker, 1977) for a fuller explanation).  As such, it is assumed that incentives can have a 
positive role in motivating agents to increase their output, or in motivating them to exert a higher 
level of effort (Becker, 1962). It is expected that behaviours can be controlled through the careful use 
of rewards or sanctions (Weibel et al., 2010).  
 
There exists strong evidence from the theoretical and conceptual work that incentives do matter in 
general terms, but there are insufficient predictive models to frame the design of incentives or p4p 
schemes in a way that guarantees that they will work as intended (Eijkenaar, 2013, Emmert et al., 
2012).  Prendergast (1999) argues that incentives have strong effects on output where measures of 
overall performance are available; that tournaments (where the highest performers in a group receive 
rewards while other performers receive nothing) and team incentives do not necessarily have positive 
effects on overall performance; the trade-off between risks and incentives are mixed and levels of 
variations are poorly explained; and that there is insufficient evidence on how employment or 
performance contracts should be calibrated for workers with complex, or multitask, roles 
(Prendergast, 1999). There is empirical evidence that direct financial incentives can improve efficiency 
or productivity, based on studies of single-task agents, often in roles such as assembly line work in 
factories, tree-planting, or sales (Lazear, 2000, Paarsch and Shearer, 1999, Shearer, 2004).  However, 
these studies have limited applicability for contexts with multitask agents, team settings, or outside 
the private sector.  There is insufficient empirical work, especially about those workers whose outputs 
are hard to measure, such as in jobs where performance assessments are subjective.  More work is 
required on how best to evaluate the performance of, and set compensation for, workers with non-
contracted output (e.g. workers with fixed compensation, or for those who are not paid on a piece 
rate basis) (Prendergast, 1999).  
    
There is disagreement about the use of financial incentives (via targets or explicit outcomes-based 
contracting) for outcomes in public services, with some arguing that p4p should have no role in the 
public sector.  There is however, very little evidence on the benefits and drawbacks of team-based 
production and rewards with attention to the public sector.  Burgess and Ratto’s (2003) review of the 
use of incentives in the public sector finds that the design of an optimal incentive scheme is difficult 
given the high costs of monitoring and the potential for perverse behaviour. For example, where a 
team contributes to the same output, the principal must specify which aspects of performance or 
output are most important so incentives and contracts for employment or a project can be developed 
to best limit the potential for dysfunctional behaviour by agents.  Despite efforts to control this, 
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complementarities in production can increase the potential for free riding when incentives are team-
based, or rewards are based on aggregate team performance.  Free riding can erode individual effort 
or dilute the strength of the incentive, and increases with the uncertainty of output measurement 
and with team size.  Since public service outputs are not as readily measured as those in private 
sector firms (i.e. widgets), it is more complex to design an optimal incentive scheme because public 
service outputs require more monitoring.  This is also seen to be more costly to the principal (Burgess 
and Ratto, 2003, Holmstrom, 1982) and has the potential to outweigh any efficiency savings derived 
from the incentives (Burgess and Ratto, 2003).  Milgrom and Roberts (1990) demonstrate that where 
cooperation in a team is important for overall organisational objectives, then rewarding individual 
behaviour can detract from the team’s performance as the marginal cost of effort to cooperate also 
rises (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  
 
Performance pay incentives have been widely used to motivate staff in the public and private sector, 
but can also negate the impact of other means available to organisations to influence behaviour 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, Eldridge and Palmer, 2009, Karlsberg Schaffer et al., 2015).  
Holmstrom and Milgrom argue from their models that extrinsic incentives are an insufficient tool to 
influence an agent’s actions and that principals have a range of other tools at hand to influence 
behaviour, that may be as, or more, effective in modifying staff output, such as shifting ownership of 
related assets, or varying restrictions on how to do a job.  This model argues that it is insufficient to 
look at tasks in silos, and that principals need to look at the wider system in order to make correct 
inferences about the activity itself that is to be incentivised (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  The 
theoretical work indicates that the introduction of incentives for public services is complex and it can 
be difficult for a principal to design an optimal set of rewards or encouragement to promote effort.  
Other factors influence provider behaviour, particularly in public services, such as a staff member’s 
motivation to do their work.  The next section considers the role of intrinsic motivation of staff to 
consider the potential impact of incentive schemes within organisations.  
 
2.4.  Motivation crowding 
The theoretical literature about motivation suggests that extrinsic motivation, such as incentives in an 
outcomes-based contract, can be counterproductive because it has the potential to ‘crowd out’ an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation to do his/her work where incentivised tasks do not resonate with 
personal goals or values (Deci, 1971).  At the same time, it is also possible that extrinsic motivation 
can be a positive influence where the incentives resonate with an individual’s intrinsic motivation, 
thereby ‘crowding in’ her/his motivations (Gagné and Deci, 2005).   
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In this study, intrinsic motivation is defined as actions an individual undertakes for the enjoyment of 
the task itself, for public service motivation, or to ‘do good’.  This definition is drawn from the four 
ways that intrinsic motivation is defined in the literature: 
 In the first, individuals pursue actions out for enjoyment of the task itself, where they receive 
no apparent rewards except the act of doing the activity itself (Deci, 1972).   
 Second, there exists public service motivation, defined as an individual’s predisposition to 
respond to motives that are based in, or unique to, public institutions and organisations 
(Perry and Wise, 1990).   
 The third, pro-social motivation view is linked to the first and second definitions above, where 
individuals are motivated by helping others, which stems from both a) impure or action-
oriented altruism, where an individual receives a “warm glow” from contributing to the 
production of a good or service they care about, and b) pure or output-oriented altruism 
where the individual cares about the overall value of the good or service they contribute to 
(Andreoni, 1990, Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) draw on these 
definitions to suggest that intrinsic motivation comes from a combination of these two 
sources of altruism, so those who choose pro-social work (e.g. services for the infirm or 
homeless) do so because it makes them ‘feel good’ and because it is the ‘right thing’ to do 
(Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008).  
 The fourth definition draws on  Self-Determination Theory, which assumes that incentives will 
motivate individuals in a particular way but will crowd out intrinsic motivation over the long 
term (Deci and Ryan, 1980) and extend the analysis away from the dichotomisation of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in work (Gagné and Deci, 2005).  Instead, this view from Self-
Determination Theory sees financial incentives as a tool that can foster autonomous 
motivation in some while impeding it in others.  For example, in a SIB, according to Deci and 
Ryan (1980), external rewards (in the form of outcomes-related payments) would impair self-
esteem after an actor is incentivised to perform a task they would have done at no cost 
because their intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged and not appreciated.  This in turn 
makes the individual less motivated to maintain the same levels of effort, so they will reduce 
their efforts.  By contrast, using Gagne and Deci’s (2005) extended theorisation about Self-
Determination Theory, the introduction of outcomes-related payment through a SIB can have 
both positive and negative effects on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  This will vary with the 
design and implementation of the SIB and how workers respond to the financial rewards 
embedded in that scheme.   
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Extrinsic motivation refers to activities that are not interesting to the individual (i.e., not intrinsically 
motivating), for example, externally or internally imposed pressures that do not correspond to an 
individual’s goals, values, or preferences (Lohmann et al., 2016, Gagné and Deci, 2005).  
 
In neo-classical economics, it is assumed that individuals in the workforce are rational, resource-
maximising decision makers within principal-agent relationships, so one can expect that incentives 
(either directly tied to rewards or explicit financial ones) will motivate the agent to do the incentivised 
task, and not dilute the agent’s intrinsic motivation to do the rest of her/his job.  In the absence of 
extrinsic incentives, neo-classical economists assume that the agent’s efforts will be at the lowest 
possible level to maintain their job, so the application of incentives is a tool that can be used to induce 
desired behaviours in rational individuals (Prendergast, 1999).   This theorisation views incentives as 
necessary to motivate individuals, but this pessimistic view of staff motivation fails to consider other 
motivating forces for staff, such as altruism or a desire to serve the public good.  This sort of 
motivation is likely to be most prevalent in non-profit organisations. 
 
While the neo-classical economics perspective sees individuals as fundamentally responsive to 
incentives, the social psychology literature argues that the introduction of incentives and rewards can 
be counterproductive because actors will not maintain the same levels of effort for rewarded actions 
after they are removed.  This ultimately undermines intrinsic motivation and can lead to lower overall 
outputs or have adverse effects on behaviour (Benabou and Tirole, 2003).  According to  Self-
Determination Theory in social psychology, rewards can motivate individuals to act in a desired way, 
but tend to do so at the expense of intrinsic motivation, which can have negative effects on self-
esteem and self-determination in the longer-term (Deci et al., 1999).  For example, external rewards 
can impair self-esteem where an actor is incentivised to perform a task they would have done at no 
cost, as their intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged and not appreciated.  This in turn makes the 
individual less motivated to maintain the same levels of effort, so they will reduce their efforts.  
Likewise, external rewards can impair an individual’s sense of self-determination because the 
imposition of incentives will shift the individual’s sense of autonomy (referred to hereafter as their 
locus of control) away from the individual.  The individual will then be aware they are being compelled 
to act a certain way by external forces and will become disempowered, and not maintain the same 
level of intrinsic motivation they had before being externally coerced to act that way (Frey and Jegen, 
2001, Kreps, 1997).  When applied at the organisational level, it has been found that when 
organisations use rewards as a way to control behaviour, this often involves more surveillance, 
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evaluation and competition, all of which undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985, Kohn, 
1993).   
 
Standard neo-classical economic theorisation tends to place too much value on the power of 
payment-based measures, and places  an overreliance on the principal’s capacity to skillfully apply the 
price effect to their work and choices when exerting effort (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  Motivation 
crowding theory blends the economics and social psychology literature by positing that intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation should be viewed as a continuum of individual preferences along two poles.  In 
this model, preferences change under two conditions: a change in behaviour because of a change in 
preferences; or if there is a change in the nature of the performed task, task environment or the 
actor’s self-perception of the task.  For example, a change in preferences can be the result of a 
change in signals as to the nature of a task received by the agent.  This theorisation requires the 
following assumptions: that all interventions are external to the person under consideration and that 
these outside interventions  only crowd out, crowd in or leave intrinsic motivation unchanged 
(Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Frey and Jegen, 2001).  This theorisation is supported by Besley and 
Ghatak’s (2005) work that suggests agents’ preferences can be disrupted by the introduction of 
extrinsic incentives, which serve to alter their willingness to donate labour or for the ‘positive feelings’ 
associated with doing good as a compensating differential (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).  For example, 
the theory would suggest that teachers accept lower pay because they are intrinsically motivated by a 
commitment to public education as a social good, however, education policy reform has been 
dominated by closer surveillance and externally-imposed performance targets, which curtails self-
determination and discretion, thereby crowding out work morale (Frey and Jegen, 2001).   
 
More recent work argues that agents have a wider range of preferences and autonomy in how they 
respond to incentives than the motivation crowding model suggests.  One study provides an 
economic model in support of this.  This model about street level bureaucracies studies the 
implications of personnel policy on altruistic agents in a bureaucracy serving different types of clients, 
to understand how staff self-select into their roles, and about their allocation decisions toward 
clients.  It suggests that the use of incentives among altruistic agents is complicated, as agents have 
private knowledge about their own preferences relative to each client.  The interests of the principal 
and agent are not always aligned, so the agent can make decisions that are not necessarily in the 
principal’s interest which vary depending on their feelings of warmth or indifference to the client 
(Buurman and Dur, 2012).  This suggests that agents have a wide range of preferences that influence 
their motivation, such as how they select, form and foster relationships with clients beyond 
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performing actions solely for the feeling of ‘doing good,’ that are more complex than a diametrically 
opposed continuum.  
 
The current public health and economics literature on motivation uses an intensity approach to 
motivation.  The intensity approach is drawn from the psychology literature that defines work 
motivation as a “set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual’s 
being, to initiate work related behaviour and to determine its form, direction, intensity and duration” 
(Pinder, 2008 p.11).  As with the justification for performance-based funding schemes, it assumes that 
in the absence of incentives, health workers do not always perform as well as they could (Eichler, 
2006).  Recent literature argues that this conceptualisation of motivation crowding as dichotomous 
should instead reflect more recent theorisations of motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005).  Lohmann et 
al.(2016) use Self-Determination Theory to extend the theoretical work by challenging the 
dichotomisation of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005, Lohmann et al., 2016).  In 
this theorisation, Self-Determination Theory, as defined by Deci and Ryan (1980) is best thought of as 
an extension of the traditional approach in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are dichotomised 
(Gagné and Deci, 2005).  It builds on the motivation crowding theory work described above and the 
deficiencies of agency theory, which is critiqued for offering a largely descriptive and unspecific 
account of individual worker’s motivations.  It is not intended as a competing theory for agency 
theory but to complement it as an explanatory theory (Lohmann et al., 2016).   
 
Lohmann et al. (2016) draw on Gagne and Deci’s (2005) recent work on Self-Determination Theory to 
develop a theoretical framework that argues that incentives can have both positive and negative 
effects on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  This can occur in different ways that vary with the design 
and implementation of the financial incentive scheme and how workers respond (Gagné and Deci, 
2005, Lohmann et al., 2016).  For example, Lohmann et al.(2016) argues that it is helpful to 
complement intensity approaches with approaches that focus on motivation composition to improve 
our understanding of worker motivations because there exist varied internal and external drivers of 
performance (Lohmann et al., 2016, Henderson and Tulloch, 2008, Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008).  This 
theorisation argues that it is important to consider how individuals respond to incentives relative to 
their feelings of competence and autonomy (Gagné and Deci, 2005).  
 
 This thesis draws on Lohmann et al.’s (2016) framework because it is a novel approach to the impact 
of incentives on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation that suggests incentives can have both positive and 
negative effects that vary with the design and implementation of a financial incentive scheme.  The 
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framework assumes that the following factors affect how motivation is constructed: opportunities for 
participation and feedback, transparency, supervisor’s support for proactive behaviours, constructive 
supervision and performance feedback and the perceived contingency of rewards.  An individual’s 
sense of autonomy and competence in delivering a service under a particular incentive scheme is of 
interest to understanding how outcomes are introduced and under what circumstance they allow 
workers to achieve a sense of self-efficacy3 (Lohmann et al., 2016).  This thesis applies these 
theoretical approaches to motivation to contextualise and analyse the impact of the SIBs’ indirect 
incentives on motivation, thereby extending what is known about motivation crowding theory. 
 
2.5.  Organisation and behaviour of non-profits 
This section provides a summary of the economic and management literature on the organisation and 
behaviour of non-profits.  First, it explores how non-profit organisations differ from the public sector 
or for-profit firms. Second, there is a discussion about the impact of incentives on team behaviour to 
establish what gaps exist in the literature on the use of financial incentives in the non-profit sector.  
 
2.5.1.  Organisation of non-profits  
A non-profit organisation is not accountable to shareholders or owners with the right to access to its 
earnings (as revenues, dividends or profit), but may still earn surpluses, which can be reinvested, kept 
as endowment, or used for charitable purposes.  Non-profits differ from for profit firms as they are 
not profit-maximising (Hansmann, 1980).  However, if the non-profit’s organisational aim is to 
maximise their charitable impact, they may then seek to earn surpluses that can be distributed 
towards greater charitable spending.  In such a case, it is possible that the non-profit would seek to 
maximise profits, however the non-profit differs from a for profit firm because they do not distribute 
their profits to stakeholders.  Non-profits differ from for-profits and the public sector because they 
are able to tap into different revenue streams (Anheier, 2005).  However, unlike private firms, non-
profits are expected to ensure their programs and activities remain aligned with their organisational 
mission to ensure that new endeavours meet the right balance of contributions to organisational 
mission and economic viability (Anheier, 2005).  
 
                                                          
 
3 For example, “If nurses strongly value their patients’ comfort and health and understand the importance of 
doing their share of the unpleasant tasks for the patients’ well-being, the nurses would feel relatively 
autonomous while performing such tasks (e.g., bathing patients), even though the activities are not intrinsically 
interesting.” (Gagne and Deci 2005, p348) 
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There exists a wide range of non-profit organisations.  It is important to note the differences in 
organisational type within the sector to understand how they differ from one another and from 
private and public sector provision of goods and services.  In a mixed economy, non-profit firms are 
present in many industries, and funded by a mix of donations, government grants, public spending 
and private endowments.  They are also able to charge users for services in the same way that private 
for-profits do.  The funding structure, and sector that a non-profit operates in, can affect the 
organisation’s behaviour and mission.  For example, there exist donative non-profits (e.g. a charity 
focussed on combating cancer) led by donor interests, such as improving access to cancer screening, 
which can be less likely to face cost-cutting incentives if the services they provide are not cost-
effective or clinically effective.  The proliferation of types of non-profits has necessitated more 
nuanced economic theories specific to non-profit firms (Hansmann, 1980, Hansmann, 1987, Rose-
Ackerman, 1996) because these differences in funding sources, and level of commercial mindedness, 
hold implications for how incentives are communicated through organisations, relative to the goals 
and interests of the organisations. 
 
Early models of non-profit organisation and behaviour argued that non-profits were productively 
inefficient, defined as a failure to minimise costs due to an absence of ownership claims to residual 
earnings (Hansmann, 1980, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  It was also argued that non-profits arose 
because their comparative advantages outweighed the inefficiencies that accompanied the non-profit 
firm’s capacities, such as lack of access to capital and low incentives for cost minimisation (Hansmann, 
1980).  However, this theorisation neglected the complexity of non-profits, which, like the public 
sector, have many principals to serve. In recent years, the non-profit sector has become increasingly 
professionalised and subject to greater scrutiny by both government and public donors to improve 
both accountability and value for money (i.e. through demonstrable outcomes) with donated or grant 
funds.  This is part of a wider shift, beginning in the 1990s, for non-profit firms to become more 
commercially-oriented, blurring the distinction between the not for profit and for profit sector 
(Weisbrod, 1997, Weisbrod, 1998).   
 
In the UK, policymakers have focussed on the importance of scaling up social business and 
empowering local organisations to deliver social services (HM Government, 2011, HM Government, 
2014) through the third sector, as part of the ‘social economy’.  This has been intended to harness 
entrepreneurialism, for example, in health and social care, through the introduction of new providers 
to improve quality and foster innovation (Allen and Jones, 2011).  This is because non-profits, as part 
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of the third sector, may be more effective in mobilising ‘prosocial behaviour’ than for-profit private 
enterprises due to their ‘intrinsic’ social motivations (Bartlett, 2006, Allen et al., 2011). 
 
The long-term impact of external pressures for non-profit organisations to be more entrepreneurial 
and commercially minded by entering outcomes-based or performance-based funding contracts on 
organisational, team, and staff behaviours is unknown.   The evidence suggests that the effort 
required to satisfy multiple principals (i.e. to demonstrate accountability with donated funds and 
entrepreneurialism) can lead to the inefficient allocation of financial and human resources within the 
organisation (Foster and Bradach, 2005). The impact of these changes on behaviour in the sector are 
of interest as SIBs represent a new contractual arrangement, where non-profit actors enter 
performance-based funding relationships with investors.  The introduction of new contractual 
relationships can affect organisational behaviour in ways that can change the agency relationship and 
non-profit staff’s intrinsic motivation.   
 
It is relevant to examine the impact of shifting contractual structures and ownership models on non-
profit service delivery given the introduction of outcomes-focused service models.  At the managerial 
level, more research is needed to understand how managers prioritise new organisational priorities; 
for example, when asked to implement services with high financial benefit but low social value, which 
can be at odds with the organisational mission and their own personal motivations (Anheier, 2005).  
 
2.5.2.  Behaviour of individuals in non-profit organisations 
Non-profit organisations have criticised the focus on outcomes because it neglects their unique 
characteristics (e.g. autonomy from government and accountability to service users).  They have 
argued that this can undermine their social missions and independence from the public sector (Alcock 
et al., 2013, Harlock, 2014). There is some evidence that the use of non-profit organisations in the 
third sector, as delivery arms of the government can be suboptimal.  For example, potential 
drawbacks to contracting out service delivery are that the government has limited oversight over the 
non-profit organisations they work with (in comparison with public ownership and operation), which 
can be unstable due to a lack of asset ownership, inability to borrow funds, and lack of investment 
capacity (Mullins et al., 2011).  The use of non-profits for service delivery is also likely to come at the 
cost of fewer public providers and may exacerbate fragmentation in public services, rather than foster 
innovation (Allen and Jones, 2011).  
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The ethos and operational focus of a non-profit organisation is closely linked to its mission statement 
– a powerful motivational tool, similar to that of profit-maximisation in for-profit firms.  Non-profits 
tend to have well-defined, focussed mission statements that are expected to enable the recruitment 
of similar minded, self-selected people.  Their non-distributional structure and the absence of equity 
holders can demonstrate and reinforce staff’s belief in the organisation’s cause, while enabling 
managers to persuade staff to accept lower wages, relative to their skill set, especially if the revenue 
forgone could be allocated instead to organisational priorities (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  The mission 
statement provides a guiding principle that frames the organisation’s focus and area of work, and can 
draw in potential employees and volunteers whose views and values are aligned with the non-profit.  
It is therefore important that non-profits seek funding for work that is seen to complement and build 
on their organisational mission.  When non-profits embark on work that is perceived to detract from 
or be poorly aligned with their mission, there can be ‘mission drift,’ which is described as commercial 
activities a non-profit engages with that may divert time, resources, or energy away from the non-
profit’s mission (Weisbrod, 2004).  
 
Staff in non-profits are assumed to be motivated by altruism and/or willingness to do good in return 
for limited, or below market, compensation (Hansmann, 1980, Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  This 
willingness to trade off financial gain for the positive feelings derived from altruism or ‘doing good’ is 
used to explain the high degree of donated labour in the non-profit sector, where donative labour is 
defined by the assumption that there exists a negative relationship between intrinsic motivation and 
worker pay (Hansmann, 1980, Preston, 1989, Rose-Ackerman, 1996, Frank, 1996).   
 
In non-profit firms, we expect that intrinsically motivated team workers will be willing to donate some 
of their labour if their own motivations are satisfied by the ethos or mission of their organisation, so 
they will trade monetary compensation for intrinsic, relational or social incentives, which are 
expected to exert a positive impact on individuals (Borzaga and Tortia, 2006).  This trade-off is 
described as the compensating wage differential where workers in non-profit firms were willing to 
work for lower wages because they gained additional, intrinsic benefit from their work (Frank, 1996, 
Benz, 2005).  
 
While there are benefits to having staff that are highly motivated to do good, non-profits are also 
critiqued for organisational amateurism and low productivity. For example, non-profits are often 
dependent on donations and may not be able to expend funds on staff training and development.  
This can result in sub-optimal human resource skill sets or attrition to other industries so the non-
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profit will be unable to maintain necessary staffing levels.  For example, a non-profit can rely instead 
on volunteers and amateurs who are poorly prepared for the work they are asked to do (Anheier, 
2005).  One economic model studies self-selection by managers into the public and private sector in a 
perfectly competitive market.  It  argues that the non-profit and public service sectors are stunted 
because they are unable to attract or retain the ‘best and brightest’ because of low remuneration or 
sufficiently talented teammates, as the most promising staff choose the private sector (Delfgaauw 
and Dur, 2010).   It is likely that workers in the non-profit sector are motivated by a desire to do good, 
serve the public, or contribute to a certain cause because the sector is assumed to rely on high levels 
of donative labour.  This thesis seeks to understand whether staff’s intrinsic motivation to select into, 
and accept lower compensation in, the non-profit sector can be eroded by the introduction of 
financial incentives. 
 
2.6.  Framework for analysis 
Several key concepts arise from the theoretical literature review presented above, and have been 
organised into two categories that will form my framework for analysis in considering what impact a 
SIB contract can have on the behaviours of managers and staff in non-profit providers.  Firstly, there is 
provider motivation for staff in the non-profits, which includes the factors that drive an individual to 
work in a pro-social organisation, such as intrinsic motivation and professional ethos.  Second, there 
are the extrinsic rewards found in a SIB contract, such as the introduction of an outcomes-based 
contract or performance management.  Given that workers in non-profits are expected to be 
intrinsically motivated and serve multiple principals, the introduction of a SIB contract has the 
potential to change the agency relationship or erode intrinsic motivation.  Combined, these two 
categories may have a direct effect on the behaviours that determine outcomes for service recipients 
(See Figure 2.1 below for a diagram of how these form a framework for analysis). 
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Figure 2.1 Framework for analysis 
 
 
To deliver a SIB contract for a target population, commissioners rely on non-profit providers to deliver 
the intervention, with the expectation that non-profit staff are highly motivated to do the right thing 
for their clients.  Motivation in teams is aided by the factors related to positive perceptions of the 
indirect incentives from management, such as opportunities for participation and feedback, or the 
perceived importance of the rewards themselves (Lohmann et al., 2016).  It is expected that workers 
that self-select into the non-profit sector exert effort for several reasons, for example, a desire to help 
others, altruism, or intrinsic motivation.  As a result, they will trade monetary compensation for 
intrinsic, relational or social reasons if their own motivations are satisfied by the ethos or mission of 
their organisation (Borzaga and Tortia, 2006).   
 
At the organisational level, decisions about the non-profit’s priorities are shaped by broader 
environmental and market factors that affect the third sector.  For example, how widely p4p financing 
mechanisms are applied, and whether, or how much, the sector will embrace the use of outcomes-
based contracting.  The uptake of such broad incentives will determine the options that a non-profit 
organisation and its managerial hierarchy can use to influence front line staff behaviour in meeting its 
organisational goals (i.e. in this case, the outcomes associated with the SIB contract).  Multitask 
principal-agent theory, also identifies issues arising from such a situation, for example, where agents 
have multiple tasks, it is likely to be difficult for a principal to motivate the agent to act in a particular 
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way (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  Figure 2.1 (above) provides a framework for analysis to 
understand the impact that direct and indirect incentives in a SIB contract may have on staff 
motivation and behaviour.   
 
In a SIB, the agent (here the non-profit) has multiple principals, including its client group, 
commissioners and investors, and this can create tensions or conflicts of interest for the agent, since 
what is best for the investor is not necessarily what is best for the client group or the commissioners. 
As agents in a SIB contract are responsible to multiple principals (such as the investors or 
commissioners) who can have divergent interests because of the introduction of direct and indirect 
financial incentives.  Hypothetically, the agency relationship can change in the following ways:   
 
Firstly, if the agent acts to serve the self-interests of other principals (such as the investors, by 
maximising profit generation for investors), they might work harder on behalf of those clients that will 
maximise revenue in the form of higher outcome payments.  This problem is known as ‘risk-selection’ 
or ‘creaming’ and can arise to the detriment of service provision to the wider client population. 
 
Second, if the organisation receives financial incentives for meeting specific targets or outcomes, their 
managerial techniques might change through the introduction of sanctions or rewards for front line 
staff to induce them to behave in particular ways.  For example, managers might use non-monetary 
sanctions or rewards on front line staff to motivate them to meet, or prioritise certain targets over 
the well-being of others (for instance, encouraging staff to ‘park’ more difficult clients or disciplinary 
measures if staff do not willingly ‘park’ clients).  In this case, agents may disproportionately allocate 
their time and effort to ensuring that some individuals generate outcomes payments so they are 
unable to dedicate time to other group members, resulting in a suboptimal allocation of resources 
and services for the wider target population.  
 
Third, agents may take advantage of asymmetries of information between principals and exaggerate 
or falsify outcomes data, to meet targets.  This problem is known as ‘gaming’, and can arise as a 
mechanism that enables the agent to exert effort on members of the target population who need 
support but are least likely to generate outcomes (e.g. falsified outcomes allow front-line staff to 
spend more time with more complex clients who are less likely to generate outcomes payments).  It 
may also lead staff to exert less effort overall since they have generated a fixed amount of money for 
the organisation, or appear to be very productive and efficient in meeting outcomes. This will be 
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detrimental to the quality and volume of services rendered to the target population, particularly if 
equity in service provision is important to the commissioner. 
 
To mitigate the potential for such adverse behaviours, it is the responsibility of the managerial staff to 
set out clear expectations for service provision.  While these are not intrinsically good practices for 
non-profits faced with financial incentives, from the perspective of the public commissioner 
interested in improving public services in an equitable way, it is important to consider whether, and to 
what extent, it is possible to ensure that that equal efforts are made for all members of the group, or 
that personnel appraisals are not based on how many outcomes an individual staff member 
generated. These management practices can result in positive behaviours, such as ‘crowding in’ of 
motivation, greater autonomy for front line staff, or a more personalised approach for group 
members, while increasing awareness of the outcomes targets and improving service pathways.  This 
also raises the issue of which principal is ultimately responsible for trying to balance the various 
combinations of goals that could be pursued, such as the balance between outcome maximization 
overall and ensuring equity of outcomes between different types of clients.  This is ultimately the role 
of the public commissioner to consider due to the government’s ultimate responsibility to deliver 
public services. 
 
Although non-profits are expected to behave altruistically, there is the potential that an organisation 
will prioritise revenue generation and condone adverse behaviour, given the possibility of changes to 
the principal-agent relationship outlined above.  It is also possible that the whole organisation will 
knowingly promote adverse behaviour to maximise revenue generation.  In the case of low 
performance, it is possible that there can be investor sanctions on the organisation, which can 
encourage the use of sharper managerial techniques to push middle managers and front-line staff to 
meet outcomes. There is the potential that these techniques will result in mission drift and a 
distortion of the values that drew staff to the organisation.  This can also lead to staff attrition or an 
erosion of staff’s intrinsic motivation in their work or the motivating factors that drew them into the 
non-profit sector. This framework for analysis will be tested in the empirical chapters (Chapters 6-8) 
of this thesis to examine the impact of direct and indirect financial incentives on two non-profit 
organisations.   
 
2.7.  Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the potential issues arising from the application of performance-based funding 
schemes on staff in public and non-profit organisations.   The theoretical work indicates that the 
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introduction of incentives for public services is complex and it can be difficult for a principal to design 
an optimal set of rewards or encouragement to promote effort.  As a result, the introduction of 
incentives has the potential to change the principal-agent relationship.  The theoretical literature also 
suggests that incentives have the potential to ‘crowd-in’ or ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation among 
workers in ways that depend on the degree of autonomy and competency that staff have in delivering 
a service under an incentive scheme.  These theoretical concepts are of interest because staff in non-
profits are seen to self-select into the non-profit sector for altruistic reasons or because they are 
motivated to do good.  These motivations may be eroded in the case of mission drift or introduction 
of direct and indirect financial incentives for non-profit staff.  It is important to consider what the 
impact of changes in the design and structure of public services contracts for non-profit staff will be.  
The next chapter builds on these theoretical insights by exploring the empirical evidence related to 
performance-based funding and motivation in public services to assess the degree to which the 
evidence supports or disagrees with the theoretical propositions outlined in this chapter and the 
framework for analysis presented in the preceding section. 
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 Empirical literature review 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Performance-based financing policy instruments, such as p4p, are intended to incentivise 
improvements in quality, efficiency, and productivity, while maintaining a degree of equity in the 
distribution of time and resources for individuals, in service delivery.  These are criticised for their 
focus on process measures, targets and the implications for equity, rather than outcomes.  Moreover, 
there are unanswered questions as to whether the incentives posed by these schemes lead to 
adverse behaviour, unintended consequences or erode staff motivation.  SIBs and outcomes-based 
contracts have been developed to ameliorate the shortcomings of p4p and PbR by focusing on long-
term outcomes rather than intermediate measures of performance.  However, there remain 
questions as to whether these mechanisms enhance service quality, lead to efficiency gains, or 
improve outcomes.  This chapter sets out the empirical evidence about the impact of direct and 
indirect financial and non-financial incentives in public and non-profit organisations delivering public 
services on organisational, team, and individual behaviour and motivations4 to establish what is 
known and what remains to be answered about the application of such incentives.   
 
The theoretical literature presented in Chapter 2 (Theoretical background) suggests that incentives 
have the potential to change the principal-agent relationship and to affect intrinsic motivation among 
workers in the non-profit sector.  The framework for analysis (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7) views 
organisational, team and individual behaviours as influenced by the impact of direct and indirect 
incentives alongside, and potentially in opposition to, providers’ motivations.  This chapter seeks to 
explore the empirical evidence related to these two areas of the theoretical literature.  It first reviews 
the empirical evidence on p4p schemes, specifically the application of p4p on the teams and 
organisation and its impact on provider behaviour and unintended consequences.  Second, this 
chapter reviews the evidence on the impact of direct and indirect incentives on intrinsic motivation to 
establish what is known about motivation-crowding.   
 
                                                          
 
4 While the focus of this study is on the impact of direct and indirect financial incentives on two non-profit organisations, 
there is limited empirical research about the use of p4p and outcomes-based contracts for non-profits delivering public 
services.  This chapter looks at the application of p4p-related incentives on any organisation delivering public services 
through a performance-related funding scheme to reflect the breadth of empirical evidence available about the impact of 
p4p on provider behaviour.   
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3.2.  Methods for identifying literature 
Two strands of empirical literature were examined to explore the impact of direct and indirect 
financial incentives on non-profit providers.  These were: 1) impact of p4p programs; 2) impact of 
performance-based funding on intrinsic motivation.  
 
Searches on the empirical literature were conducted to answer the following questions: 
- What is known about the impact of p4p programs on organisations, in teams and on provider 
behaviour? 
- What is known about the impact of incentives on intrinsic motivation? 
 
A scoping review of the literature was undertaken using online databases in November of 2016.  This 
was an iterative process conducted throughout the research study.  A final search was conducted in 
January of 2018 to include all relevant papers.   
 
Impact of p4p programs 
A formal search strategy was used to identify empirical evidence about the impact of p4p programs 
on team and provider behaviour.  A search of the published peer-reviewed, academic literature used 
bibliographic databases EconLit, Cochrane, IBSS, PubMed and Google Scholar.  The searches were 
conducted in English and used the following search terms ("pay for performance" OR "p4p" OR 
"performance pay" OR "payment by results") AND (team* OR staff OR behavio?r* OR manager* OR 
adverse OR gaming OR organi?ation* OR non?profit). Searches were performed in English for all dates 
without restrictions.  Titles and abstracts were scanned for inclusion in this review.  Studies about 
performance-based financial rewards were excluded if they did not relate to the public services 
delivery, the impact on team or organisational behaviour, or on the potential for unintended 
behaviours.  Other relevant references were hand-sourced from already identified publications.  The 
review included any study type if the study included empirical data on the impact of p4p on team and 
organisations.   
 
Impact of performance funding on intrinsic motivation 
A formal search strategy was used to identify the literature on motivations and the non-profit or 
public sector.  Searches were conducted on Google Scholar and EconLit for “intrinsic motivation” and 
(“pay for performance,” “p4p,” “payment by results,” “PbR,” “results-based financing,”) or “results-
based financing” or “RBF”.  Papers were excluded if they did not include empirical data.  References 
were hand sourced from the reference lists of identified publications.  A small number of research 
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projects were identified that generated most of the literature on the impact of p4p incentives on 
motivations.  These authors’ publication lists were hand searched for relevant work about the impact 
of incentives on motivation. 
 
3.3.  Impact of p4p programs  
The use of performance-based financing policy instruments, such as p4p, are intended to incentivise 
improvements in quality, efficiency, and productivity, while maintaining equity for individuals 
receiving services.  The application of performance funding to public services delivery emerged in the 
late 1990s in the United States, where p4p was introduced to improve quality in health care and to 
introduce incentives for cost-containment.  The application of this financing mechanism to public 
sector service delivery has grown across the UK and other OECD countries, notably in health care and 
education.  In health care, new financial incentives have emerged to incentivise improvements in 
quality, efficiency, and productivity in service delivery using a range of provider payment mechanisms, 
such as performance-based contracting or p4p variants (Cashin et al., 2014).  In education, 
performance pay has been introduced to improve student performance or teaching quality, using 
performance related pay for individual teachers based on supervisor evaluations, work portfolios, and 
student test scores (e.g. incentives using standardised testing to gauge teacher performance) 
(Podgursky and Springer, 2007, Marsden and Belfield, 2006).  There is mixed evidence from the health 
sector about the effectiveness of such schemes in demonstrating better quality or productivity 
(Lagarde et al., 2013, Van Herck et al., 2011), and a lack of robust quasi-experimental evaluations of 
such schemes (Flodgren et al., 2011, Scott et al., 2011).  Despite the mixed evidence, the UK Central 
Government has sought to increase the number of p4p and outcomes-based contracts in public 
services (HM Government, 2011, HM Government, 2017).  Given the government’s commitment to 
increasing the use of such payment schemes when contracting out services to the third sector, it is 
important to consider the evidence about the impact of p4p schemes. 
 
This section examines what is known about the impact of p4p on organisations, in teams, and on 
provider behaviour when applied to public services delivery through non-profit (and public 
organisations where relevant).  This section first presents what is known about p4p schemes 
specifically using outcomes-based contracts.  This is followed by findings about the impact of p4p on 
organisations and teams in the non-profit (and, where applicable, the public) sector.  Lastly, the 
evidence from studies that examine the impact of unintended behaviours is discussed.   
 
44 
 
3.3.1.  Impact of outcomes-based p4p programs  
The UK government has encouraged the use of outcomes-based measures via novel, and atypical, 
financing mechanisms like SIBs to allow service providers greater personalisation, freedom, and 
creativity in service delivery than traditional financing mechanisms, such as process measures or block 
contracts (Conservative Party, 2015, HM Government, 2011, HM Government, 2017).  There is limited 
empirical evidence about p4p schemes using outcomes-based contracting.  This section considers the 
limited evidence on schemes where the majority of the funding was dependent on outcomes 
achieved or where outcomes-based p4p schemes put varying proportions of funding at risk.  
 
There are a small number of studies looking at the impact of outcomes-based contracts on at the 
provider level and on the individuals, teams, or organisations involved.  One study of the UK’s national 
‘payment by results for drugs recovery pilot’ finds that the introduction of payments for outcomes 
had a significant negative impact on successful treatment completion rates.  The authors interpret 
this finding to suggest that it was possible that providers chose not to discharge service users because 
of the high proportion of outcome rewards associated with individuals not re-presenting for 
treatment in the 12 months following discharge.  It appeared that providers were foregoing the high 
outcome rewards for successful completion to mitigate the risk of individuals re-presenting after 
discharge because outcomes payments would be withdrawn or clawed back if users re-presented 
within 12 months (Mason et al., 2015).   
 
Two UK studies examine a DWP employment scheme targeted at the long-term unemployed.  This 
was an outcomes-based PbR scheme in which providers had substantial flexibility over their 
interventions, and payments were adjusted for case complexity or difficulty.  In this scheme, the 
target population were placed in one of nine claimant groups linked to the average difficulty of 
securing employment for these individuals, to mitigate the risk of ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’.  The bulk 
of these service delivery contracts were held by the private sector (35), with the remainder held by 
third sector organisations (3) and public sector organisations (2).  The use of private sector providers 
is noteworthy because they can have different organisational priorities that affect how they respond 
to financial incentives.  These studies find that there is evidence that the use of differential group 
payments did not mitigate the incentives for creaming and parking within the scheme for service 
providers due to cost-pressures and ambitious performance targets (Carter and Whitworth, 2015, 
Rees et al., 2014).  The evidence from outcomes-based p4p schemes suggest that the existing 
schemes are unable to mitigate unintended consequences when process-driven service delivery 
specifications are removed.   
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3.3.2.  Impact of p4p on teams and organisations in the public and non-profit sector 
There is limited evidence about the organisational level impact of financial incentives on how service 
delivery organisations respond to, implement, and transmit p4p objectives to their staff.  There are a 
small number of relevant studies about service delivery among public providers of health care.  An 
ethnographic study of two general practices explores the impact of the UK Quality and Outcomes 
Framework5 (QOF), a p4p scheme to increase funding in general practice through payments for 
meeting outcome measures based on clinical quality.  In both sites, GPs and practice managers used 
surveillance techniques to measure progress towards the performance indicators incentivised by the 
QOF. There were reports of free-riding by some GPs.  Some staff felt it was an additional 
administrative burden while others saw it as conflicting with their duty to spend time with clients. 
Nurses appreciated that the incentives scheme provided them with more autonomy and 
responsibility in certain disease areas. Doctors and nurses were positive about the incentive scheme 
though some reported a sense of constant surveillance (McDonald et al., 2007).   
 
A qualitative study of a p4p scheme in Tanzania where the senior staff in health facilities were able to 
distribute performance-based rewards to workers at their discretion finds that the dispersal of p4p 
bonuses varied between sites.  In some health facilities, it exacerbated divisions between medical and 
non-medical staff (e.g., in one site nurses and security guards received the same bonus), with some 
staff arguing it should be a flat rate while others felt medical staff deserved more.  The authors 
suggest that p4p impeded team-working and collaboration because the p4p-related bonuses were 
perceived as arbitrary (Chimhutu et al., 2016).  While this study explores perceptions of incentives 
and rewards among staff within organisations, it is unclear how managers communicated the 
incentives and rewards to their staff, and how that affected their approach to service delivery and 
organisational behaviour.  A quantitative study from Denmark explores whether p4p payments in 
secondary care are more effective at the hospital or department level. This study finds that 
departmental level rewards lead to higher performance than organisation level ones (Kristensen et 
al., 2016).  This paper is unique in its focus on how rewards are distributed in an organisation as a 
recent review of p4p schemes in OECD countries finds that there were few evaluations of p4p 
                                                          
 
5 The UK Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a p4p scheme that was introduced in 2004 to all general 
practices in the UK NHS.  It provides performance-related payments that can constitute up to a quarter of 
general practice incomes.  Rewards are available for meeting outcome measures based on clinical quality for 
over 100 publicly reported clinical indicators in three domains: chronic disease management, organisation of 
care and patient experience (Ryan et al., 2016). RYAN, A. M., KRINSKY, S., KONTOPANTELIS, E. & DORAN, T. 
2016. Long-term evidence for the effect of pay-for-performance in primary care on mortality in the UK: a 
population study. The Lancet, 388, 268-274. 
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schemes outside Anglo-countries and despite growing theoretical interest in the impact of p4p on 
organisations, most studies focused on the impact at the team-level (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).   
 
A small number of studies explore the impact of incentives on managerial and team behaviour in the 
private and public sector.  One private sector study examines the impact of managerial performance 
pay on worker productivity and finds that managers selected high ability workers for incentivised 
tasks and that those least able are less likely to be selected into employment (Bandiera et al., 2007).  
Another study of a performance-related pay pilot in two teams in the public sector finds that 
individual productivity rose alongside the reallocation of more efficient workers towards incentivised 
tasks.  Interestingly, this study rewarded the team managers of each team differently with one team 
manager able to gain a larger reward while the other shared the bonus equally with the team.  This 
provided the opportunity to assess whether higher managerial rewards resulted in more strategic 
managerial behaviours, but this study finds that the second team was successful in hitting its targets, 
while the first team was not.  This finding was interpreted to suggest that team managers were not 
just motivated by financial incentives but by other intrinsic factors such as career concerns (Burgess et 
al., 2010).   
 
Another study from the private sector examines the development of cooperative norms among 
workers under a relative incentives scheme and found that individuals quickly learn how to cooperate 
in the workplace to be less productive as a group.  These collaborative norms enabled staff to be less 
productive than in a counterfactual group where workers were paid on piece rates (Bandiera et al., 
2005).  This study has direct relevance for the experimental literature on public good and common 
pool resources but holds limited relevance for the current study as to how non-profit workers 
respond to indirect financial incentives.  Another study from the UK’s public sector examines the 
impact of team-based performance pay and finds that the schemes were more effective in small 
teams than large ones.  The authors interpret these findings to suggest that peer monitoring and 
improved information flows can overcome issues associated with free riding in small groups, unlike in 
large groups or multi-office locations where staff were too dispersed.  The focus here on public sector 
workers is more relevant to this research because such schemes focus on cooperation across workers, 
rather than the use of relative performance evaluation to promote competition between workers as 
seen in the private sector (Burgess et al., 2017).   
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These studies were all in settings with performance related pay in team settings and do not provide 
further insight about how managers and teams work under a scheme of indirect financial incentives.  
This is a weakness of the existing literature on p4p and merits further consideration. 
 
3.3.3.  Evidence about unintended consequences 
The empirical evidence on unintended behaviour is limited.  Findings about adverse behaviour or 
gaming often emerged from qualitative interviews conducted as part of wider mixed-methods 
projects.  There are no studies that explicitly sought to understand this using qualitative methods and 
no clear qualitative or quantitative methods by which unintended behaviours, such as creaming or 
gaming, could be assessed.  This is difficult to assess given the complexity pf public services delivery, 
for example, in health care, it is hard to assess the impact of incentives due to the difficulties in 
attributing individual efforts to a particular outcome for a patient receiving care from multiple teams 
or individuals, or to identify the potential for unintended behaviour that could be detrimental to team 
performance (Eijkenaar et al., 2013).   
 
A number of studies examine about how teams respond to the introduction of incentives.  The 
empirical evidence suggests that where cooperation in a team is viewed as important for overall 
organisational objectives, rewarding individual behaviour has the potential to detract from team 
performance because it raises the marginal cost of effort to cooperate.  Conversely, team-based 
rewards can result in ‘free riding’ and regression to the mean for high performers.  Reviews of the 
literature find that where tournament style incentives are introduced, there is the risk of 
disincentivising low performers and rewarding high performers for work they are already doing, 
unless relative improvements are targeted (Burgess and Ratto, 2003, Petersen et al., 2006).  
 
There is evidence from studies of p4p schemes in the UK that non-incentivised aspects of 
performance are likely to change after the introduction of a p4p program.  Evidence from one study 
of the QOF in primary care in the English NHS  finds improvements in quality of care for incentivised 
tasks occurred at the expense of non-incentivised aspects of care (Doran et al., 2011). In one study, 
the QOF provides a natural experiment to test the impact of a p4p scheme on hospital admissions for 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions, defined as conditions where admissions can be prevented or 
reduced through high quality primary care.  This study examines emergency admissions after the 
introduction of the QOF in England and finds a decrease among the incentivised conditions compared 
to those that were not subject to incentives.  The authors suggest that the decrease was larger than 
expected and might be explained by unmeasured impacts on quality of care that were outside of the 
directly incentivised activities (Harrison et al., 2014).  Some studies, by contrast find some evidence 
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that incentivised activities have positive spillover effects for non-incentivised activities for the 
targeted groups and there is no evidence of effort diversion.  This suggests that QOF incentives 
induced providers to improve quality (Sutton et al., 2010).  Another study finds that the introduction 
of the QOF is associated with a change in smoking behaviour, though it was not possible to know 
which intervention associated with the QOF induced this change (i.e., it could have been due to 
advice related to BMI, alcohol consumption or smoking cessation) (Fichera et al., 2016).  Evidence 
from the QOF suggests that the non-incentivised aspects of performance suffered in some areas while 
there were positive spillovers in other areas after the introduction of the primary care p4p scheme. 
 
The evidence is mixed about the effects on non-incentivised measures after the introduction of a p4p 
scheme in secondary care.  The Advancing Quality (AQ) p4p scheme6 in the northwest of England 
used a ‘tournament’ system7 of incentives where only the top two quartiles of participants in a p4p 
scheme received bonuses.  Rewards were paid to the hospital and then allocated to the clinical teams 
whose work earned the bonus and allocated to improving clinical care not personal income.  AQ 
provided a natural experiment about a p4p scheme in one geographic area (24 hospitals in northwest 
England) and data from the rest of England served as a comparator.  One study tests whether the 
incentives in the AQ scheme affected mortality and finds a 1.3% decrease in combined mortality in 
three of the five incentivised conditions.  The authors note that a range of quality improvement 
strategies, new data collection systems and shared-learning events for participating staff 
accompanied the tournament scheme.  These contextual factors are important because they may 
have muted the competitive aspects of the scheme, and may explain the apparent success of the p4p 
scheme (Sutton et al., 2012). A subsequent analysis of this data using different quantitative methods 
finds that that AQ scheme was associated with no significant reductions in mortality for incentivised 
conditions while there was a significant increase in mortality for non-incentivised conditions (Kreif et 
al., 2016).  An extended analysis of the longer-term effects of AQ over an additional 24 months finds 
                                                          
 
6 The AQ used a composite quality score based on 28 quality measures in five clinical areas to rank the 24 
participating hospitals.  At the end of the first year, the first and second quartile of performers received a 
financial bonus of 4% or 2% of their revenue paid to the hospital.  In the next six months, additional bonuses 
were available for reaching a set threshold of performance and for top improvements on their performance in 
the first year (Sutton et al., 2012, Kreif et al., 2016).   
7 A ‘tournament’ incentive scheme is based on tournament theory, where a group of agents compete for a fixed 
set of prizes.  For example, in a tournament scheme, there can be fixed performance rewards of £100 for the 
top performer, £50 for the runner up, and no rewards for the remaining participants.  In such a scheme, the 
highest performers are rewarded while low performers receive no rewards.  It is expected that agents will exert 
more effort to increase the chance that they will win the larger (e.g. a financial prize), or better (e.g. a 
promotion) prize.  Unlike other p4p incentive schemes that are rewarded on absolute achievement or targets, in 
a tournament, the emphasis is on relative performance compared to others in the group (Prendergast, 1999).   
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that these reductions in mortality in the first 18 months were not maintained over the next 24 
months, compared to the rest of the country.  It is possible that this was a result of spillover effects; 
for example, this study finds that the largest reductions in mortality were for conditions also treated 
by specialists that were treating conditions linked to incentivised conditions (Kristensen et al., 2014).  
These findings are echoed in a systematic review about p4p in primary and hospital care that finds 
that non-incentivised aspects of performance were likely to suffer or fall after the introduction of a 
p4p program  (Van Herck et al., 2010).   
 
Limited evidence exists about the effect of p4p interventions on organisations and how they are 
related to unintended behaviours.  These studies vary in scope and focus on unintended behaviours, 
but find a wide range of provider responses to performance targets and incentives that merit further 
consideration in relation to the use of outcomes-based rewards for public services.  A study of the 
impact of the star rating system for hospital performance in England finds that the scheme used a 
combination of measurement and audit practices to gauge performance.  This system of regulation by 
targets can lead to a myopic focus on targets, and indicates to hospitals that what is measured is 
more important than what is not (Bevan and Hood, 2006a).  In a system characterised as one of 
‘targets and terror,’ providers resorted to perverse behaviour to avoid sanctions for failure (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006b).  A study from Tanzania finds that the introduction of a p4p scheme to improve 
antenatal care and increase the number of deliveries in hospital led to unintended behaviour.  In this 
scheme, there was evidence that health care workers used coercive strategies, such as the threat of 
fines, to urge women to deliver in hospital (Chimhutu et al., 2014).    
 
The evidence is mixed about the extent and prevalence of gaming or unintended behaviours in p4p 
schemes.  A systematic review of the literature finds limited evidence of gaming with just three 
studies that specifically sought to measure gaming.  This is attributed in part to limited contexts for 
comparison to prove gaming and the authors suggest that more research is needed to monitor 
unintended consequences (Van Herck et al., 2010).   One study examines whether a change in 
performance related pay had an impact on GP behaviour in Scotland.  It finds that lower-performing 
GPs improved significantly more than their high-performing counterparts.  The authors suggest that 
performance-based incentive payments are effective in motivating health care providers that 
received the payment but the presence of incentives may have led GPs to manipulate patient records 
in ways that were hard to identify despite auditing (Feng et al., 2014).  A mixed-methods study using 
administrative data and focus groups with providers and users finds no proof of parking or creaming 
but the authors strongly suggest that there was anecdotal evidence from the focus groups to indicate 
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it occurred (Rees et al., 2014).  A mixed-methods study of a p4p scheme in Rwanda finds that gaming 
was regularly reported (e.g., not distributing the last box of a medicine to avoid a stock out) and that 
informants distorted information associated with the p4p incentives through the arbitrary or 
retrospective filling out of forms. Staff felt justified in doing so because they lacked the time to do 
everything properly and also suggested that the payers (here, the Rwandan government and 
multilateral funders) instigated the gaming process by setting an indicator as the basis for payment 
that was seen to be inappropriate, ambiguous, or not useful (Kalk et al., 2010). 
 
A small number of studies used routine administrative data or large scale RCTs to assess the degree to 
which gaming or selection occurred. Two such studies from the UK examine the use of exception 
reporting in the QOF.  The QOF rewarded providers for the number of eligible patients that reported 
receiving appropriate treatment, but practices were able to exclude patients from their denominators 
or numerators as not suitable for treatment.  One study finds no evidence that there was purposeful 
exclusion of patients to game the p4p scheme (Doran et al., 2008) while another finds evidence of 
gaming through exception reporting (Gravelle et al., 2010).  Another study examines a DWP work 
program that used a PbR payment scheme where payments were based on job outcome results for 
the long-term unemployed in the UK. This study explicitly sought to explore gaming in the PbR 
scheme for employment and found that ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ were widespread and systematically 
embedded within the DWP’s Work Programme, despite efforts to mitigate for this through different 
maximum possible payments for nine subgroups in the PbR scheme.  These adverse behaviours were 
driven by a combination of intense cost pressures and ambitious performance targets (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015). While these studies relied on quantitative data analysis, they are notable in that 
they explicitly sought to explore the ‘black box’ of outcomes based commissioning and ascertain 
whether gaming behaviours were occurring.  
 
This section identifies a dearth of research about the use of outcomes-based contracts and the impact 
of p4p incentives in organisations, and few studies that examine the unintended consequences of 
behaviours.  The evidence suggests that the assumption that direct or indirect financial or non-
financial incentives deliver better services belies the evidence, that p4p is not a ‘magic bullet’ due to 
the complexity of public services delivery. This thesis is thus able to contribute to the gap in the 
literature about the impact of incentives in organisations and how they are communicated through 
organisations.   
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3.4.  Impact of incentives on motivation 
An objective of this study is to explore the impact of incentives on the intrinsic motivation of 
managers and front line staff.  Intrinsic motivation is of interest to this thesis because p4p (and its 
variants) are often used as a policy mechanism to increase worker motivation through the 
introduction of individual, team-based, or workplace rewards for meeting pre-specified performance 
rewards.  When service provision is contracted out to the non-profit sector, commissioners rely on 
non-profit providers to deliver the intervention, with the expectation that the organisation and its 
staff are highly motivated to do the right thing for their clients.  From the service delivery perspective, 
these p4p-based initiatives are often reliant on the efforts of workers in the non-for profit or public 
sectors whose motivations are of interest to this thesis.   
 
This literature review finds that the introduction of incentives could be met by both positive and 
negative behavioural responses by staff at the individual, team, and facility level.  These findings 
suggest that crowding in or out can have both positive and negative implications for motivation 
depending on the design and implementation process of the p4p scheme (Lohmann et al., 2016).  The 
empirical literature on the impact of p4p on intrinsic motivation is mixed with evidence of both 
‘crowding in’ and the ‘crowding out’ of provider motivations and suggests that there is a continuum of 
motivation crowding behaviours that vary according to what was incentivised, the size of the reward, 
and how rewards are distributed between individuals, teams or facilities.   
 
This review finds a small but growing body of literature about how the introduction of performance-
based funding initiatives affects the intrinsic motivation of workers in the public or non-profit sector.  
These papers comprise a mixture of experimental economic or psychological laboratory experiments 
and field-based experiments from the education sector and health workers in Low-Middle Income 
Countries (LMICs).  The lab-based experiments are of limited relevance to this thesis’s focus on the 
impact of financial incentives on the motivation of workers in real life.  There are a small number of 
studies from high-income settings that looks at workers in the public sector, such as the impact of p4p 
schemes on general practitioners in the UK, France and Spain (Berdud et al., 2016, Gené-Badia et al., 
2007, Sicsic et al., 2012, McDonald et al., 2007, Allen et al., 2017), and the impact of incentives for 
public sector workers in the UK or in US local government (Burgess et al., 2010, Stazyk, 2013).  A 
review of the impact of incentives in public services has argued that incentive programs add to 
intrinsic motivation but does not fully account for how the individual’s intrinsic motivation affects 
her/his utility function in work (Karlsberg Schaffer et al., 2015).  Most empirical evidence was 
published in the last three years and emanated from research conducted in LMICs, notably out of a 
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series of Performance-Based Financing or Results-Based Financing initiatives aimed at improving 
maternal health outcomes8 (Bhatnagar and George, 2016).  While there is some evidence from LMIC 
settings, this is of limited relevance as the study context differs substantially.  The findings of these 
studies are presented here because they concern the implementation of outcomes or target-driven 
contracting and because of the very small number of studies specifically looking at the impact of p4p 
schemes on staff motivation.   
 
These limitations further support the need for a qualitative approach to understanding intrinsic 
motivation and how, and in what ways, direct and indirect financial incentives may have crowded in 
or crowded out non-profits’ staff’s intrinsic motivation. 
 
Most studies define motivation using Deci (1971) or Deci and Ryan’s (1985) definition of Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) (Deci, 1971, Deci and Ryan, 1985).  A small number of studies situate 
their analysis in behavioural economics9, described  as a new field that challenges the simple view of 
economic behaviour in which price is the only tool available to incentivise economic agents (Berdud et 
al., 2016).  
 
                                                          
 
8 In pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals to improve Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) by 
2015, the World Bank (alongside other national development banks in Norway and Belgium, among others), 
funded a series of Performance-Based Financing (PBF), or Results-Based Financing (RBF) schemes aimed at 
improving MNCH indicators by increasing institutional deliveries, antenatal care and childhood vaccinations.  
The scheme was first introduced in Rwanda and soon followed by similar schemes in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria and Afghanistan.  There were also variants of these projects in Benin, Sierra Leone and Malawi.  These 
were all robust field experiments using randomised design, extensive household surveys, validated patient 
experience surveys, and qualitative interviews with staff and users to assess how successful these PBF schemes 
were in improving worker experience and patient outcomes.  These projects sought to ascertain the impact of 
the PBF schemes on health worker motivation and job satisfaction and so provided an extensive contribution of 
fourteen papers based on actual field experiments to this area of the literature.   
9 The field of behavioural economics is expanding rapidly to explore the potential impact of ‘nudges’ to shape 
and personalise policy interventions to incentivise actors to take up actions for their own benefit.  This field is 
dominated by social psychology and economics and uses lab-based experiments to yield insights about how 
individuals make decisions or respond to incentives.  This emerging field uses a mix of statistical methods and 
lab-based experiments to understand whether incentives can improve motivation (e.g. one study found that 
incentives can improve performance but higher reward thresholds can distract individuals from the task and 
result in a decrease in performance (Ariely et al., 2009)).  This area of the literature is not explored because of 
its reliance on lab-based experiments while this study is about the impact of a highly powered financial 
incentives scheme on two non-profit providers delivering public services in a real life setting.  It is worth noting 
that behavioural economics has the potential to develop insights about how best to structure or design an 
incentive scheme to mitigate the potential for perverse behaviour where output is hard to measure or individual 
incentives might be prohibitively costly to implement over an extended period of time.  This may be relevant for 
future research about optimal design or the size of incentives. 
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There is no agreed measure for motivation across the empirical evidence.  There is no established 
methodology for measuring or assessing intrinsic motivation.  Several studies have developed their 
own measures (Lohmann et al., 2017, Borghi et al., 2017); draw on Franco et al.’s (2002) motivational 
outcomes framework (Franco et al., 2002, Bhatnagar and George, 2016); have job satisfaction as a 
proxy for motivation (Allen et al., 2017); or rely on a contextualised ‘Dictator’ game, an economic 
game10 to develop a proxy for participant’s motivation (Ashraf et al., 2014).  There are no established 
quantitative or qualitative methodologies for the assessment or measurement of intrinsic motivation 
in the literature.   
 
Some evidence reveals that the introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives had a positive 
effect on workers and ‘crowded in’ their motivation to perform their work.  This ‘crowding in’ of 
intrinsic motivation is found in several studies from LMICs that looked at the impact of incentives on 
health workers.  There is evidence that incentives ‘awakened’ or increased staff’s motivation 
(Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Kalk et al., 2010, Paul et al., 2014); encouraged mission-matching 
between staff and the organisation (Serra et al., 2011); or staff were more excited to come to work 
following the introduction of incentives (Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Kalk et al., 2010).  There is 
evidence that p4p schemes improved organisational behaviour, team working and cohesion due to 
team-based rewards (Kalk et al., 2010, Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Paul et al., 2014).  Staff 
responded positively to both salary bonuses and facility funding (Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Kalk et 
al., 2010, Shen et al., 2017).  Staff reported that the incentives increased the degree of supervision 
received in a positive way, by providing greater responsibility or clarity over roles and professional 
expectations due to the introduction of clear performance indicators and a quality score checklist for 
staff (Bertone et al., 2016); greater autonomy from local government in that staff were able to buy 
drugs or fund repairs in the health clinic as needed with p4p funds, rather than applying for approval 
through local government (Bhatnagar and George, 2016) and encouraged professional goal-setting or 
enabled greater autonomy (Gené-Badia et al., 2007).  One study finds that the p4p scheme 
                                                          
 
10 A contextualised ‘dictator’ game is a tool in economics and social psychology to test how much money a 
research participant is willing to share with another.  This study examined a public health initiative in Zambia 
where hairdressers and barbers received training about HIV prevention and agreed to sell condoms in their 
shops.  At the training, a contextualised dictator game was used to develop a proxy for agent’s willingness to 
donate to a charity providing HIV/AIDs care in Zambia.  The hairdressers and barbers received a payment for 
attending the training and were told that there was an additional payment (<25% of the fee for attending) that 
they could keep or donate to a local charity providing care to HIV/AIDs patients.  The amount donated was used 
as a proxy for agent's motivation to the cause and used in conjunction with asset- and socio-economic status 
measures in analysis because willingness to donate might have been correlated with wealth. The donation in the 
experimental game predicted sales and reassured authors that social pressure to donate did not mask actual 
differences in motivations.    
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introduced a feedback loop that informed managers about front line staff needs that was seen to 
make them more supportive of staff (Kalk et al., 2010).  Other studies find a reduction in reports of 
adverse behaviour among staff enrolled in the p4p schemes, such as decreased absenteeism and 
attrition (Paul et al., 2014, Kalk et al., 2010, Shen et al., 2017).  There is evidence of a potentially 
positive impact of incentives for public sector workers such as variable pay where motivation or 
altruism is low, such as in the UK Treasury among workers in tax collection or in US local government 
(Burgess et al., 2010, Stazyk, 2013).   
 
There is evidence that non-financial incentives can ‘crowd in’ motivation.  For example, a field 
experiment where hairstylists in Zambia were recruited to educate clients about condom use 
contrasts the impact on motivation of four groups receiving higher and lower financial incentives, 
non-financial incentives of a poster with stamps for sales made and a control group that received no 
rewards.  This study finds that non-financial incentives were more effective at eliciting effort from 
participants to sell condoms to their clients.  Agents offered non-financial rewards exerted more 
effort than those offered the higher or lower financial incentives (a 90% or 10% commission on 
suggested retail price).  The authors find that the non-financial incentives succeeded in eliciting 
greater effort by leveraging the agents' pro social motivation by facilitating social comparisons among 
agents because the non-financial incentive’s visual rewards (a poster with stars for sales achieved) 
were clearly visible to third parties (Ashraf et al., 2014).  A qualitative study from Spain about 
physician attitudes towards financial incentives finds that doctors wanted more autonomy and 
preferred that future incentive schemes use non-financial rewards, such as investing in aspects that 
fostered intrinsic motivation, such as staff development or training, as being more effective than 
monetary incentives (Berdud et al., 2016).  
 
There is evidence that the financial incentives in some p4p schemes ‘crowded out’ intrinsic 
motivation over the course of the p4p intervention.  There is also evidence that, for a smaller subset 
of staff in the studies cited above, they ‘crowded out’ intrinsic motivation.  While staff were largely 
positive about the impact of incentives on their motivations, some staff reported that the 
introduction of monitoring and evaluation demands could detract from time spent with service users, 
held the potential to introduce ethical ‘conflicts,’ or could have a negative impact on work-life balance 
(Bhatnagar and George, 2016).  There is evidence from one qualitative study that crowding out could 
occur following the imposition of incentives among doctors in Spain.  This study finds that the 
incentives had the potential to change the nature of their work.  For example, doctors reported 
seeing patients out of hours as something they would do to alleviate waiting time pressures for the 
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public good, but it could be transformed into a task they only did in return for financial compensation 
after the introduction of incentives (Berdud et al., 2016).  In Tanzania, the introduction of incentives 
led to tensions between hospital units that received financial rewards and those that did not, and 
could erode motivation for those that did not receive rewards (Chimhutu et al., 2016, Chimhutu et al., 
2014).  In some cases, the evidence finds that design and implementation issues contribute to the 
‘crowding out’ of intrinsic motivation.  One study from Zambia reveals that remuneration alone could 
not adequately address two causes of demotivation: high workload and low staffing levels (Shen et al., 
2017).  In another study from Nigeria, motivation was crowded out among staff that felt that the p4p 
scheme had targeted rewards too strongly at medical doctors rather than other health workers 
(Bhatnagar and George, 2016).  The empirical studies described above were set in low-middle income 
countries so were of limited relevance to the case studies but were included in this review because of 
the dearth of studies on motivation among public and non-profit workers. 
 
There are also mixed findings about motivation from studies that found incentives had little or no 
impact.  One study in Sierra Leone reported mixed results on the potential of performance bonuses to 
the facility as both a motivator and de-motivator for the staff and team (Bertone et al., 2016).  Several 
studies set in LMICs find no evidence that p4p increased motivation when job satisfaction is used as a 
proxy for motivation (Anselmi et al., 2017, Engineer et al., 2016, Shen et al., 2017).  In one study of 
individual-level p4p rewards for maternal, neonatal and child health in Tanzania, this may have been 
due to the limited sample size of the health survey or invalid measurement of underlying motivation 
construct (job satisfaction as proxy), however, it is also possible that staff responded to incentives by 
changing their behaviour without experiencing greater job satisfaction (Anselmi et al., 2017).  Another 
study finds that job satisfaction is unrelated to the rate of p4p exposure in the UK QOF scheme (Allen 
et al., 2017).  An ethnographic study from the UK’s QOF finds that there was no impact on doctor 
motivation while nurses were concerned about the impact of greater surveillance on their internal 
motivation (McDonald et al., 2007).  This is echoed by a study among doctors and nurses in Spain 
(Gené-Badia et al., 2007).  A study about US public servants finds low evidence of a crowding out 
effect on public service motivation and job satisfaction (Stazyk, 2013).   
 
The literature on the impact of incentives on individuals’ motivation features a number of laboratory 
based experiments from the economics and psychology literature that challenge the assumption that 
incentives improve motivation.  One study conducts a number of lab experiments in India and among 
students at US universities that provided subjects with different levels of incentives to examine 
whether an increase in contingent pay led to an improvement or decline in performance.  It finds that 
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high incentives can increase motivation but beyond some threshold level, it appears that raising 
incentives can increase motivation to supra-optimal levels and distract from the task itself, described 
as ‘choking under pressure,’ and result in a decrease in performance (Ariely et al., 2009).  One study 
uses lab-based real effort experiments to test the effect of different remuneration schemes in a multi-
tasking environment among physicians.  It finds that there was heterogeneity in behaviour, with 
intrinsically motivated being least sensitive to financial incentives, defined here as those motivated to 
work well and achieve high quality outputs in the absence of an form of incentive) (Lagarde and 
Blaauw, 2017).  These studies challenge the assumption that incentives positively affect motivation 
and improve performance in all circumstances with all subjects.  
 
This review of the empirical literature about motivation has identified a gap in the literature about the 
impact of p4p on the intrinsic motivation of workers delivering public services in the public and non-
profit sectors.  Given that workers in the public and voluntary sectors are assumed to be intrinsically 
motivated and serve multiple principals, there is the potential that financial incentives erode 
motivation by incentivising actions previously done at no cost, for reasons such as personal 
satisfaction, job fulfillment, or career concern.  This review finds that little is known about how 
workers in the non-profit or public sectors in high income countries respond to incentives and the 
impact that this has on their intrinsic motivation.   
 
3.5.  Conclusion  
This chapter provides an overview of the evidence about the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
introducing p4p to non-profit organisations delivering public services to demonstrate that the 
introduction of external rewards to non-profits necessitates careful examination as they have the 
potential to change the principal-agent relationship and erode intrinsic motivation.  This is of interest 
from both a research and policy perspective because non-profit organisations and the third sector are 
being pressed to diversify their revenue streams through large service provision contracts, or to raise 
income through outcomes-based contracts.  The introduction of indirect financial incentives (i.e. no 
financial rewards for staff delivering the SIB intervention) necessitates further examination of the 
impact that p4p contracts will have on the behaviour of workers in non-profit organisations. SIBs and 
outcomes-based contracts were developed to ameliorate the shortcomings of p4p by focusing on 
long-term outcomes rather than intermediate measures of performance.  There remain questions as 
to whether these mechanisms improved service quality or led to efficiency gains or improved 
outcomes.  Moreover, there remain unanswered questions as to whether the incentives posed by 
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these schemes leads to adverse behaviour, unintended consequences or erode staff motivation.  This 
thesis seeks to address these questions. 
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 Methods 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter discusses how the study design was developed to address the aims and objectives of this 
study.  It discusses the potential limitations of the research design, fieldwork, and where applicable, 
how these shortcomings are mitigated.  This chapter describes the selection of the comparative case 
study approach and the implications of this study design choice.  This chapter opens by setting out 
the study design, process for securing access to the case studies, the methods for gathering data, the 
data analysis process, and details of ethical approval.  This chapter closes by critically reflecting on the 
methods used and how my role as a researcher may have impacted the data collection process and 
analysis of research findings. 
 
4.2.  The research questions 
The aim of this study, as explained in Chapter 1, is to examine the impact of incentives on non-profit 
organisations, specifically how incentives affect organisational behaviours and the motivation of staff 
members. The introduction of direct financial incentives for each case study organisation and indirect 
financial incentives for its front line workers necessitates further examination about the impact of p4p 
contracts on the behaviour of workers in non-profit organisations. This project will address the 
research question: “How do workers in non-profit organisations respond to the use of direct and 
indirect outcome-related financial incentives?”  
 
This research focuses on the impact of the incentives generated under two different SIB contracts on 
organisational, team, and staff behaviour at the managerial and front-line level.  This research 
addresses these objectives through comparative case studies in two non-profits delivering services 
through a SIB with the same outcomes goals.  
 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To understand how new financial incentives are articulated and prioritised within a non-profit 
organisation’s management and how this affects the way that the organisation plans and 
delivers services. 
2. To understand how senior and team managers respond to extrinsic incentives and the impact 
that these have on staff structure, task allocation, service delivery, performance management 
and monitoring outcomes. 
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3. To understand how team managers and front line staff perceive incentives and outcome-
related rewards driven by the SIB, and how this affects their attitudes toward outcome 
targets.  
4. To understand the impact that incentives have on the intrinsic motivation of team managers 
and front line staff. 
 
4.3.  Comparative case study approach  
The research was conducted using a case study approach.  This was selected as the most suitable 
form of research strategy for its ability to explore and learn from events and situations in real life.  
Case studies have been used across many academic disciplines as a research strategy for increasing 
understanding because they can be used to explain, and draw out learnings from, real life situations 
(Fraser and Mays, 2018).   
 
 The case study approach is considered a comprehensive research strategy that includes the logic of 
design, techniques for data collection and specific approaches for data analysis that enable the 
investigator to conduct an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context” (Yin, 2013 p.8).  This method allows for the use of a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, which was of especial importance where an investigator relies on multiple 
sources of evidence, to ask “how” or “why” questions, when they have little to no control over a 
contemporary set of events they are studying (Yin, 2013).  An advantage of the case study approach is 
that they allow the researcher to examine real life situations, and in the process of doing so, to test 
preconceptions and early assumptions about their research.  This process of learning from proximity 
to real-life situations allows the researcher to draw out more discoveries and analytical insights 
through extensive analysis of a small group than is possible through the statistical analysis of large 
groups (Flyvbjerg, 2006).   
 
A comparative case study approach was selected as the research design to generate insights about 
the impact of different approaches to implementing a SIB on two organisations (hereafter referred to 
as Provider A and Provider B).  The comparative approach allowed me to seek out and contextualise 
emerging patterns in how staff responded to the extrinsic rewards created by the SIB at a larger scale.  
The two projects were suitable for comparative research on the impact of p4p contracts on non-profit 
organisations because the two organisations were working with the same target population and faced 
the same outcomes (albeit with different contractual arrangements and at different payment tariffs, 
which will be described at length in Chapter 5, Study Setting), but varied in how they operationalised 
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the SIBs.  The comparative case study approach allowed me to examine how non-profit organisations 
respond to the introduction of direct financial incentives for the organisation to repay SIB investors, 
and on the impact of indirect financial incentives for provider behaviour.  
 
4.4.  Selection of case studies 
The selection of the case studies was determined by the Department of Health’s (known as the 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) from 2018) Evaluation of the SIB Trailblazers in Health 
and Social Care through which this thesis was funded (described below in Section 4.4.1. Link to 
concurrent evaluation).  
 
One provider received a grant from the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) and the Department 
of Health (now DHSC) in 2012 to fund the development of a SIB Trailblazer in Health and Social Care.  
This provider was required to take part in an ongoing Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU) 
evaluation examining the impact of the SIB as a funding mechanism for public services in health and 
social care.  A second provider was identified as an ideal candidate for comparative research with one 
of the Trailblazer initiatives, since the contractual arrangements of the two SIB models differed (in 
that one used a Special Purpose Vehicle11 (SPV) to isolate the risk to the organisation while the other 
was a direct p4p contract with the commissioner, these differences are detailed in Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.1. Contractual structures). Both initiatives used the same outcome metrics (reduction in rough 
sleeping, move to settled accommodation, reconnection to home country, employment or training, 
and reduction in unplanned A&E admissions).  The second provider agreed to take part in the PIRU 
evaluation about the impact of the new financing mechanism and to contribute to this thesis about 
how the organisation operated and responded to the outcomes-based contract.   
 
4.4.1.  Link to concurrent evaluation 
This thesis contributed a stand-alone component to a larger project, An Evaluation of Social Impact 
Bonds in Health and Social Care, led by Prof. Nicholas Mays and Dr. Mylene Lagarde, funded through 
PIRU at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM).  I was a named co-investigator 
for the second phase of this project (2016-2017) and contributed to the research design of the 
extended evaluation.  I led the data collection and was responsible for the analysis of all data from the 
                                                          
 
11 In a SIB contract, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a subsidiary company or entity that is established for the 
acquisition and financing of the SIB intervention.  SPVs are used to deliver the project without putting the larger 
organisation at risk in the event of failure.  The SPV can also receive investments and make outcome payments 
(Fraser et al.2018b).  
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comparative case studies presented in this thesis.  This evaluation followed nine ‘Trailblazer’ projects 
that received funds from the Department of Health’s SEIF in 2013 to explore the potential 
applications of SIBs in health and social care, to assess whether the SIB funding mechanism facilitated 
better outcomes than other forms of financing, and at what cost.  In the first phase of this project 
(January 2014-December 2015), the evaluation focused on the early development and negotiation 
processes associated with finalizing a SIB contract.  This phase of the research consisted of interviews 
with commissioners, managers and investors involved in the nine Trailblazer projects.  In the second 
phase of the project (January 2016-June 2017), the evaluation looked at the five Trailblazers that 
proceeded to the operational stage.  This component of the evaluation looked at SIB implementation 
and the experiences of the first group(s) of SIB intervention recipients, and wherever it was possible, a 
comparable counterfactual group to understand if, and how, SIBs facilitated better outcomes than 
other forms of financing and at what cost (where data were available).  The main research questions 
guiding that research are distinct from those used in this thesis. 
 
4.4.2.  Contribution of the candidate to this thesis 
One of the nine Trailblazer projects was selected for inclusion in this thesis.  It was identified in early 
2014 as suitable for a distinct research degree project.  My research questions are distinct from the 
broader DHSC-funded evaluation that examined whether SIBs, as a financing mechanism, delivered 
better outcomes than more conventional types of financing, at what cost and why.  Instead, this 
thesis aims to understand how the introduction of new outcome-related incentives affected staff in 
non-profit organisations.  To ensure that all findings from the proposed project were independent of 
the wider research team’s work, I was responsible for all data collection in this study site from the 
outset, led all fieldwork in the site, and conducted all subsequent analyses related to the interview 
and contractual data generated from this site. 
 
This research project ran in conjunction with a DHSC-funded Evaluation of Social Impact Bonds in 
Health and Social care.  All costs were covered by this research project, as data were collected during 
fieldwork that directly contributed to Objective 3 of that research project, which was to qualitatively 
understand the impact of introducing SIB funding on service providers. 
 
4.5.   Securing access to the case studies 
As detailed above, one provider was a DHSC SIB ‘Trailblazer’ and so was required to take part in the 
ongoing PIRU evaluation examining the impact of the SIB as a funding mechanism for public services 
in health and social care.  In May of 2015, the second provider team agreed to take part in the 
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evaluation about the impact of the new financing mechanism and this PhD research on how the 
organisation operated and responded to the outcomes-based contract.  All interviewees in Providers 
A and B were made aware that the interview data would be used for both the PIRU evaluation and 
this PhD research. 
 
4.6.  Timeframe of research 
The interviews were held in conjunction with the concurrent evaluation of nine SIB ‘Trailblazers’ in 
Health and Social Care in England.  The data presented in this thesis were drawn from a larger, 
concurrent project launched in January 2014.  Fieldwork for this project commenced at the midpoint 
of the intervention in June 2014. This enabled the collection of interview data over the last 18 months 
of the intervention with the senior leadership team, middle and team managers, front line staff, and 
where applicable, volunteers with the SIBs in both organisations.  The fieldwork was conducted in 
three waves with managers and front line staff  from July to September 2015, June to October of 
2016, and September to October of 2017.  See Table 4.1. in the following section for details of 
interviews held as part of this research. 
 
4.7.  Research methods  
The methodology in this research project can be summarised in the following ways: 
 
This research is suited to qualitative methods because this study is concerned with peering inside the 
‘black box’ of two outcomes-based p4p contracts where all financial rewards accrued to the 
organisation. Quantitative studies draw on existing datasets or collect data that is predefined and 
categorised as variables to test hypotheses about the research questions.  These methods are 
intended to draw out ‘statistical generalisations’ about population groups.  By contrast, qualitative 
studies enable the researcher to explore flexible data generation methods in terms of sampling and 
determining what appropriate units for analysis will be.  Qualitative research seeks richness and 
nuance to understand and shed light on the experiences of interview subjects rather than seeing 
divergent or different accounts as issues that require standardisation (Mason, 2006, Fraser and Mays, 
2018).   
 
Qualitative methods have been described as a particularly useful tool for economics when applied to 
complex issues such as financial incentives.  For example, in health economics, they allow the 
researcher to obtain information that contributes to the development of economic models and 
theory that reflect the complexity of the health economy informed by the views and preferences of 
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individuals in that economy (Coast and Jackson, 2017).  This research draws on economic theory 
about agency, incentives and motivation to inform an analysis about the impact of a complex 
financing arrangement throughout an organisational hierarchy that accounts for the views and 
experiences of individuals within the case studies. 
 
The literature review reveals a gap in the empirical evidence about how direct and indirect financial 
incentives are interpreted and communicated through organisations from senior to team managers 
and to front line staff members tasked with service delivery. There are a small number of quantitative 
studies of the impact of incentives in the private and public sectors but these schemes involved 
individual-level performance based financial rewards (Bandiera et al., 2005, Bandiera et al., 2007, 
Burgess et al., 2010).  This thesis contributes to this gap in the literature through a case study 
approach that enables a comparison of the impact of indirect financial incentives on two 
organisations.  Qualitative methods can offer a strategy to understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
about real life circumstances, for example why interventions differ in one setting from another (Fraser 
and Mays, 2018, Yin, 2013).  The qualitative approach allows for the collection of data that can be 
used to increase and inform understandings about the how and why of social phenomena (Pope et 
al., 2006, Mays and Pope, 2006). 
 
The qualitative research methods enabled the collection of rich staff accounts about their experiences 
of working in complex public services.  Qualitative interviews with individuals enable the use of ‘why’ 
questions to gain information and understanding about past events with informants that cannot be 
obtained through methods involving observation (Owen-Smith and Coast, 2017).  These nuanced 
accounts allowed for a comparison of provider behaviour throughout the organisational hierarchy in 
the context of indirect incentives (where the staff had not stood to benefit financially from the 
financial incentives placed on the organisations they worked for).  This also enables an understanding 
of the impact of incentives on staff behaviour, responses to managerial instructions, and their own 
motivations. 
 
The rest of this section describes the methods used to gather data relating to the contractual 
documents and interviews in the case studies. 
 
4.7.1.  Contractual documents  
The comparative case study approach enabled the use of documentary analysis (e.g. contractual 
documents) and interview data.  The comparative approach to analysis allows me to draw out the 
similarities and differences in organisational behaviour and to try to understand the effects of 
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different contexts.  The  use of two sites helps to minimise chance associations in the analysis process 
as the project findings are based on a wider range of data (Eisenhardt, 1989).    
 
To understand the allocation of risk between parties, and the incentives embedded in the SIB 
contract, it was important to view the contractual documents related to the SIB sites.  With the 
support of the Department of Health (now DHSC), formal letters were sent to the lead commissioner 
and providers in both sites that explained how a central research objective of the evaluation was to 
describe and characterise the signed SIB contracts in order to unpack the implications for the 
different parties.  See Appendix 1 for the letter.  On behalf of the research team, I liaised with the 
commissioner and providers to obtain the relevant contracts.  I assured all parties that the disclosed 
contracts and documents were treated with the strictest regard for confidentiality and anonymity and 
that all findings were subject to an internal quality assurance processes prior to any dissemination of 
any findings. 
 
The following documents were obtained in regard to the SIB in Provider A: i) the commissioner to 
provider contract, ii) the investor to provider contract, ii) the investor to provider loan agreements.  
For the SIB in Provider B, the commissioner to SPV contract was also obtained.  It proved impossible 
to obtain any documents associated with the loan agreements, set up of the SPV and its legal 
obligations or any investor to provider contracts.  There was substantial organisational flux within 
Provider B’s senior leadership team and it proved impossible, despite many attempts, to contact 
successive finance directors to obtain the contractual documents.  During this time, a senior director 
made every effort over several months to find the contractual documents but was only able to locate 
the commissioner to SPV document.  After this attempt failed, I was referred to the members of the 
finance department and the bids department to find the contracts.  Ultimately this attempt proved 
impossible and staff speculated that the files had either been lost due to staff turnover or destroyed 
in the move to a new office.   
   
4.7.2.  Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews 
In qualitative research interviews12, the researcher takes on a role that can be analogous to a driver, 
                                                          
 
12 Research interviews can be categorised in three ways: structured, semi-structured, and in-depth.  Owen-
Smith and Coast (2017) identify semi-structured and in-depth as being qualitative in approach.  Structured 
interviews are described as being restricted in nature, such as the use of a formal questionnaire or survey that 
seeks to address specific hypotheses (Owen-Smith and Coast, 2017, DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). 
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where they are responsible for the direction of the conversation and for steering it back on course as 
needed.  They are held with individuals who have more information about the topic because it relates 
to their life experiences when compared to the researcher (Owen-Smith and Coast, 2017).  Semi-
structured interviews tend to be scheduled in advance at a specific time with specific, pre-determined 
questions that can include questions that emerge through the dialogue with informants (DiCicco‐
Bloom and Crabtree, 2006).  Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to take a directive 
approach using topic guide prompts that relate to specific research questions.  This enables some 
comparability between interviews (Owen-Smith and Coast, 2017).  All interviews followed the topic 
guide which was informed by the framework for analysis and research questions guiding this study.  
The topic guide was loosely structured so that there was the opportunity to follow issues of interest 
as required with informants.  See Appendix 2 for the interview topic guide. 
 
Recruitment 
Fieldwork in Provider A comprised interviews (18 interviews with 15 individuals) with two members of 
the senior leadership team, a middle manager, three team managers, seven front line staff and two 
team volunteers held between June 2015-February 2016.  Fieldwork in Provider B (15 interviews with 
11 individuals) comprised interviews with one member of the senior leadership team, two team 
managers, and eight front line staff members.  See Table 4.1. for details of interviews with study 
subjects at the close of fieldwork.  The interviews with front line workers included those 
subcontracted from partner organisations.   
 
Sampling 
I purposively sampled informants to include viewpoints from staff at all levels of the organisational 
hierarchy in both service providers.  This enabled the collection of a wide range of opinions from the 
managerial level from both managers and front line staff.  Interviews were held with members of the 
senior leadership, middle and team management, front line staff, administrators and volunteers.   
 
The data collection was determined by the evaluation’s timeframe for fieldwork and ethical approval.  
The fieldwork began in the Summer of 2014, at which point the SIBs had been operational for 18 
months so it was not possible to collect data over the life of the SIBs.  Instead, qualitative interviews 
were held with all staff working in both SIBs sites at regular intervals over the remaining 18 months of 
the contract period, with follow up interviews held again toward the end of the fourth year.  In total, I 
interviewed most staff involved with the SIB in both organisations.  This included senior management 
staff at both organisations (3), all managerial staff involved in the development and administration of 
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the SIBs (6), most front-line staff (7 of 8 potential interviewees at Provider A and 8 of 11 potential 
interviews at Provider B) and all volunteers (2) involved in the two organisations.  
 
Every effort was made to contact staff who were no longer in their original roles with the 
organisation.  This was successful with former front-line staff who were happy to speak over the 
phone or in person as they were still engaged in the same sector or in similar work (e.g. those who 
had since been promoted or sought other opportunities at similar organisations).  Of the five front-
line staff members that were not interviewed, two were living abroad, two relocated within the 
country, and one returned to education.  While any additional interviews may have been helpful, they 
were not required to validate emerging patterns in the data and in reaching data saturation. 
 
It proved more difficult to contact senior leadership team members who had since left the 
organisation in Provider B.  For example, the Chief Executive and Finance Director in Provider B were 
not available to speak as they had since retired.  There was organisational flux within Provider B’s 
senior leadership team and it was impossible, despite many attempts, to contact successive finance 
directors.  Despite these challenges, there were several reasons to be confident in the findings: first, 
the senior leadership representative interviewed had spearheaded the decision to bid for the SIB and 
oversaw all staffing and service delivery decisions; and second, there were no changes in the SIB’s 
management during the intervention so there was consistency in the narrative presented to the 
interviewer by informants in this provider.  
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Table 4.1  Interviews with study subjects at close of data collection period 
Roles Number of interviews 
Provider A   
Senior and middle managers 5  
Team managers 3 
Front line staff  8  
Volunteers  2 
Total 18 
Provider B  
 
Senior and middle managers 1 
Middle managers 4  
Front line staff 10  
Total 15 
Total interviews in A and B 33 
 
Approach to consent 
Interviews were held with managers and staff at the two case study providers.  All staff were 
presented with an information sheet and consent form about this project (see Appendices 3 and 4 for 
participant information sheet and consent form).  Interview participants were assured of anonymity 
about any information shared. All participants were told that they could withdraw from the study at 
any time without specifying why.  Interviews were held in their workplace so any risks to the 
individual were minimised.   
 
4.8.  Analysis of data 
Analysis of contract data 
The contracts between the public commissioner and service provider were used to inform my 
understanding of the risks and incentives embedded in the SIB contracts.  The contracts were 
analysed with attention to the relationships between the different parties involved in the SIB contract 
and to the allocation of risk between the different parties.  The findings were discussed and 
interrogated with my supervisor.  This enabled a fuller understanding of the specific risks and benefits 
that each organisation faced to understand the potential implications that any differences in 
contractual structure may, or may not, have had for the implementation and delivery of the SIB for 
each organisation.  
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The findings from the contract analyses in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1. were shared with key 
stakeholders in the SIB contracts to validate the analysis and to ensure accuracy in my interpretation 
of the contracts.  
 
Analysis of interview data 
Interviews were transcribed and data was analysed using NVivo 10 (QSR International, 2012).  The 
interview data was analysed thematically.  First level coding was based on the themes from this 
project’s research questions, interview topic guide (see Appendix 2 for the interview topic guide), and 
key issues in the framework for analysis presented in Chapter 2 that drew on the theoretical literature 
about SIBs, intrinsic motivation, p4p, and non-profit organisations and their behaviours.  This was 
intended to account for what was explicable and for unexpected new themes that emerged in the 
data.  I discussed initial emerging themes with my supervisor, advisory board members and wider SIB 
evaluation research team to assist in the identification of main themes and sub-themes for analysis.  
Throughout the data analysis process, I was careful to reflect on and refine the main themes and sub-
themes for analysis to ensure they were representative of the information found in the data.  The 
positive and negative findings about provider behaviour, such as reported instances of unintended 
behaviours or gaming, were scrutinised with my supervisor, advisory board members, and the wider 
SIB evaluation research team to qualify my findings.  I sought out deviant cases in the analysis to find 
data that contradicted my interpretation and explanation of the data.  This process did not result in 
odd data that caused me to reconsider my findings.  This process did challenge and enable me to 
incorporate the data about unintended behaviours and gaming into a more refined synthesis of the 
research findings, as it related to provider behaviour and motivations (Pope et al., 2006).  The findings 
were organised thematically based on how they corresponded to the themes highlighted in the 
framework for analysis. 
 
4.9.  Ethical approval 
The fieldwork for this research project was conducted as part of an ongoing contribution to the 
Evaluation of Social Impact Bonds in Health and Social Care.  Ethical approval to undertake that study 
was granted by the research ethics committee of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM ethics reference 7227, 18 February 2014).   
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4.10. Comments on methods used 
It is necessary to reflect on the role of reflexivity throughout the research process to consider how the 
researcher’s own prior experiences and assumptions can influence a study (Pope et al., 2006, Mays 
and Pope, 2006).  This section considers the potential influences of my experiences on this study with 
attention to epistemology and ontology and issues of triangulation, validity and replicability.  It then 
briefly discusses alternate theoretical approaches.  This section closes with a reflection on my 
previous work experiences and training in other academic disciplines.   
 
Ontology is defined as the nature of reality (Lincoln, 1992).  Epistemology concerns the theory and 
nature of knowledge, specifically the relationship between the researcher and what is known (Lincoln, 
1992).  This is an area that has received little attention in (health) economics because the nature of 
the discipline assumes that there is a universally shared view of reality (Coast and Jackson, 2017) 
because explanatory research in this field is often made within the orthodox neoclassical framework 
(Coast, 1999).  This view assumes that there is a single knowable reality, and that research can help to 
expand what is known about this reality.  The economist assumes that predictions, based on 
inferences and deductive processes can be tested and therefore become the basis for explanations.  
The focus on testing hypotheses to eliminate biases is expected to shed light on how a single reality 
works (Coast and Jackson, 2017).  This view of the world has the potential to be reductive and 
neglects an engagement with how the world of human behaviour is understood and experienced.  
Qualitative methods are more appropriate for this study because it enables the collection of intra-
organisational data to develop a rich understanding about how individuals respond to the 
introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives in an actual real life situation.  The use of 
qualitative methods in economic analysis enables a researcher to capture contextual information 
about individual’s preferences and views that influence their behaviours and motivations and forms 
the basis of explanation. 
 
The comparative case studies may be seen to limit the generalisability of these findings but a strength 
of this research is that it sought to develop a rich account of the experiences of two non-profit 
organisations with direct and indirect financial incentives.  It is also important to note that this 
research gained analytical generalisability using the insights from the theoretical literature.  This is 
consistent with recent methodological work that argues qualitative methods are particularly useful 
when applied to complex issues such as financial incentives.  This is because they allow the researcher 
to obtain information that contributes to the development of economic models and theory that 
reflects the complexity of the economy, informed by the views and preferences of individuals in that 
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economy (Coast and Jackson, 2017).  Further, this has the potential to mitigate criticisms of 
economics as a discipline that provides models and theories for debate but ultimately fails to account 
for, or understand, actual human behaviour (Hunter, 1993).  
 
A key issue in qualitative research is the triangulation of data, whereby the researcher looks for 
patterns to develop or corroborate their interpretation of the data.  This is a useful analytical tool to 
compare the data from two different sources (such as interviews with the same group at different 
sites) to encourage a more reflexive analysis of the data (Pope et al., 2006).  In this study, 
triangulation enabled comparisons of the findings between groups in the two sites (i.e. comparing 
data from team managers in Provider A with their counterparts in Provider B) to seek similarities and 
differences where they occurred.  Where the accounts diverged, this enabled me to question my 
assumptions about the divergent accounts.  While there is some controversy about this as 
methodological tool when used to test the truth or validity of the data (Pope et al., 2006), in this 
study, triangulation was a helpful tool to reinforce the themes that emerged from the analysis of the 
interview data.   
 
As a single researcher, it is important to be reflexive about the interpretation and explanations 
developed from the case studies.  There are several reasons to be confident about the findings of this 
research:   
 
First, there have been multiple stages at which the findings of this thesis were interrogated by my 
supervisor. Where both case studies are concerned, the findings have been discussed with my 
supervisor who challenged me to evidence my claims and develop detailed accounts of the 
observations being reported in this thesis.  Second, the findings in this thesis have been presented in 
part in the final report of the wider PIRU evaluation of five operational SIBs in Health and Social Care 
(Fraser et al., 2018a).  This includes the contractual analysis for one provider and a short section 
about provider behaviour.  The thematic findings in the report were interrogated by the wider 
evaluation team over the course of several ‘away days’ during the analysis process to triangulate the 
findings across that study’s five case studies with the intent of developing generalisable findings 
across all the sites.  Positive and negative findings, particularly as they related to instances of 
unintended behaviours and moral dilemmas, were held to high levels of scrutiny.  These findings were 
investigated during a full day workshop with the project team to qualify our findings.  In doing so it 
became possible to incorporate what appeared to be divergent findings into a more refined synthesis 
of the research findings for the final report and my thesis (Pope et al., 2006).  The final report was 
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finalised in summer of 2017 and underwent formal peer review by the UK DHSC and the Centre for 
Social Impact Bonds at the DCMS.  This provided an additional test of the external validity of these 
findings.  The final report was published in July of 2018 (Fraser et al., 2018a).   
 
Second, a comparison of the research findings with other concurrent published work about the SIBs 
that form these case studies (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2018, Cooper et al., 2016) indicated that my 
observations were consistent with other academic researchers.  It should be noted that these 
research findings disagree with findings from a government-commissioned evaluation by the DCLG 
that concluded that there was no evidence of perverse incentives.  The DCLG’s qualitative evaluation 
did not separate the two case studies or seek to draw out differences in organisational or managerial 
approaches to the incentive scheme (Mason et al., 2017) which may offer some explanation for this.  
This did provide some concerns as to whether I placed too much attention on negative cases.  To 
mitigate this, as detailed above, deviant cases were examined to challenge my explanation of the data 
and discussed with my supervisor, advisory board members, and the SIB evaluation research team 
(Pope et al., 2006).   
 
These are reasons to be confident in the findings of this research.  This research project is qualitative 
and draws on ‘real life’ accounts of the impact of incentives on non-profit organisations in two case 
studies that were specific to a particular context.  A detailed account of the methods used has been 
provided to allow the reader to consider whether efforts have been made to ensure that these 
findings are valid.  To an extent, it would be possible for this study to be replicated on a wider scale 
with more operational SIB contracts.  There have been several other SIBs commissioned using similar 
outcomes targets as these case studies so it would be possible for another researcher to conduct the 
study and thereby expand the power of these findings.  There are some caveats to any replication of 
this study, particularly that it has been extremely rare to see SIB contracts structured like those in 
Providers A and B, which are entirely p4p contracts where the investors were repaid on a quarterly 
basis regardless of outcomes-related payments received from commissioners.  These SIBs are atypical 
because the investors bore no risk of success or failure13.  Further, the case studies operated as proof 
                                                          
 
13 In a ‘typical’ SIB, public commissioners repay investors for their upfront investment into the service if, and 
only if, the intervention achieves predetermined outcomes.  The case studies differed from this ‘ideal type’ 
because Providers A and B chose to obtain funds via commercial loans from private and social investors to 
finance the SIB services, so the only revenue stream available to the providers with which to repay their 
investors was through quarterly outcomes payments from commissioners.  As a result, Providers A and B had a 
100% p4p relationship between the commissioner and service providers.  Further details about the contractual 
structure of these SIBs are set out in Chapter 5 (Study setting). 
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of concept pilots so it was possible that there were unique temporal aspects to the implementation 
and operationalisation of these sites that might not be captured in subsequent work.   
 
There are two related areas of theory that were considered but did not ultimately influence the study 
design.  First, the contractual analysis did not draw on the literature about contracting and 
transactions cost economics.  The wider literature on public sector contracting is relevant for 
academics interested in understanding the benefits and disadvantages of SIBs as an outcomes-based 
contracting mechanism.  However, this topic was outside the direct remit of this study and its focus 
on understanding the impact of financial incentives on provider behaviour and motivation.  Second, 
this research did not draw on the field of behavioural economics, a field that is dominated by social 
psychology and economics, which uses laboratory-based experiments to yield insights about how 
individuals make decisions or respond to incentives.  Behavioural economics has the potential to 
develop insights about how best to structure or design an incentive scheme to mitigate the potential 
for perverse behaviour where output is hard to measure.  This area of the literature was not explored 
because the methods associated with this field were not relevant to this study, which sought to 
examine the impact of an actual, real life situation on individuals, not to coerce them to behave in 
particular ways.   
 
It is also important to critically reflect on the experiences that informed my work as a researcher. 
First, my previous career was in a non-profit organisation (in a different country setting focused on 
international development projects) that later divided itself into two entities, the non-profit and a 
social enterprise.  I was part of this organisation for several years during period of rapid growth and 
expansion while the senior leadership sought to balance their pro-social motivations and ‘core values’ 
with the need to generate income to subsidise and expand the non-profit’s work.  This experience 
informed my interest in understanding what the impact of managerial decisions at the senior and 
middle management level were on front line staff – particularly to explore whether front line staff 
were aware of the wider organisational changes that were occurring and how those were 
communicated through the organisation.  This ‘real life’ experience was in an organisation whose 
aims and goals were different than the case studies in scope and target population.  I was conscious 
that there might be common organisational experiences from the non-profit sector and took care to 
ensure that I challenged my preconceptions of working in a non-profit with mixed missions.  As the 
settings were very different from the non-profit case studies, who worked with homeless individuals 
in a high-income setting, I did not believe my previous experiences were relevant to my interviewees.  
In a few cases (ranging from interviews with front line staff and senior managers), I revealed that I had 
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previously worked in the non-profit sector and these experiences did allow me to build a rapport with 
informants, often about resource scarcity in the sector and the reluctance of non-profit staff to adopt 
performance management and data monitoring practices.  I was guarded against revealing details of 
my own experiences with organisation level incentives so that staff were led to be less forthcoming or 
were guided in their responses in any way.   
 
Second, my previous academic training and research experience are worth noting.  My first degree 
was in Anthropology and International Development Studies, which entailed training in ethnography 
and macroeconomic theory as it related to Development Economics.  This provided a unique 
perspective and respect for the detailed, immersive qualitative work required through ethnography 
that prizes ‘thick description’ and the cultural reflexivity associated with Anthropology alongside 
knowledge about the advantages of economics, as it relates to quantitative methods that enable 
hypothesis testing and developing models through which to understand real world problems.  In my 
role as a Research Fellow in the Policy Innovation Research Unit at the LSHTM, I have gained 
qualitative research and analysis experience as part of the research team in multiple evaluations.   
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 Study setting 
 
5.1.  Introduction  
This chapter describes the rationale for the introduction of SIBs in the two case studies and examines 
the service design and contractual structures that underpinned these interventions.  The two SIB 
contracts merit examination because of their potential impact on service providers.  The focus of this 
thesis is to understand how workers in non-profit organisations responded to the use of direct and 
indirect outcome-related financial incentives.  It is important to set out how, and what risks, were 
transferred between different actors to understand the incentives that were established by the SIB 
contracts.  This chapter provides an analysis of the contractual structure of each SIB and the financial 
and reputational risks embedded within each study site.  This is followed by a summary of the overall 
performance of the two SIB providers towards their outcome targets to set out the degree to which 
each provider met or missed its stated goals.  This chapter closes with a descriptive overview of the 
case studies with attention to their position in the sector, operational budgets, funding streams, and 
approach to staff recruitment and team structure. 
 
5.2.  Background 
5.2.1.  Social Impact Bonds  
The case studies were both SIB contracts, a variant of p4p using outcomes-based contracts that draws 
on private and social investment to provide upfront capital to fund service delivery where 
commissioners only pay if predetermined outcomes are achieved so investors risk losing their full 
investment if outcome targets are missed.  SIBs have been welcomed because they present a novel 
financing mechanism where investors provide upfront funds to service providers to scale up or pilot 
an innovative or high-cost intervention that is expected to bring substantial cost savings to 
commissioners.  Within a SIB, investors are only repaid for their investment by commissioners, if the 
project is successful at meeting its predetermined outcomes.  SIBs purport to shift the risk of 
unsuccessful services away from public commissioners to investors who then bear the financial risk of 
failure.   
 
This study focuses on the impact of these SIB contracts in two non-profit organisations delivering the 
SIB service.  Each of these sites will be referred to as Provider A and Provider B.  The two providers 
differed from the ‘typical’ SIB model described above because the service providers bore the full 
financial risk of failure.  Although the interventions were categorised as SIB contracts because the 
public commissioner wanted to commission outcomes-based SIB contracts targeted at rough 
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sleeping, both providers then chose to obtain funds via commercial loans from private and social 
investors to finance the SIB services14.  In these SIB contracts, the investors provided loans at the 
outset to fund the service interventions.  The investors were repaid for these loans on a quarterly 
basis, with a fixed interest rate, irrespective of the outcomes-related payments that Providers A and B 
received from commissioners.  The only revenue stream available to the providers with which to 
repay their investors was through quarterly outcomes payments from commissioners, resulting in a 
100% p4p relationship between the commissioner and service providers in Providers A and B.  Thus, 
the providers, not the investors, assumed the whole financial risk of failure.   
 
Providers in SIB contracts are often performance managed by an intermediary who is responsible for 
data monitoring and troubleshooting when outcomes are not met.  This is intended to provide an 
additional level of accountability and professional management support for service providers.  
Providers A and B differed in that all performance management and data collection were done in-
house so there was no oversight or direct management embedded in the service delivery contract, or 
in the form of commissioner-driven process targets, such as in the form of an external auditor or 
performance and contract manager.  Given the atypical contractual models in the two case studies 
described above, closer examination is necessary to understand how risk was allocated between 
different parties in the SIB contract and to understand how the financial incentives created by the SIB 
impacted workers in the two non-profit provider organisations (Providers A and B).  
 
5.2.2.  Social Impact Bonds for homelessness 
The two rough sleeping SIB projects that are the focus of this thesis were initiated to improve 
outcomes for homeless individuals in London using an outcomes-focused approach intended to 
promote a move into settled accommodation and more stable lifestyles.  This section discusses how 
SIBs were developed to target rough sleeping and the homeless population in London, as described in 
the policy documents and grey literature developed in response to the policy problem, and provides 
context as to why this financing mechanism was selected.   
 
                                                          
 
14 In a SIB contract, the public commissioner enters an outcomes-based contract with the service provider or a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a subsidiary entity that could be used to deliver the project without putting the 
larger organisation at risk in the event of failure.  The service provider, SPV, intermediary, or investment 
manager is then responsible for securing upfront funding for service delivery and the terms of repayment.  The 
public commissioner is not involved in this process.  SIB contracts take many forms but these case studies were 
defined as SIBs because they were outcomes-based contracts with the commissioner where funds came from 
other, non-public or state sources.   
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In the late 2000s, there were repeated increases in the numbers of individuals seen rough sleeping in 
London, with an increase in people seen sleeping rough of 8% from 2009 to 2010 (3,673 in 2009 to 
3,975 in 2010).  This occurred alongside a rise in ‘hidden’ homelessness (i.e. individuals not seen 
sleeping rough on the street but who lacked stable accommodation).  At the local authority level, 
these increases in reported rough sleeping were accompanied by increased demand for services 
related to homelessness, such as early interventions for new rough sleepers and homelessness 
assessments.  This presented a policy problem for local authorities, as rough sleeping was associated 
with increased numbers of complaints regarding anti-social behaviour, and the higher costs 
associated with a growing, entrenched, homeless population, such as increased demand and costs for 
chaotic interactions with A&E or entry into the criminal justice system.  In the longer term, rough 
sleepers were expected to require more costly interventions and intensive support for societal 
reintegration as their exposure to street lifestyles increased (The Young Foundation, 2011).   
 
At the practical level, there was a lack of coordination and accountability among the local authorities 
and service providers that worked in London’s 32 boroughs.  There were reported tensions at the 
local authority level between doing what was right, and what was politically possible, given that 
providing excellent homelessness services was neither a political priority, nor something that 
individual boroughs wanted to be known for in an era of austerity.  Homelessness services were also 
characterised by a high degree of fragmentation, with services operated by the private, public, and 
voluntary sector working in silo.  For the homeless population itself, there were administrative 
obstacles to accessing services, for example, an individual had to demonstrate a local connection (e.g. 
previous work, or having lived, in the area for a set period of time) in the borough to be eligible for 
assistance.  In this patchwork of services and accountabilities, the SIB was intended to act as a 
London-wide initiative that provided ring-fenced funding for rough sleeping services  (The Young 
Foundation, 2011, Social Finance and The Young Foundation, 2012).   
 
The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was interested in SIBs as a way of 
financing preventive services to mitigate the impact of entrenched rough sleeping through a pan-
London approach.  To tackle the issues highlighted above, the DCLG commissioned the Young 
Foundation and Social Finance (an intermediary with specialist SIB and public services reform 
knowledge) to design an intervention targeted at rough sleeping in London.  Through interviews with 
staff at service providers and London Boroughs, this report identified a number of policy, service and 
delivery gaps that prevented homeless individuals in London from securing accommodation or 
accessing mental health or substance abuse support services.  For example, it was difficult to provide 
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spot purchases or financial support for homeless individuals without drawing on social welfare 
benefits (policy gap), there was insufficient housing available for individuals leaving prison (service 
gap), and inconsistent tenancy support for those that were housed by the borough (delivery gap).  
This work recommended that an individualised approach had the potential to enable better access to 
existing services for a group of entrenched rough sleepers in London.  As a direct result of this work, a 
SIB was proposed as a mechanism to provide personalised services to move entrenched rough 
sleepers into stable accommodation (Social Finance and The Young Foundation, 2012, The Young 
Foundation, 2011).  The DCLG committed to providing central government funding for outcomes 
payments and worked with the Greater London Authority (GLA) to commission two SIBs targeted at a 
defined group of entrenched rough sleepers in London.  The GLA, as the lead commissioner for 
homelessness services in London, commissioned two SIBs to reduce rough sleeping among a group of 
830 entrenched rough sleepers (divided into two groups of 415 individuals) in London in 2012.  The 
GLA acted as lead commissioner and contracts manager throughout the duration of the interventions. 
Two registered UK charities were selected to deliver the SIBs to the two fixed groups after a 
competitive bidding process.  Investors were recruited separately by the provider organisations and 
not part of the competitive bidding process or consultation with the GLA15 (Mason et al., 2017, Mason 
et al., 2015, Tan et al., 2015).   
 
5.2.3.  Housing as a mechanism to improve homelessness and health 
There are two dominant approaches to the reintegration of homeless people into society - the 
‘Staircase’ model and the ‘Housing First’ approach.  In both, individuals are placed into sheltered 
accommodation, which is expected to create greater stability for the individual as a first step, so that 
other health issues, such as mental health or substance abuse problems can then be addressed.  In 
the staircase model, people are referred into temporary accommodation, such as hostels, then to 
treatment for substance abuse or other health issues, after which individuals are referred into 
permanent housing, often in the private rented sector, when deemed appropriate (The Young 
Foundation, 2011).  In a Housing First model, homeless individuals are placed into stable 
accommodation and asked to accept a low level of case-worker support.  Their tenancies are not 
subject to restrictions related to their mental health or substance abuse issues, e.g. there tend not to 
be sobriety restrictions or a requirement that individuals enter, or complete treatment for substance 
abuse issues as a condition of their continued tenancy. The Housing First approach originated in 
                                                          
 
15 This approach differs from a ‘typical’ SIB where the intermediary or investment managers first negotiate an 
outcomes-based contract with the public commissioner, and second, select providers through a competitive 
bidding process. 
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America and the approach has since been applied in other countries, with notable success in Finland, 
among other European countries (Bretherton and Pleace, 2015).  The staircase model is the dominant 
approach for the majority of rough sleepers in London with the exception of those that have taken 
part in policy experiments, such as the SIB intervention and other pilot projects (e.g. the RS205 
scheme that targeted London’s most entrenched group of homeless individuals through a 
combination of personal budgets, outreach workers, housing support, along with support from 
medical and enforcement staff ) (The Young Foundation, 2011).  
 
The Housing First model was recommended as one possible approach for the London SIBs, alongside 
the staircase model (Young Foundation 2011).  This approach is supported by existing evidence that 
Housing First had been successful, albeit with a small pilot group of 13 individuals, in Camden, a 
borough in North London (Pleace and Bretherton, 2013).  There is also evidence from an evaluation of 
nine Housing First initiatives initiated from 2009 to 2014 across England that found that most service 
users (78%) were housed through the intervention.  Similar to the Camden pilot, the nine initiatives in 
this study worked with small groups of fewer than 15 individuals.  Despite the limitations of 
generalising based on pilots with small numbers, the authors suggest that the Housing First approach 
has the potential to be a more cost-effective approach than conventionally-funded services for 
entrenched homelessness (Bretherton and Pleace, 2015).  In practice, the SIBs were not strict Housing 
First approaches.  Instead, they drew on the principles of the approach with clients, such as placing no 
restrictions on individuals’ tenancies related to substance abuse or employment.  However, the 
commissioner did not pay for outcomes in respect of individuals that were placed in hostels, so there 
was a distinct disadvantage for workers who approached the group using a staircase model, as it 
would take considerably more time, and therefore, increase financial risk to the non-profit 
organisation, to secure permanent housing for their group.   
 
There is some evidence that Housing First approaches are a promising intervention to improve health.  
An evaluation of nine Housing First initiatives in England reports that users felt they improved their 
physical and mental health and reduced their drug and alcohol usage, based on users’ self-reported 
consumption.  While there was considerable variation between users, the evaluation found that there 
was no evidence that drug or alcohol use or anti-social behaviour increased after joining the scheme 
(Bretherton and Pleace, 2015).  Other evidence in support of Housing First and improved health is 
mixed.  Two comprehensive systematic reviews find considerable variations in the quality of the 
studies available and heterogeneity among the groups studied so it is not possible to draw 
generalisable conclusions about how best to improve the health of homeless populations.  Hwang et 
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al.(2005) report that findings were mixed for homeless people with mental illness, substance abuse 
issues, and concurrent mental illness and substance abuse.  There is not a clear link between a move 
to accommodation and improved health, but it was positive and cost-effective when individuals were 
homeless for short periods of time (Hwang et al., 2005).  Frederick-Lewis et al.(2011) provide a follow-
up systematic review to Hwang et al.(2005) that assesses the evidence on interventions targeted at 
those with mental health and/or substance abuse issues.  One study finds that the provision of 
housing was an effective intervention for homeless individuals with substance abuse problems, and 
abstinence-contingent housing was even more effective.  Another study finds that access to 
accommodation improved survival rates and adherence to antiretroviral drugs among those with 
HIV/AIDS.  Fitzpatrick-Lewis et al.(2011) suggest that provision of housing is associated with decreased 
levels of substance abuse, relapse from periods of substance abstinence, health services utilisation, 
and increased housing tenure. As with Hwang et al.(2005), case management is seen as an effective 
tool to improve health outcomes when integrated, supportive and well matched for homeless 
individuals (Fitzpatrick-Lewis et al., 2011).  Overall, there is evidence that the Housing First approach 
has the potential to enable health improvements and the socio-economic integration of homeless 
people (Fitzpatrick-Lewis et al., 2011, Hwang et al., 2005, Culhane et al., 2002, John and Law, 2011, 
Larimer et al., 2009, Bretherton and Pleace, 2015). 
 
 
5.3.  Study sites 
This thesis explores the impact of financial incentives on two registered UK charities that were non-
profit organisations delivering outcomes-based SIB contracts to understand how the incentives affect 
intra-organisational behaviour and the motivation of staff members.  This section describes the two 
case studies (Provider A and B) and explores the implications of the SIB contracts to set out the direct 
financial incentives for Providers A and B.  It then describes how the two non-profits performed in 
relation to the direct financial incentives.  This provides important contextual information to identify 
the potential implications of over- or under-performance against targets for organisational strategy 
and for provider behaviours.    
 
Organisational background 
The two case study providers differ substantially in scale.  Provider B is one of London’s largest 
homelessness charities, providing a broad range of outreach and temporary accommodation services 
across Greater London.  The senior managers felt that their organisation had a strong reputation in 
the sector and that they were well positioned to experiment with a new financing mechanism, as the 
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organisation’s capacity to deliver services would not suffer reputational harm in the case of low 
performance. Provider A is a smaller charity that specialises in transitions to supported housing and 
housing services in London.  For Provider A, this SIB contract was important for the organisation as it 
was their largest ever contract with the GLA. This contract was therefore of strategic value to the 
organisation’s growth, and in raising its profile within the sector.  See Table 5.1 for descriptive 
information about the scale and goals of each provider. 
 
Table 5.1  Organisational characteristics of Providers A and B based on 2015 financial reports16 
Characteristics Provider A  Provider B 
Established 1980s 1970s 
Geographical range London  London; and elsewhere in 
England 
Staff  <500 staff members, <100 
volunteers 
>1000 staff members, 
<1000 volunteers 
Total income  
(approximate £ year ending March 2015) 
£10 million £70 million 
Annual deficit/surplus  
(2014-15 financial year) 
£-400,000 (deficit) £800,000 (surplus) 
Potential SIB revenue if all outcomes met £2.1 million £2.4 million 
 
The 2015 annual reports of each organisation (in the last financial year that the SIBs were operational 
in both sites) provided details about the operational budget and staff numbers of each organisation.  
At the time, Provider B employed four times more staff than Provider A.  Provider B’s 2015 annual 
income was seven times larger than Provider A.   For provider A, the SIB contract could have 
generated approximately £2.1 million pounds over the course of the intervention, a sizable amount 
for an organisation with an annual budget of £10 million pounds.  On the other hand, Provider B’s 
contract had the potential to generate more revenue17 at £2.4 million pounds but this was much 
smaller in proportion to its total annual revenue of £70 million pounds.  
 
                                                          
 
16 All dates and figures have been rounded in order to provide anonymity for each provider.   
17 The difference in potential SIB revenue is due to the competitive tendering process that the public 
commissioner used to award the contracts.  The public commissioner provided maximum tariff levels that they 
were willing to pay for each outcome and invited the providers to set their own tariff for each outcome.  This 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.2 (SIB outcomes). SIB contracts were awarded based through a 
competitive tender process.   
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Target population  
The client group (n=830)18 was identified as any individuals seen sleeping rough more than six times 
from July to September of 2012, based on routinely collected data from the Combined Homeless and 
Information Network (CHAIN), an independent database funded by the GLA with information since 
2000 on all rough sleepers in London (Tan et al., 2015).  The client group was divided evenly between 
the two providers in Westminster (the Central London Borough that accounts for much of London’s 
homeless population) with the remainder of the boroughs assigned to each provider by the 
commissioner so that each provider was responsible for half of the 830 individuals identified as 
eligible for the SIB intervention.  The projects began in November 2012 for a period of three years 
(ending in October 2015), with the last possible outcomes payments for two of the three 
accommodation outcomes in a payment tail available until October of 2016.  The payment tail was 
intended to ensure that clients that entered accommodation in the last year of the SIB or had been in 
sustained accommodation for 12 months in October of 2015 continued to receive support to maintain 
their tenancies (see Section 5.3.2 for a description of the outcome targets, definition of outcomes, 
and Section 5.3.3 for actual versus target performance in each case study).  
 
5.3.1.  Contractual structures  
 
This thesis is about the impact of an outcomes-based payment contract on two non-profits in the 
homelessness sector.  Unlike services commissioned through conventional financing, or other SIB 
contracts seen in operation (Fraser et al., 2018a), these case studies are both unique in two respects.  
First, the investors bore no financial risk; and second, there was no oversight or direct management 
embedded in the service delivery contract, or in the form of commissioner-driven process targets, 
such as an external auditor or performance and contract manager.  All data monitoring and 
performance measurement for each provider was conducted in house.  While the outcomes-based 
contracts were categorised as SIBs because of the outcomes-based contract between the 
commissioner and the service providers, it must be noted that these SIB contracts were highly 
unusual.   
 
The SIBs were 100% p4p contracts between the service providers (Providers A and B) and the public 
commissioner.  The investors received quarterly repayments with fixed interest (where just one 
investor in Provider A also received a very small percentage of the outcomes-related payment for one 
                                                          
 
18 There were originally 831 individuals across the two SIBs but this figure was later revised to 830 individuals 
after the CHAIN data revealed that one person had duplicated records (Mason et al., 2017) 
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of the five outcomes).  Due to the 100% p4p SIB structure, it was possible that the Providers could 
accrue surpluses if the outcomes-related payments for service delivery were higher than their loan 
repayments with interest and their costs for running the intervention.  It is not possible to determine 
the potential surpluses that each provider may have accrued because the costs associated with SIB 
delivery for each service provider were not made available, such as staff salaries or overhead 
expenses to run the service intervention.  The filed accounts available on Companies House for 
Provider B’s SPV for the year ending 31 March 2017 (to account for the last outcomes-related 
payments received through the payment tail in October of 2016) show that no surplus was made and 
there was a small deficit.  There is no such information available for Provider A because they did not 
use an SPV, so no data is available on Companies House.  Provider A’s annual reports during the years 
of the SIB intervention do not provide further detail because the costs for running the SIB are not 
distinct from the costs of running the non-profit as a whole.  It is not possible to report whether 
Provider A or B made surpluses or losses based on the information available.   
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Provider A: Contract background 
Provider A was one of two registered UK charities selected to deliver the SIBs to one of two groups 
identified through the CHAIN database after a competitive bidding process. Investors were recruited 
separately by the provider organisations and were not part of the competitive bidding process or 
consultation with the GLA.  In this site, the investors provided the initial cash flow to the providers so 
that they could start delivering services to obtain performance-related payments from the public 
commissioner.  
 
Figure 5.1 Provider A model 
 
 
Incentives and risk sharing for investors 
To provide cash flow at the outset of the SIB, Investor 1 provided an unsecured loan of £250,000; 
Investor 2 provided £250,000 (as secured loan facility), and Provider A reported a contribution of 
£250,000 from its own reserves. Investor 3 provided a grant of £100,000 that was not subject to 
repayment. Investors 1 and 2 provided funds directly to Provider A and were repaid on a quarterly 
basis with fixed interest rates (4%) with repayments commencing within the first year of operations, 
making this a fixed repayment that was not contingent on performance.  Unlike under a 
conventionally funded SIB, provided the provider organisation did not default on its loans and 
become financially insolvent, investors did not assume any degree of risk in this site.  If the project 
had failed, they only lost their investment if the provider organisation had became insolvent.  Investor 
2 also received a percentage (less than 2% of the primary outcome related to a reduction in rough 
sleeping) of performance-related payments from commissioners, despite shouldering no risk of 
failure.  In addition to its loan repayments with interest, Investor 2 had the potential to share in the 
84 
 
outcomes payments received from the GLA.  The public commissioner was not involved in the 
provider’s decision to share a proportion of the performance-related payments with the investor. 
 
Incentives and risk sharing for provider 
Provider A assumed financial risk in the case of low performance.  Provider A chose to use a direct 
provider model to minimise the transaction costs associated with establishing a SIB contract.  They 
felt they lacked the financial resources necessary to cover the legal fees associated with establishing 
an SPV, a subsidiary entity that could be used to deliver the project without putting the larger 
organisation at risk in the event of failure.  Provider A matched the funds from Investors 1 and 2 from 
its own reserves. The provider was at risk because it had to pay quarterly repayments with 4% interest 
to Investors 1 and 2.  This financial arrangement increased the financial burden as Provider A itself 
was liable for the general loans it received from investors 1 and 2, while sharing a percentage of 
performance related payments with Investor 2.  There was no provider risk associated with the funds 
from Investor 3, as they were grant funds that did not have to be repaid.  Investor 2’s funds allowed it 
to hold non-voting observer status on the charity’s board of directors. In this model, the provider 
assumed all the financial risk, so if it failed to generate revenue, it would therefore be unable to repay 
the loan with interest from its operational reserves.  This also meant that if Provider A succeeded in 
meeting the goals set out in their financial forecasting model (not disclosed to this researcher as 
described above in the beginning of Section 5.3.1.), it was possible that Provider A could gain 
surpluses (See Section 5.3.3. Provider performance for further details about the implications of the 
contractual structure and actual payments received) from outcomes payments after repaying the 
commercial loan to put toward other organisational programming or priorities.  
 
See the end of this section (page 84) for an overview of the incentives and risk sharing arrangements 
for the SIB commissioners in Providers A and B. 
 
Provider B: Contract background 
Provider B was one of two registered UK charities selected to deliver the SIBs to one of two groups 
identified through the CHAIN database after a competitive bidding process. Provider B hired an 
intermediary to manage the SIB development process.  This included legal advice, establishing an SPV, 
and finding investors for the SIB.  This intermediary was not involved in any capacity once the SIB was 
operational.  Investors were recruited separately by the intermediary and were not part of the 
competitive bidding process or consultation with the GLA.  The SPV subcontracted Provider B as the 
main delivery partner and two other non-profit organisations that provided drop-in services in Central 
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London to aid with service delivery.  See Figure 5.2 below for a diagram of the contractual 
relationships in Provider B’s SIB. 
 
Figure 5.2  Provider B model  
 
Incentives and risk sharing for investors 
To fund the SIB, investors 1 and 2 provided loans of £307,692 and £80,000 and two private investors 
(hereafter Investors 3 & 4) contributed £12,308.  Provider B contributed £200,000 from its own 
reserves.  Of the £650,000 raised, only £400,000 was drawn down. Investors provided funds to the 
SPV.  They were repaid on a quarterly basis with fixed interest rates of 6.5% on a quarterly basis. 
Repayments were not based on outcomes achievement, so unlike under a conventionally funded SIB, 
provided the SPV did not default on its loans and become financially insolvent, investors did not 
assume a high degree of risk if the project failed.  
 
Incentives and risk sharing for provider 
In this SIB with a SPV model, the provider carried the majority of the financial risk, although the 
investors’ money was still at risk if the project underperformed to the extent that the SPV became 
insolvent.  Provider B assumed direct financial risks of low performance, because its £200,000 
investment was invested on a first loss basis, i.e. that the investors would be repaid first so their 
capital investment was only at risk after Provider B’s investment. The SPV isolated the wider 
organisation from financial risk.  However, if successful, Provider B could gain substantial surpluses 
from outcomes payments after repaying the commercial loans.  These funds would be reserved for 
further use with the SIB group and could not be redistributed to Provider B’s wider organisation. The 
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two subcontracted providers each received block funding for one staff member on an annual basis, 
for their services.  There were no explicit financial incentives for the subcontracted providers as they 
received block contracts so did not share the financial risk of low performance. 
 
Incentives and risk sharing for the commissioner 
In both Providers A and B, the commissioner was only required to issue payments based on quarterly 
outcomes achievement as reported by the provider. Outcomes payments were funded by central 
government so the local commissioner bore no financial risk. These quarterly reports were audited by 
a program officer at the local commissioner. If the provider did not report outcomes, the 
commissioner did not provide any money, so shared no financial risk for low performance. 
 
5.3.2.  SIB outcomes   
The public commissioner set the same five outcomes for both providers.  Table 5.2 provides details of 
the SIB outcomes, how they were defined, and the proportion of total funding available for each.   
Table 5.2  Details of SIB outcomes 
1 This applied to any bedded down sighting, so outcome payments were only made for clients not seen rough sleeping (i.e. if 
clients were seen bedded down just once, or every night, in the quarter, they were ineligible for payments) 
2 The historic baseline figure was based on CHAIN data for historic cohorts generated with the same criteria. The baseline 
figure was based on the adjusted historic performance for the first four quarters after cohort generation, which was 
averaged to produce an average yearly figure for quarterly use.   
Outcome  Definition  How many times 
payments can 
be claimed  
Proportion 
of allocated 
funding 
Primary outcomes    
1. Reduction in 
bedded down 
sightings  
Service providers receive an outcome payment 
for each individual not seen bedded down 
during that quarter1 above a baseline2 
Quarterly  25% 
2. Accommodation 
i. Enter accommodation  
 
Client enters accommodation  
 
One time. 
40% 
ii. 12 months sustained 
accommodation 
Client remains in an eligible settled 
accommodation for 12 months 
Not specified  
iii. 18 months sustained 
accommodation 
Client remains in an eligible settled 
accommodation for 18 months 
Not specified  
3.  Repatriation 
i. Repatriation to 
country of origin 
 
Client voluntarily moves to a destination 
outside the UK, e.g. country of origin.  The 
provider can also claim outcomes if involved in 
cases where enforcement action was taken by 
the UK Border Agency (UKBA).   
Not specified  
ii. 6 months sustained 
repatriation  
The client remains out of the country for 6 
months after repatriation  
Not specified 25% 
Secondary outcomes    
Supporting 
employment, education 
or training 
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 2 
or equivalent qualification, volunteering, self-
employment, part time or full time 
employment (for 13 weeks or 26 weeks) 
Maximum of 1 
time per 
outcome sub-
metric  
5% 
Improved health A reduction in A&E episodes associated with 
the cohort compared to a baseline.   
Not specified 5% 
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See Appendix 5 for a full description of the outcomes, outcome-related metrics, criteria for eligibility 
and the supporting evidence needed to verify each outcomes payment. 
 
Outcomes-related payments  
SIB contracts were awarded through a competitive tender process where the public commissioner 
provided maximum tariffs that they were willing to pay for each outcome.  The actual tariffs from 
each SIB contract are not reported in this thesis at the request of both providers for reasons of 
commercial confidentiality.  Providers were invited to set their own tariff for each outcome up to the 
maximum tariff value.  For example, if the public commissioner set a maximum tariff of £200 for one 
outcome, Provider A’s bid could have offered £150 while Provider B offered £120.  Due to this 
competitive bidding process, the contractual analysis revealed that the two providers received 
different payment amounts that varied by 10-20% for almost all outcomes.  This is an important 
distinction between the two providers and affected how services were delivered, cash flows and 
potential returns.  The public commissioner set a maximum of £17,200 in outcomes payments per 
individual during the contract (in addition to limits on the number of times specific outcomes were 
payable).   
 
Implications of outcomes-related payments and contractual structure 
There are three important implications of the differences in outcomes-related payments and the 
contractual structure.   
 
First, Provider A’s SIB contract did not have an SPV so any outcomes payments received from the 
commissioner flowed to the organisation itself.  The outcomes payments were pooled into the 
organisation’s overall revenue, and then allocated to different areas of the non-profit’s fixed costs 
such as property and salaries, and through to different project teams, plus other organisational 
priorities (as determined by the senior leadership team).  The senior leadership team decided that 
outcomes payments generated by the SIBs were not ring-fenced for the SIB team’s operating costs or 
to be put toward personalisation budgets (e.g. for spot purchases or financial support) for the client 
group.  There was no SIB project-specific oversight board distinct from the organisation to manage or 
oversee how funds raised by the SIB were then spent.  If successful, the SIB had the potential to 
generate a significant amount of money in the first year that could be allocated throughout the 
organisation.  If the SIB failed to generate enough income to cover the provider’s running costs, 
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including the cost of loan repayments with interest, the wider organisation was liable to cover the 
shortfall from other initiatives or revenue sources.    
 
Second, Provider B’s SIB contract had an SPV so the outcomes payments did not flow directly into the 
wider organisation’s budgets.  These funds and any surpluses generated from performance-related 
payments were ring-fenced for the running costs of the SIB intervention, such as staff costs, 
personalisation budgets, and sub-contracts to other provider organisations.  There was a separate 
oversight board for the SPV that was distinct from the non-profit’s governance board.  In the case that 
Provider B had a surplus, it was not decided (during the time fieldwork was conducted) what would 
happen to residual funds generated from outcomes payments and paid into, and held by, the SPV for 
the wider non-profit organisation after repayments to investors and overhead costs.  In the case of 
poor performance, the wider organisation would not have been legally liable to cover the shortfall 
from other initiatives.  It is not possible to report whether Provider A or B made surpluses or losses 
based on the information available (See Section 5.3.1. for further details)   
 
Third, the contracts revealed the outcomes targets in each provider’s business plan for the SIB, so 
provided an indication of the predicted cash flows for each organisation by quarter.  This provided 
important insights as to the approach each provider took to service delivery, with Provider A being 
more ambitious in the first year, while Provider B expected to receive more outcomes-related 
payments in the second and third years, except for the 12 months of sustained accommodation target 
in Year 3 when Provider A was more ambitious.  Table 5.3 shows the outcomes where one provider 
was more ambitious than the other and where they were the same.  The actual targets associated 
with each outcome are not reported in this thesis at the request of both providers for reasons of 
commercial confidentiality.   
Table 5.3  Different thresholds of outcomes achievement in study sites for primary outcomes 
Outcomes Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  
Outcome 1     
Reduction in rough sleeping Provider A more ambitious Provider B more ambitious    
Outcome 2 
   
 
Entry to accommodation  Provider A more ambitious Provider B more ambitious    
12 months sustained 
accommodation 
n/a Provider B more ambitious Provider A more ambitious 
18 months sustained 
accommodation 
n/a Provider B more ambitious   
Outcome 3 
   
Initial repatriation 
Site A more ambitious   Both providers set the same 
targets  
6 months sustained 
repatriation 
Site A more ambitious 
  
Both providers set the same 
targets  
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5.3.3.  Provider performance  
This section sets out the degree to which Providers A and B met, missed, or exceeded their projected 
outcomes-related earnings over the three years of the SIBs. The preceding sections have established 
that Providers A and B were in 100% p4p contracts with the public commissioners.  Both sites 
assumed the financial risk if their interventions failed to generate enough outcomes-related payments 
on a quarterly basis to meet the scheduled repayments of the loans from the investors.  The providers 
differed in that they set out different outcomes-related targets for service delivery with Provider A 
being more ambitious about the number of outcomes-related payments it wished to obtain in the 
first year than in the following years while Provider B intended to receive the bulk of its outcomes 
payments in years 2 and 3. The following figures and tables illustrate how each provider performed 
relative to its projected incomes.  This had implications for service delivery and the numbers of staff in 
place over the course of the intervention (to be discussed in Section 5.3.4).  
 
These figures and tables are based on the average of the tariffs set by Providers A and B for each 
outcome (drawn from the contractual analysis) to respect the request for commercial confidentiality 
by the two provider organisations.  The figures are grouped by year of the intervention.  The targeted 
and actual performance figures (represented in percentages only) are drawn from the DCLG 
evaluation’s final report (Mason et al., 2017).   
 
Primary outcomes 
 
Outcome 1: Reduction in rough sleeping 
The first outcome-related payment was linked to the number of times individuals in the client group 
were seen ‘bedded down’ sleeping outside19. This outcome comprised a quarter of all possible 
payments related to the SIB (See Table 5.2. for the proportion of allocated funding related to each 
outcome).  The provider received a payment for each individual that was not seen sleeping rough 
below a baseline figure.  The baseline was defined as the expected reduction in the number of 
homeless individuals sleeping outside in the absence of the intervention.  The baseline was reduced 
during each year of the intervention making it more difficult to generate payments in subsequent 
                                                          
 
19 There are a number of street outreach teams (run by a diverse range of third sector providers) that are 
responsible for recording instances of ‘bedded’ down rough sleepers around London.  These sightings are 
entered into the CHAIN database and include details about the location where the individual is seen. 
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years.  If an individual was seen sleeping outside - even once - in a given quarter, the provider 
received no payment for that individual.   
 
Figure 5.3 presents the target and actual earnings for Outcome 1 over the three years of the 
intervention.  It illustrates that the providers failed to meet their target outcomes during every year of 
the SIB intervention.  Table 5.4 indicates the percentage of projected income earned in each year.   At 
the end of the first year, Providers A and B failed to meet their targeted reduction in ‘bedded down’ 
sightings achieving just 75% and 62% of projected payments that year.   The baseline was revised in 
Year 2, with Provider A receiving just 5% of projected outcome while Provider B achieved more, but 
still only 15% of projected income.  Neither provider received any payments for this outcome in Year 
3.  Provider A was slightly more ambitious than Provider B in Year 1 so was likely to have been 
disappointed by underperformance, and so might have focussed less on achieving any outcomes for 
Years 2 and 3 in response.  Provider B performed poorly against all its targets in Years 2 and 3, it is 
also possible that it focussed less on Outcome 1 in light of poor performance in Year 1 despite the 
higher outcome targets in Years 2 and 3.  Providers in both sites felt that this outcome was poorly 
suited to the SIB because many members of their client group were housed in stable accommodation 
but were recorded as sleeping rough on one or two occasions as a matter of convenience (e.g. they 
were in central London for social reasons and chose to sleep rough for one evening after seeing 
friends rather than travel back to the outer boroughs where they were now housed).  
 
Figure 5.3  Outcome 1: Reduction in rough sleeping 
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Table 5.4  Outcome 1: Actual payments as a percentage of projected income 
Outcome 1:  Reduction in rough sleeping  
Actual payment (% of projected income) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Provider A 75% 5% 0% 
Provider B 62% 14% 0% 
 
Outcome 2:  Sustained accommodation  
The move to sustained accommodation was an important outcome that comprised 40% of all possible 
outcome-related payments.  There was a payment for the move into accommodation (paid no more 
than once per client), with increasing reward amounts if the individual was sustained for 12 and 18 
consecutive months, during which they could not be seen sleeping rough more than one time in the 
six months prior to an outcome payment claim being made.  Figure 5.4 shows the outcomes achieved 
for Outcome 2 and Table 5.5 shows the actual payments as a percentage of projected income. 
Provider A was very successful in Year 1 and doubled their projected income.  This reflects its 
ambitious approach to generating outcomes-related payments in Year 1.  While Providers A and B 
exceeded their projected income in Year 2, it is clear from Figure 5.4 that Provider B made more 
money from this outcome in that year.  This extra income was likely to have offset its losses in the 
other primary outcomes and choice to be more ambitious with targets in the latter half of the 
intervention rather than in the first year like Provider A.  Both providers exceeded their projected 
income in Years 1 and 2.  While they did not meet their full targets in year 3, both Providers A and B 
came close to meeting their projected income targets at 87% and 95% of projected income.   
 
Figure 5.4  Outcome 2: Sustained accommodation at entry, 12 and 18 months 
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Table 5.5  Outcome 2: Actual payments as a percentage of projected income 
Outcome 2:  Sustained accommodation at entry, 12 and 18 months 
 
Actual payment (% of projected income) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Provider A 203% 113% 87% 
Provider B 122% 149% 95% 
 
This is consistent with the results of the DCLG’s quantitative analysis that reported that the SIB had a 
significant positive impact on moving the group into long term accommodation with 37% of the SIB 
group entering accommodation two years after the start of the intervention, compared with just 7% 
of the comparison group (Spurling, 2017).  No data were available about the income generated after 
the SIB ended during the payment tail20 for 12 and 18 months of sustained accommodation.  
  
                                                          
 
20 The payment tail refers to the only two outcomes for which payments were still possible from the end of the 
intervention in November 2015 to October of 2016; this was intended to ensure that clients that entered 
accommodation, or had sustained accommodation for 12 months, in October of 2015 received support to 
remain housed.  
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Outcome 3: Repatriation to country of origin 
This outcome rewarded providers for repatriating non-UK clients to their country of origin, where 
possible, in two stages, first for the initial repatriation, and second, demonstrating that the 
repatriation had been sustained for six months.  Figure 5.5 shows the outcomes achieved for 
Outcome 3, Table 5.6 shows the actual payments as a percentage of projected income.  Neither 
provider achieved its targets in Year 1 of the intervention with Provider A achieving just 39% of 
projected outcomes while Provider B received just 17% of projected income.  Provider A exceeded 
targets for repatriations in just one of three years while Provider B came close in Year 2. 
 
Figure 5.5  Outcome 3: Repatriation to country of origin 
 
 
Table 5.6  Outcome 3: Actual payments as a percentage of projected income 
Outcome 3:  Repatriation to country of origin 
 
Actual payment (% of projected income) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Provider A 39% 45% 120% 
Provider B 17% 90% 55% 
 
There were significant policy changes in 2014 (Year 2) that affected the client group from the 
European Economic Area (EEA).  It is likely that this policy change, unrelated to the SIB’s direct 
incentives, influenced the increase in repatriations in Years 2 and 3 of the intervention.  In January of 
2014, citizens of the EEA were unable to claim Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) if they had not been in the 
country for three months, or did not meet a minimum earnings threshold.  From April of 2014, 
citizens of the EEA faced new limitations on the Housing Benefits they were eligible for.  This operated 
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as a disincentive for those who were not yet in accommodation to stay in the country but also meant 
that some clients from the EEA in housing and in work (below the threshold) were no longer eligible 
for financial support and were forced to return to rough sleeping.  This is an apt reminder that there 
existed a range of competing incentives (e.g. for the UK Border Agency to facilitate repatriations) in 
addition to those associated with the SIBs that affected service delivery.    
 
There was some evidence from the DCLG’s quantitative analysis that SIB clients were likelier to stay in 
their country of origin after repatriation than a comparison group.  There was no significant difference 
in those who sustained their repatriation over six months in the first year.  For non-UK nationals who 
were repatriated to their country of origin, the SIB intervention had a significant positive impact with 
8% in the SIB group repatriated after year one compared to 4% in the comparison group.  In the 
second year, 12% of the SIB group were repatriated while just 5% of the comparison group were 
(Spurling, 2017).  It is possible that the SIB group were likelier to remain repatriated due to support 
they received from Providers A and B to facilitate their return, such as help securing housing or 
training in their country of origin.   
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Secondary outcomes 
 
Outcome 4: Education, volunteering, or employment (part and full time) 
This outcome provided five percent of total resources available in the SIB contracts.  This outcome 
rewarded the non-profit providers for encouraging the client group to engage in further education, 
such as the National Vocational Qualification (NVQ), volunteering or employment on a part- or full-
time basis.  Figure 5.6 shows the outcomes achieved for Outcome 3 and Table 5.7 shows the actual 
payments as a percentage of projected income.  Provider A was more successful in Years 2 and 3, 
exceeding its projected income by 16% and 13%.  Provider B gathered 34% and 58% of projected 
income in the first two years, but achieved a significant increase in the number of outcome-related 
payments generated in Year 3 by gaining 94% of projected income.  This slow growth reflects Provider 
B’s focus on the latter years of the intervention rather than the first years.   
 
Figure 5.6  Outcome 4: Education, volunteering or employment (part and full time) 
 
 
Table 5.7 Outcome 4: Actual payments as a percentage of projected income 
Outcome 4: Education, volunteering, or employment (part and full time) 
 
Actual payment (% of projected income) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Provider A 82% 116% 113% 
Provider B 34% 58% 94% 
 
Outcome 5: Health 
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The health outcome was designed to enable providers to support the client group to better manage 
their health through a reduction in the number of unplanned visits to A&E.  The commissioner was 
willing to pay providers for each A&E episode avoided, compared to a constant baseline for each 
provider’s SIB cohort.  In the contracts, the baseline was to be constructed using the number of A&E 
attendances for each provider’s clients in the year before the program began.  The commissioner was 
unable to access identifiable individual-level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on the SIB 
group’s use of A&E due to a change in data protection law that took effect in 2013 affecting the 
Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) (known as NHS Digital from 2016)21.  The HSCIC 
was only able to release the data for the cohort with the consent of each client.  Approximately eighty 
consent forms were obtained (Mason et al., 2017) but this was an insufficient number for analysis so 
it proved impossible for the commissioners to generate a baseline or the number of A&E admissions 
during the three years of the intervention for the SIB group.  The commissioner chose to pay each 
provider the full amount of their projected earnings as a sign of good faith that they were delivering a 
successful intervention22.  Figure 5.7 shows the target and actual figures for each provider.  For this 
outcome, Providers A and B set different health targets so Provider B, being more ambitious, received 
more outcomes-related payments for health than Provider A.   
 
Figure 5.7  Outcome 5: Reduction in A&E use 
 
                                                          
 
21 The feasibility study accessed individual-level data from the NHS Information Centre for a different cohort of 
homeless individuals with ease so this was an unforeseen issue that emerged after the contracts were signed 
because the HSCIC was a non-departmental public body that replaced the NHS Information Centre following the 
Health and Social Care Act in 2012 (Social Finance and the Young Foundation 2012). 
22 After the first year, payments were made in full for the health outcomes with the expectation that the data 
access issue was going to be resolved.  This mitigated potential concerns about projected and actual revenues at 
the time for providers.  It was not resolved at the end of years 2 and 3 so payments on full outcomes 
achievement were then made.   
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Summary of provider performance  
For the primary outcomes, Providers A and B tended to underperform to varying degrees on 
Outcomes 1 and 3.  Both providers were more successful in meeting, and exceeding, targets 
associated with sustained accommodation (Outcome 2).  Provider B gained more income from this 
outcome than Provider A.  In the first year of the intervention, Provider A appeared to be more 
ambitious and successful than Provider B in demonstrating outcomes.  This reflected a front-loaded 
approach to outcomes and service delivery.  Provider B was more ambitious toward the later years of 
the intervention.  This reflected a slower approach to outcomes and a willingness to miss outcomes in 
the first year with the expectation that they would increase with time.  This is an important distinction 
that affected how staff were deployed during the intervention and each organisation’s strategic 
approach to service delivery.  It is not possible to report whether Provider A or B made surpluses or 
losses based on the information available (See Section 5.3.1. for further details)   
 
5.3.4.  Service delivery and staff structure 
The SIB contracts were novel approaches to service interventions in the homelessness sector because 
they operated across London’s 32 boroughs and used an outcomes-based approach rather than the 
process-driven measures that were typical of the sector. SIB financing was seen to be beneficial for 
the target population, and allowed workers to provide ongoing support for individuals (instead of 
passing individuals between agencies) to lead less chaotic lives. Staff felt that such improvements 
would not have been possible without the operational freedom and flexibility that SIB financing 
entailed because conventionally funded services (e.g. block contracts) in this sector (e.g. for rough 
sleeping and housing transitions) tend to operate in silos, making it difficult, if not impossible, to 
follow up clients once they have been referred to other services or boroughs. Unlike conventionally 
funded projects, the SIB enabled a cross-borough, London-wide approach, and allowed staff 
‘navigators’ to deliver highly personalised services and assistance.  
 
The service delivery model in both non-profit providers relied on matching front line staff to the client 
group.  Front line staff acted as ‘navigators’ to guide clients through a personalised pathway toward 
sustained housing and more stable lifestyles.  At the outset, clients were assigned to front line 
workers based on client needs.  Staff were allocated according to their specialised knowledge of  
specific client sub-groups, such as complex or older clients, or by borough, or according to their 
language skills (e.g. staff tasked with the Eastern European client group).  The outcomes-focused 
approach allowed staff greater freedom and autonomy in working with their client population.  In 
particular, the upfront capital investment from investors provided running costs for the teams and 
allowed for personalisation budgets for client needs, on the promise that small investments would 
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lead to larger outcomes payments over the course of the intervention.  These personalisation budgets 
enabled creative, and often, supportive means of working with clients, for example, they were used to 
provide deposits for flats in the private rented sector or to buy furnishing for council-provided 
housing, such as curtains and blankets.  In other cases, the funds went towards training courses for 
clients to enter the workforce (e.g. bricklaying courses) or for recreation, such as swimming lessons or 
video game consoles to ease the transition from the homeless community to a more solitary life in 
stable accommodation.  Front line staff in both providers had more autonomy than in previous, 
process-driven roles in the sector.  
 
There were six notable differences in how each team approached service delivery that reflected 
different strategic organisational priorities and approaches to the SIB contracts: 
 
First, there were different approaches to how staff were organised in each site and in the use of paid 
and unpaid staff.  Provider A used a rotating pool of social work students from a Scandinavian 
University and drew on unpaid volunteers and peer mentors, to deliver services to the client group.  
Provider B took a more collaborative approach by subcontracting a staff member from two providers 
that operated drop-in centres in Central London to join the SIB outreach team as a way of assuring 
wider reach or local buy-in from competing organisations.  In both these partnerships, Provider B 
issued block contracts which covered the salary of one full time staff member at each organisation for 
three years, their incidental costs, and personalised budgets for their clients.   
 
Second, front line workers in each non-profit provider managed different caseloads.  Provider A’s 
front line staff were assigned a larger workload with 70-80 clients each.  The frontline staff in Provider 
A were designated as SIB ‘Navigators’, a role managers likened to a social worker in that they were 
responsible for liaising with the local council, housing or benefits tribunals while daily support for 
their straightforward cases was designated to social work interns, volunteers, or peer support workers 
who assumed a primary relationship manager role. The difference in clients per front line worker was 
an important structural factor that affected how the interventions were delivered and affected the 
allocation of staff time and resources per member of the group in each organisation.  Although 
Provider A’s managers reported pushing for additional staff resources at the outset of the 
intervention, and in the second year, it was unclear what, if any, concessions were made at this stage 
by senior managers and whether they resulted in a substantially smaller workload for the front line 
staff.  Provider B’s staff members had fewer clients, due to the larger size of their outreach team (see 
Table 5.8 at the end of this section for details of staff structure), with each staff member having 
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around 30-40 clients while the two team managers had 15-20 clients each.  The staff team in Provider 
B was consistent in size throughout the first three years of the intervention (between nine to ten staff 
members) while the team in Provider A was reduced significantly after year one (from seven to four 
staff members).   
 
Third, the two providers took a different approach to service delivery and staff to client relationships 
over the course of the three-year contract (plus payment tail). At Provider B, staff and client 
relationships remained relatively consistent throughout the life of the project, with clients only being 
shifted in extenuating circumstances, for example, a male client was transferred away from a female 
front line worker after inappropriate behaviour, or if a client requested it.  By contrast, in Provider A, 
there was a shift in organisational priority to maintain achievable outcomes during the second year of 
the intervention, with a focus on sustaining  clients in housing.  Staff were assigned new client lists 
based on outcomes; for example, one staff member was tasked with sustaining clients in their 
accommodation, another focused exclusively on Eastern European clients, while another continued to 
focus specifically on rough sleepers in a central London borough. While the personalised approach to 
the interventions was similar, the staff structures differed in the following ways: first, there was less 
consistency between front line staff and the relationships they formed with the client group.  Second, 
there was more flux in the managerial team at Provider A as there were four different team managers 
over the four years of payment for outcomes, each of which brought different approaches to how 
outcomes were to be pursued and how staff were allocated to clients.   
 
Fourth, the approach to performance management and claiming outcomes-related payments differed 
in each site.  Provider A’s staff were responsible for the administrative work related to claiming 
outcomes, such as tracking client progress toward outcomes, e.g. by procuring tenancy agreements 
or documentation to prove that their clients were in a long-term care home or prison (both counted 
as sustained accommodation), or employment pay stubs to validate Outcome 4.  Their team manager 
was also responsible for assisting with this, alongside a part-time administrator in the first year.  This 
created a clear link between front line staff actions with clients and generating outcomes-related 
payments.  By contrast, in Provider B, there was a full-time outcomes officer throughout the three 
years of the intervention who was primarily responsible for documenting and tracking outcomes for 
clients, based on regular meetings with front line staff who were expected to provide updates about 
their clients.  This removed the administrative burden of evidencing outcomes from front line staff 
members so they could concentrate on their relationships with clients, but also had the potential to 
lessen the link between their actions and a financial reward for the organisation.   
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Fifth, interviews with staff about their previous roles and overall experience in the sector suggested 
that staff in Provider A had less experience in the sector with an average of 2-5 years of work before 
joining the SIB team compared to an average of 8-10 years at Provider B.  It should be noted that 
Provider A had three staff members that each reported more than ten years of experience working 
with homeless populations.  
 
Lastly, each provider organisation phased out their services to different timeframes.  The SIB contract 
was for a period of three years, however there was a 12-month payment tail for the outcomes related 
to 12 and 18 months of sustained accommodation available until October of 2016. These extra 12 
months of outcome payments were interpreted differently by each organisation.  Provider A 
interpreted the contract to mean that the service was funded for 36 months, and initiated plans to 
wind down the service at the 30th month by formally referring clients back to other agencies and 
services when the service ended in October of 2015.  At the request of commissioners, this provider 
agreed to keep one staff member and one volunteer on the project for an additional five months after 
the project formally ended in October 2015. On the other hand, Provider B felt it was required to run 
the service for the full three years and that the wind down period should only be initiated in the final 
month (35th month) of the project.  It believed that the presence of some paid outcomes, in the form 
of the payment tail, allowed for a fourth year of operation.  This enabled Provider B to maintain a 
reduced project team of four front line workers and one team manager to work with a reduced group 
of individuals in sustained accommodation, and with others from the client group on an ad hoc basis, 
until October 2016.  See Table 5.8 for details about staff structure. 
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Table 5.8 Characteristics of staff structure in case studies 
 PROVIDER A PROVIDER B 
MANAGERIAL TEAM One team manager for the SIB team 
for 3 years, changing during each year 
of the intervention (4 in total)  
Two team co-managers in post for 3 
years.  One remaining in post for year 
4. 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUPPORT  
Part time administrator in year 1 One outcomes officer responsible for 
all administrative work related to 
evidencing outcomes, in post for 3 
years.  
STAFF SIZE 7 front line workers for the first year of 
the project, reduced to 4 in the second 
and third year. One staff member for 
Q1 of the fourth year. 
10 front line workers for the first two 
years of the project, reduced to 8 for 
the third year and 4 in the fourth year 
(ultimately 3 staff members as one 
went on sick lead in Q2 of the fourth 
year). 
USE OF UNPAID WORKERS Use of social work interns from 
Scandinavian university on 3-6 month 
placements throughout intervention, 
use of volunteers and peer support 
members conducting face to face 
contacts with clients.  
Some use of volunteers to assist with 
attending benefits tribunals or job 
centre appointments. 
 
These differences in staff structure reflected senior managers’ views on the potential benefits and 
risks of working under an outcomes-based contract.  This impacted the resources made available to 
provide front-line services.  It appeared that Provider A operated a leaner model given its lower 
number of staff in every year of the intervention while Provider B was willing to expend more 
resources on staff over the course of the contract.  
 
5.4.  Empirical research about the case studies  
The London rough sleeping SIBs are among the world’s first SIBs and were subject to multiple 
concurrent studies.  These studies comprise two qualitative process evaluations (Fraser et al., 2018a, 
Mason et al., 2017), comparative qualitative analyses of multiple SIB sites  (Edmiston and Nicholls, 
2018, Fraser et al., 2018a), and a case study of one of the two SIBs (Cooper et al., 2016).  There is one 
quantitative impact evaluation (Spurling, 2017) while another concurrent evaluation abandoned their 
efforts to conduct a comparative quantitative analysis of the two sites due to reporting bias in the 
data (Fraser et al., 2018a).  In comparison to these evaluations and studies, this thesis seeks to 
understand the impact of the incentives embedded in the SIB contracts on the actions and behaviours 
of staff.   
 
The concurrent studies provide useful contextual information about the SIBs, but a shortcoming of 
these studies is that they do not engage with the consequences of these contractual models on 
organisational and individual-level provider behaviours.  Edmiston and Nicholls (2018) find that 
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differences in contractual structure had an impact on the degree of performance management, 
namely that the London rough sleeping SIB that did not use an SPV secured a lower number of 
sustained outcomes (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2018) but do not explore this finding in more depth.  
Another study examines the contractual implications but treats the SIB as an accounting mechanism 
for public services and uses one of the two SIBs to explore how different actors in the contracting 
process commoditise individuals with social problems.  This study is unique in that it sets out the non-
profit organisation’s decision to engage in the SIB scheme in the context of the organisation’s financial 
flows, and the wider environment of resource scarcity, for a non-profit that derived most of its 
income from government sources  (Cooper et al., 2016).  However, this study fails to consider that 
there are important differences in contractual structure between different SIBs, or how the SIB they 
examine differs from conventional commissioning to support their conclusions.   
 
There are also differing accounts as to whether the London rough sleeping SIBs had a positive effect.  
One study finds that there is no evidence that suggested the SIBs provided better outcomes relative 
to concurrent or previous service interventions, or that sufficient data and evidence were available to 
enable evaluators to define and measure the ‘impact’ or potential value added by SIB contracting 
(Edmiston and Nicholls, 2018).  It is not possible to draw broader implications from the available 
studies as to the impact of different SIB structures on service delivery or what the ‘SIB effect’ might 
be on provider behaviour.   
 
There is just one quantitative analysis of the London Rough Sleeping SIBs and it does not seek to 
compare or contrast the performance of the two SIB providers.  This is not in the remit of that study, 
and so, there is no empirical work that analyses whether overall performance differs by site, and to 
what extent any variations are attributable to different organisational responses to incentives.  The 
quantitative analysis assesses whether the interventions were effective but fails to separate the two 
providers and treats them as a single intervention in the analysis.  The impact analysis examines the 
impact of the SIB intervention against key outcomes.  This quantitative analysis uses propensity score 
matching to assess the SIB group against a matched comparison group to ascertain whether the 
intervention led to a reduction in rough sleeping and finds that there was a significant reduction in 
rough sleeping when compared to a matched group.  The findings of this study are limited in that the 
authors reported it was not possible “to disentangle the effect of the social investment model from 
the intervention service” (Spurling, 2017 p.8).  This quantitative analysis is helpful in that it 
contributes to the very limited quantitative empirical evidence about SIB interventions compared to 
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no intervention, or a control group, but it could not explain whether, and why, one provider might 
have performed better on some outcomes than others.  
 
There are conflicting reports as to whether these SIBs result in perverse incentives or adverse 
behaviour.  The DCLG evaluation asserts there is no evidence of perverse incentives or adverse 
behaviours (Mason et al., 2017) while another study identifies anecdotal evidence of gaming and 
parking among staff but does not provide detailed information about what this involved (Edmiston 
and Nicholls, 2018).  Another suggests that senior managers expressed ambivalence toward doing 
what would generate an outcome compared to what they would do if there were no financial 
incentives  (Cooper et al., 2016).  The evidence from these studies echoes findings from other studies 
of outcomes-based PbR contracts that find some evidence of adverse behaviours (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015, Rees et al., 2014, Mason et al., 2015).  The empirical evidence about these SIBs 
suggest that unintended consequences, such as gaming, may occur to the detriment of some 
members of the target population but that this can co-exist alongside improved outcomes for service 
users. 
 
In sum, the academic evidence suggests that outcomes-based contracts and the rough sleeping SIBs 
can result in an excessive focus on how to measure and achieve outcomes.  This dearth of data 
supports this study’s qualitative approach to understanding the impact of financial incentives on non-
profit organisations taking part in the SIBs.   
 
5.5.  Conclusion 
This chapter described the study setting in which the two service providers operated to give 
contextual information to frame the analyses to follow in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.  The discussion of the 
contractual structures explained how these were anomalous SIB contracts for two reasons: first, both 
providers were in a 100% p4p contract with the commissioner; and, second, the investors were 
guaranteed a return on their investments with a fixed interest rate provided that neither provider (or 
in the case of Provider B, the SPV) became insolvent.  The contractual analysis revealed that Provider 
A assumed more financial risk and reward through a direct investment into the organisation, while 
Provider B opted to contain the risk of low performance to their organisation through an SPV.   
 
The actual targets achieved were then analysed to understand the potential implications of the SIB 
contract on service delivery and response to incentives.  Provider A set higher targets in the first year 
using a front-loaded approach to implementation while Provider B set out more ambitious outcomes 
104 
 
in the second and third years of the intervention reflecting a more gradual approach to achieving 
outcomes-related payments. This chapter then outlined how the providers approached service 
delivery and how the SIB teams were structured and organised.   
 
This chapter provided an overview of the direct incentives for each organisation associated with the 
SIB contracts and a descriptive overview of the impact of those financial incentives on the 
organisation, performance and approach to service delivery in each provider.  The next chapter 
discusses the impact of the SIB-specific direct and indirect financial incentives on the managerial 
teams in each site to explore the impact they had within each organisation, and how strategic 
priorities were identified and communicated through the managerial hierarchy in each provider. 
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 Managerial experiences 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
An objective of this thesis was to explore how new financial incentives were articulated and 
prioritised through the management structure of two non-profit organisations. This chapter examines 
the impact of direct financial incentives on organisations, and indirect financial incentives from senior 
to team managers in non-profit organisation to explore how the SIBs’ incentives were filtered through 
the managerial hierarchy and affected service delivery, including how the case study providers 
organised, managed and staffed their teams.   
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on data from interviews with senior and team managers in the 
two case study organisations that focused on the SIB incentives, task allocation, financial resources 
available, and performance management.  This chapter first looks at the impact of the SIB contract on 
the agency relationship, particularly how managers responded to the new principals introduced by 
the SIB contract.  Second, the chapter examines how managers approached incentives and financial 
risk at the macro level, with a focus on whether SIB outcomes were aligned with the organisation’s 
mission and their views on the role of outcomes-based contracting in the homelessness sector.  Last, 
this chapter examines how the SIB contract was framed and implemented at the meso-organisational 
level to understand how financial risk was communicated and how that affected task allocation, 
service delivery, and performance measurement and data monitoring. 
 
6.2.  Impact on the agency relationship 
This section draws out the potential implications of entering a SIB contract on the agency relationship 
between the commissioner and the non-profit case study organisations.  This explores the impact of 
incentives introduced by the SIB’s novel contractual structure, where all payments from 
commissioners were derived from outcome-related financial rewards (See Chapter 5, Study Setting, 
Section 5.3.1. for details of the contractual relationships).  Senior and middle-managers’ views about 
the incentives introduced by the SIB contract were analysed to understand how they contributed to, 
and shaped macro-level operational decisions regarding service delivery. 
 
The introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives has the potential to change the principal-
agent relationship (Arrow, 1963, Prendergast, 1999). In a SIB, the agent (here the non-profit) has 
multiple principals, such as their commissioners and investors, and this can create tensions or 
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conflicts of interest for the agent, since what is best for one principal (here the investor) is not 
necessarily what is best for another (the public commissioner).  Where there exist multiple principal-
agent relationships, each principal seeks to induce the agent to put more effort into activities they 
care about, so there may be inefficiencies if the principals’ goals are not aligned, or this situation will 
result in distortions that make the incentives to the agent less high-powered (Besley and Ghatak, 
2003).  In each providers’ outcomes-based approach, the effort the agent exerted (i.e. agents were 
free to allocate their time and effort to the SIB group as they saw fit in the absence of intermediate 
process measures of performance) was not necessarily observable for the principal.  To correct for 
such information asymmetries, contracts can be designed in such a way as to allow the principal to 
link rewards and effort to the principal’s objectives, even when they are unable fully to observe the 
agent’s behaviour (Lagarde et al., 2013), but this is difficult to do in practice.   
 
The SIBs were set out as a way for the principal (public commissioner) to contract for desired 
outcomes, specifically a reduction in the client group seen sleeping outdoors and improved outcomes 
for a group of entrenched homeless individuals, that linked rewards to the principal’s objectives as 
they were unable to fully observe the agent’s behaviours (here, Provider A or B). The presence of 
multiple principals can create tensions or conflicts of interest for the agent since the goals of the 
public commissioner were not necessarily those of the investors who wished to recoup their 
investment.  Some principals may exert more influence on senior managers than others, such as 
where objectives are not complementary (that is, where there is not a single objective that all 
principals can benefit from).  For example, a senior manager might prioritise the investor’s interests 
over the public commissioners, and so might focus efforts on areas of work that will satisfy the 
investor, to the detriment of public commissioner-funded work.   
 
6.2.1.  New principal  
In the absence of the SIB contracts, the senior managers in the non-profit case study organisations 
were accountable to the following principals: 1) to their governance boards; 2) the public 
commissioner (as a source of funding); and 3) the organisations’ donors.  The SIB contract differed 
from the conventional commissioning relationship between each non-profit organisation and its 
government purchaser by introducing a new principal, the investors.  These investors provided seed 
funding for the intervention and expected the repayment of their investment with a fixed interest 
rate in both sites, except for Investor 2 in Provider A, who was additionally entitled to a small 
percentage of the outcomes payments from the government purchaser.  The investors joined the SIB 
with the expectation of gaining a return on their investments and were incorporated into the 
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governance structures for each non-profit organisation in different ways.  This introduced external 
performance monitoring, defined as the introduction of different governance relationships related to 
the SIB. 
 
The interview data from Provider A suggest that the SIB contract introduced two new agency 
relationships to the organisation’s existing principal-agent relationships between the organisation’s 
senior and middle management and their investors.  First, there was the obligation to repay loans to 
investors.  Investor 1’s funds came in the form of a loan, subject to repayment.  Investor 2 provided a 
loan, subject to repayment and was involved in the organisation’s board of governance (see below).  
The third investor provided grant funding so did not require repayment (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1. 
for details of the contractual arrangements).   In the second, a representative from Investor 2 was 
placed on the non-profit’s board of governance in an observer role, where they had access to 
organisational information.  As a new actor, the representative of the investor could seek to influence 
the senior leadership team and speak in board meetings, but was limited in that they had no voting 
rights.  The introduction of this principal was met with apprehension by one senior manager who said:  
 
“I think initially I was feeling a bit uncomfortable about them being on the board, but that’s 
only been good, and I would have no problem if they wanted to return to be an observer on 
the board.” (A1).   
 
The investor’s observer role was not perceived to be a potential conflict of interest.  One senior 
manager felt that “our mission and their mission are so closely aligned, that I think that enables them 
to do that” (A2).  
 
The interview data from Provider B suggest that the SIB contract introduced two new agency 
relationships to the organisation’s existing principal-agent relationships.  This was in the form of 1) 
the obligation to repay loans to investors and 2) the investors who introduced an additional layer of 
governance and oversight embedded via the SPV’s governance board.  Unlike in Provider A, these 
stakeholders had no role in the wider oversight of the non-profit’s direction as their oversight was 
limited to the SIB service.  Senior and middle managers in Provider B were accountable to a new 
principal (the investors as directors of the SPV board) but expressed that these relationships were 
positive, with the investors having a high degree of trust in the non-profit’s expertise: 
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“It’s been a good experience for us to have to answer to private sector, social investors, and 
still private sector investors. So, there’s fresh eyes on what we do, and that’s been interesting, 
but I think they’ve deferred to us in the, sort of, day to day running of our work with clients, 
because they aren’t experts, and they appreciate that we are.  So, maybe we’ve been lucky in 
that case, but they haven’t tried to be involved on a day to day basis.  They’re more interested 
in the tone and the general direction of travel, and that we do well.” (B2) 
 
Provider B’s wider organisation was subcontracted by the SPV as the service delivery body in this SIB 
contract.  In Provider B, the SPV’s directors held influence over the allocation of funds for service 
delivery.  One team manager said that the directors were closely involved in operational decisions and 
had a role in scrutinising subcontracts, saying:  
 
“[The SPV] and [Provider B] are two different things, so I think that the investors have taken a 
keen interest in money that is moved across from [SPV] to [Provider B].” (B2) 
 
“I think ultimately, we are accountable to that [quarterly governance] meeting, which is, 
[senior manager] sits on it, [other senior manager], [name] is the head of services in [Provider 
B], and then there’s the investors who attend that meeting as well, and the director of finance. 
So, that’s where we go over figures, and the projections and the outcomes, and any areas of 
concern are flagged up at that meeting, and then we have to answer to it, there and then. So, 
that’s the main oversight that we have.” (B2) 
 
6.3.  Approach to incentives 
This section discusses the impact of the incentives introduced through the SIB contract on the two 
non-profit providers and the impact this had on their behaviour. First, this section considers how the 
senior and team managers interpreted and prioritised the introduction of direct financial incentives 
on their organisations.  Second, it discusses how indirect financial incentives were framed and 
understood by team managers.   
 
The SIB contract introduced direct financial incentives in the form of outcomes-related payments to 
the two providers for achieving outcomes for a defined group.  In both sites, all data monitoring and 
performance measurement were conducted in house.  It was possible that greater information 
asymmetries could arise where agents (here, the two non-profit organisations) had considerable 
freedom and flexibility over the structure of their service delivery team and where there was no direct 
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external monitoring by another party.   This differs from conventional contracts for service delivery in 
the homelessness sector and other SIBs where oversight or direct management is embedded in the 
service delivery contract, or in the form of commissioner-driven process targets, such as an external 
auditor, or a performance and contract manager.  Further, the SIB contracts differed from 
conventional funding mechanisms because they were only remunerated on outcomes.  This was 
unlike conventional forms of financing in this sector that link service provision payments to 
intermediate process measures, such as participation rates or service delivery specifications.   
 
As the outcomes-based approach introduced direct financial incentives for each organisation to 
achieve outcomes-related payments, senior managers had considerable freedom and flexibility to set 
out organisational priorities for their team managers and over the structure of their service delivery 
team. The introduction of direct incentives in the form of financial rewards for the organisation 
affected how senior managers in each organisation set out their strategic priorities and 
communicated them to middle and team managers.  In turn, middle and team managers had the 
freedom to direct their staff along a continuum of potential behaviours that may have prioritised 
financial incentives over actions that placed the client group first.  These potential behaviours include, 
but are not limited to, potentially perverse behaviours such as parking, creaming, gaming, or positive 
unintended behaviours, such as greater autonomy or more effective pathways to societal integration 
for homeless individuals.   
 
One senior manager reflected cautiously about the freedom and flexibility embedded in a SIB 
contract, particularly on the potential limitations of expecting non-profit service providers to do their 
best because they are expected to act altruistically. This manager’s perspective highlights the 
difficulties with using incentives in contracting for outcomes in non-profit organisations, as it is 
difficult to control for the preferences and priorities of individual agents.  
 
“There’s always the risk that if it is a [p4p] program, where some degree of gaming or cherry 
picking is available –are the people who need these services the most, actually getting [their] 
needs neglected – because there’s nothing triggering [service delivery to them], minus the 
confidence [that] we’re working with people who are highly motivated to help people, so we’ll 
just trust their best judgement, which is great and it’s largely true, but it’s not always true? 
You’re taking a real leap of faith on the organisations hiring the right people, and hoping that 
they do good work, so therefore their teams will do that.” (B1) 
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This exemplifies the difficulties embedded in introducing incentives when a principal (public 
commissioner) contracts for outcomes from non-profit organisations.  It is difficult to contract for the 
full range of preferences and priorities of individual agents involved in service delivery.   
 
6.3.1.  Non-profit mission and the alignment of SIB outcomes  
A non-profit organisation’s ethos and operational focus is found in their mission statement, a guiding 
principle that frames their focus and work.  When non-profits embark on work that is perceived to 
detract from or be poorly aligned with their mission statement, there can be ‘mission drift,’ described 
as activities a non-profit engages with that may divert time, resources, or energy away from the non-
profit’s mission (Weisbrod, 2004, Anheier, 2005).  It is important to discuss how the senior leadership 
viewed and framed the SIB work within their organisation’s goals and their wider role in the sector.  
 
Interviews with the senior leadership teams at both case study organisations revealed that they saw 
some novel aspects of the SIB as aligned with their respective organisational missions.  In both cases, 
senior management felt that the SIB’s outcomes of supporting sustained accommodation, fostering 
transitions to employment, and thereby improved health outcomes were aligned with their own best 
possible hopes for the group, with one senior manager saying, “the metrics made sense, they were 
holistic, they took out some of the cherry picking that can go on in PbR stuff where you just go for the 
easy outcomes” (B1). The senior leadership at Provider A emphasised that the SIB work was appealing 
to the organisation because they saw the intervention’s focus on outcomes achievement, such as 
settled accommodation in the UK, repatriation to country of origin, transition to education, training, 
volunteering or employment, and less chaotic interactions with the NHS, as being aligned with their 
organisation’s mission to “transform people’s lives” (A1). 
 
The introduction of outcomes based rewards in these case studies was seen to be a positive thing 
insofar as the paid outcomes measures were seen to reflect core organisational goals in both 
organisations.  There was broad support for the SIB’s focus on securing long-term accommodation to 
facilitate a pathway to social integration and improved health outcomes as supportive of each 
organisation’s own goals:  
 
“The outcomes were so in line with our business. Getting people into long term 
accommodation was really important, always has been…” (A1) 
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“it’s really core, core business and so it wasn’t particularly that it was a SIB or that it was PbR, 
it was mainly that it also overlapped with a lot of stuff that we ran, some generic street 
outreach services, in some of the boroughs that would be used. So, it was a no brainer really to 
go for it.” (B1) 
 
6.3.2.  Organisational views on contracting for outcomes 
It is important to consider how senior, middle and team managers viewed the use of outcomes-based 
contracting in their work, and for wider application in their sector.  By understanding how managers 
saw the imposition of outcomes-related financial rewards for the organisation, it is possible to 
understand the organisational choices and priorities set out by each non-profit.  
 
In both providers, there was a demonstrated willingness to engage with the new service delivery 
model and explore how success could be achieved. In practice, both providers were eager to 
emphasise that their SIB experiences were very positive.  This indicated that the senior leadership in 
both organisations were strongly committed to relaying the importance of the intervention, and in 
enabling their service delivery team to be successful. For example, a senior manager in Provider B was 
sharply critical of the potential downsides of outcomes-based contracting but felt that the SIB’s focus 
on longer term outcomes was positive, saying: 
 
“I’m a big fan, not necessarily of PBR, but I’m a big fan of sustained outcomes being your 
measure of how well you’re doing.” (B1) 
 
The senior leadership in both organisations reflected on the success of the projects in terms that 
emphasised the benefits of outcomes-focussed work as opposed to rewarding process measures at 
the organisational and service delivery level because of the freedom and flexibility it enabled.  The 
quote below illustrates how a senior manager in Provider A described how the SIB freed providers 
from focussing on processes, to what worked best, rather than being cautious about the potential 
drawbacks or hazards of the outcomes-based approach. 
“What you can do with a SIB is, in a way, you don’t have to be concerned about 
how the outcomes are achieved.  You’re just asking the organisation to find ways 
of helping that group of people, so you can step back, and the SIB if you like, does 
its work because it’s based on payment by results and there’s an obligation, then, 
on the organisation that’s involved, to find solutions. That’s what the SIB did for us, 
it forced us to develop new relationships, and new ways of working.  In the process, 
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we learned a great deal.  We never would have thought about those different long 
term accommodation outcomes without a SIB.” (A1).   
 
Managers in Provider A welcomed the introduction of outcomes-based contracts and did not express 
concerns about the use of the SIB financing mechanism in their work. The senior leadership were 
asked if the use of outcomes-based performance funding was at odds with the non-profit’s 
organisational ethos.  Interviewees did not view the imposition of outcomes based rewards to their 
work as a problem but as a positive influence in focusing their staff on organisational goals.   For 
example, when asked to reflect on the use of performance related pay in the non-profit sector, one 
senior manager compared their organisation’s experience to that of another organisation where: 
 “… they regarded themselves as almost being tarnished working to a payment by 
results approach that’s shifting them away from their very strong moral 
imperatives.  I think most of the staff at [Provider A], they didn’t feel that, because 
the outcomes were so in line with our business.  Getting people into long term 
accommodation was really important, always has been, and it gave us the 
opportunity, and it forced us to unlock new outcomes, and new options that we 
hadn’t considered before.” (A1) 
 
By contrast, Provider B expressed greater scepticism about the use of outcomes-based payments in 
the homelessness sector.  One senior manager said they decided to bid for the project because the 
organisation had an obligation to their commissioners to test the use of SIBs and performance-related 
pay in the homelessness sector.  Interviews with senior and team managers described an organisation 
that did not stress the importance of the SIB to their organisation’s reputational success.  Here, one 
informant from the senior leadership team said “I guess we felt that we had to be in it really, whether 
we thought it was a good idea, SIBs or anything like that, it was kind of the new show in town and we 
probably could have financed the thing ourselves, but we wanted to see how it was structured, what it 
did and didn’t do. Used it as a pilot really.” (B1).  The managers were confident that the organisation 
had a strong reputation in the sector and felt, at the outset, that if the project failed, it would not be 
for a lack of effort or “for fault of trying” (B3).  Managers were ambivalent about the importance of 
the SIB’s financial success due to underlying concerns about whether performance pay could be at 
odds with the organisation’s ethos.  The language used to describe their choice to participate in the 
project may indicate that there was a gap between what constituted SIB success and organisational 
success:  
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“Payment by results has been great for us.  We think it [has] given the team a, sort of, focus 
and a drive that’s just been really great, maybe surprisingly so, I don’t know. And, because we 
are a homelessness charity, we’ve been able to just ignore the potential issues with payment 
by results, which are that you cherry-pick and you don’t work with the most in need. We have, 
anyway, just because we see that as our role. Reputationally [sic], it’d be rubbish for us to just 
say, well, we’re going to work with these easy people, and morally – why would you work for 
an organisation like this if you’re going to do that? But, that is definitely a risk with payment 
by results, isn’t it? Especially 100% payment by results.” (B2) 
 
This confidence extended to their relationships with commissioners.  One team manager affirmed 
that the organisation had “done rough sleeping for a long time, so I think the commissioners are fairly 
confident that we know roughly what we’re doing, so we had a bit of leeway from them, I’m sure, if 
our results initially weren’t that great” (B2).  This was an important finding which is likely to have 
affected how the project was framed and articulated from senior managers to mid-level management 
and the staff that implemented the project.   
 
6.3.3.  Organisational approach to financial risk 
Both provider organisations acknowledged that the SIB projects placed their organisations at financial 
risk, especially since repayments were due on a quarterly basis with interest (See Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.1 for contractual details about the allocation of risk between parties in each provider side).  The 
senior managers in Providers A and B conveyed that the viability of the project over the three years of 
the contract, particularly for maintaining overhead costs and staff levels, was closely linked to the 
level of revenue generated by the projects.  At the strategic level, managers in both organisations 
framed their efforts and use of personalisation budgets for the client group, in part, as a current 
investment made relative to the potential for future outcomes-related payments: 
 
“So, we’ve got staffing, and what we call, personal budgets. So, they’re the two big costs and 
we’ve got a record of every client, how much we’ve spent on them. So, we try and balance up 
how much money we’re going to make off them, how much money can we afford to spend on 
them? So, it pays to pay for people’s deposits sometimes, £2,000.00, because actually you’re 
going to make £8,000.00. So, it might seem like a lot of money, but it’s just a way of weighing 
it, and that was very different for the team, I think, this, we’re going to spend this money now 
and we’re going to calculate that we’re going to get some outcomes out of it. So, it’s always 
investing, what does the client need now? What’s the pay-off going to be?” (B1) 
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This was echoed by team managers in Provider B as they described their overall approach to 
outcomes and how the SIB model was operationalised:  
 
“So you’d spend money to make money and that’s a business model that’s been there for a 
long time. You don't have any business that says, “Oh, I can’t spend anything,” 'cause if they 
want to make profit, then they have to put something in first of all, and we did that from the 
very get-go, we did that with the investors, and then we did that throughout the project. So, 
we would have no qualms in buying somebody [a] carpet, paying for curtains, we want them 
to live in their flat, we don’t want them to, to just have the keys to their flat and it feel as cold 
and dank as the streets do, you know.  So we’re creating a home in order [for] them to actually 
live there.” (B3) 
 
Both organisations were similar in how they articulated the merits of investing time and money into 
the population to achieve outcomes.  Both acknowledged that this was linked to the sustainability of 
the intervention over the three years of the project.  It should be noted that Provider A’s managers 
utilised harsher language about the importance of focusing efforts on generating outcomes-related 
payments.  The language used to describe the organisational prioritisation of financial incentives 
revealed how the senior leadership framed, and potentially transmitted, project goals as an important 
strategic shift to team managers and front line staff. 
 
“It’s not that this person on the street is going to be neglected – if there’s any sign they’re 
going to move off the street, we’ll be around that person like wasps round a honeypot in order 
to get that person off the street. We’re entirely committed to getting the most vulnerable off 
the street, but we have to decide where we were going to focus our attention, and I think that 
was an interesting shift for the team.” (A1) 
 
At the middle management level too, there was evidence of this focus on outcomes generation.  One 
senior manager made overt references to how team managers were pushed to emphasise the 
importance of meeting outcomes to front line staff: 
 
“I think every single day [team manager] was telling them the first contact was the first 
[outcome], and then people off the street.  So, as a team, concentrate on rough sleepers and 
get as many off the street.  And then that naturally, the [outcome] goal, initial 
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accommodation, outcomes as well as you, as you went along. So that's what happened. We 
also talked to them about how much money you get for each outcome.” (A3) 
 
By contrast, Provider B’s managers presented a more cautious approach to the potential for revenue 
generation.  Managers were aware that the SIB was high profile and required that they be: “… 
outcome focussed; we have to make sure that we’re on the ball in a, sort of, business-minded way, 
where maybe we wouldn’t be in other commissioning structures.” (B2).  This differed from Provider A 
as Provider B’s managers did not report overt pressure from senior management to strongly 
communicate the importance of generating outcomes to their staff. 
 
6.3.4.  Organisational approach to staff structure and expenditures 
The SIBs represented the opportunity to expand service delivery in innovative ways in each 
organisation.  It is important to consider the strategic value placed on the SIB’s success and on 
generating outcomes payments in each provider.  Where high importance was placed on generating 
outcomes payments to ensure that the total loan amount could be repaid, it appeared that the 
organisational approach to staffing differed, with a focus on risk mitigation in Provider A. For example, 
in Provider A, there was a significant decision by senior leadership to pare down expenditure on 
clients in Year 2 after lower than expected revenue from the first year of the intervention (See 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3, Provider Performance for details of target and actual performance and 
Chapter 7 for details of how front line staff responded to this).  One manager noted that they were 
subject to very stringent financial constraints compared to a previous manager.  This was because of 
an “overspend in year 1 and part of year 2” (A4), and so, this manager had access to smaller 
personalised budgets for the client group than early in the intervention. This manager was limited in 
the amount of money available to operate the project and suggested that it might have been better 
to start small and grow the service than the front loaded approach the organisation used.  
 
By contrast, in Provider B, the managers took a more cautious approach to expenditure in the first 
year, and throughout the intervention.  They displayed a greater reluctance to buy large items for 
clients and tended to provide deposits for the private rented sector but framed them as loans to 
clients subject to repayment.  This was intended to foster a sense of obligation among clients, but also 
to preserve capital for service delivery over the long term.  Where entertainment was provided, staff 
emphasised that any tablets or televisions provided to the client group were normally donated or 
financed as part of grants for technology from other organisations.  
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There were conflicting reports at Provider A about the reduction in expenditure.  The senior 
leadership did not corroborate, and denied, that such operational decisions were made because of 
lower than projected performance-related payments after the first year of the intervention despite 
claims to the contrary by all other staff interviewed in Provider A.   As a result, it is possible that either 
the senior leadership chose to reduce costs by applying firm pressure on middle managers or that 
there was a substantial misunderstanding throughout the organisational hierarchy. 
 
6.3.5.  Organisational approach to collaboration with other service providers 
In both case study organisations, the senior leadership were aware of the high-profile nature of the 
SIB contracts and that they were intended to disrupt traditional approaches to service provision 
through the introduction of a housing-first and outcomes-based approach.  The provider 
organisations differed in how they responded to these financial incentives, with Provider A choosing 
to deliver services in-house while Provider B chose to sub-contract with other local partners. In 
Provider A, these decisions can be viewed as organisational choices that set out a more competitive, 
results-focused path for mid-level managers and front line staff who implemented the project, 
particularly in the front-loaded approach to outcomes in Year 1.  In Provider B, it illustrates the 
longer-term view that Provider B took for the organisation, particularly as it relates to the delivery of 
services over Years 2 and 3 when they were more ambitious about the number of outcomes 
achievable.  These strategic organisational choices highlight the difference in how the two SIB projects 
were conceptualised and operationalised at the outset. 
 
Provider A framed its SIB project as part of an innovative way of working in the sector that required a 
more business-like approach to achieve better outcomes than existing service provision.  For 
example, one senior manager said, “many other agencies couldn’t see how you could create a project 
like a business and then work with people” (A3).  The senior managerial team framed the SIB as a new 
way to engage with a sector that was ‘in shambles’ and ‘failing’, and viewed their service delivery 
model as disrupting established homelessness service pathways. The managers chose not to 
collaborate with other organisations because they thought that it could erode the sense of a single 
team and their organisation’s goals: 
 
“I never wanted that to happen, because my thing is we are a team and there's a danger you 
lose that team dynamic if you're kind of spaced out all over the place. How do you have a 
consistent message? How do you have a consistent vision if you're spending 95% somewhere 
else? So, I was really wanting it to be a case of ‘we're a team’.” (A5) 
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This provider also felt it was unnecessary to establish formal partnerships or subcontracts with allied 
organisations.  This was because they felt other providers were paid for their efforts, albeit 
differently, and they believed that they were responsible for most of the work that led to outcomes-
related payments:  
 
“… why should we pay someone to, you know, put people into a nice new job, if that was just 
because someone else does it, does that mean we’ve got to do it now? And so it comes, you 
come to a turning point, you know, what do you want to do, that’s how I felt, you know, and I 
think my manager at the time, [manager 1], discussed that with me and “What do you think?” 
And I thought well we had been doing a lot of the work ourselves anyway, I thought why do 
we have to pay them money for it? So in that sense I was glad that we took the path that we 
done really.” (A9, front line staff) 
 
“There was a lot of resistance from, certain people because, essentially, I mean, all these 
clients were not our clients, they were clients who had already been assisted by other 
individuals, so I think some of them kind of took it like a slap in the face saying, so what is it 
you can do that we haven't done already. What makes you think that you're better than us, 
kind of thing?” (A5) 
 
It was reported that other non-SIB service providers in the homelessness sector were hostile about 
collaborating with, or contributing to, work that aided clients in Provider A’s group. Senior, middle 
and team managers felt that other service providers colluded, to reinforce dependency in their clients 
because of the fee for service nature of their service delivery contract so it was unsurprising that they 
were reluctant to help generate outcomes-related payments.  There was little emphasis on cultivating 
collaboration and partnership working to enable buy-in from other service providers at Provider A. 
 
In Provider B, there was a greater focus on quickly forming a team and pursuing collaborative 
partnerships with other service delivery organisations that were already involved in a Central London 
borough where most of the client group lived.  The senior and team managers said this was a 
conscious choice to pursue collaborative approaches, drawing on the expertise and resources of other 
allied organisations to succeed with the project.   
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At the outset, there was a decision by the project’s director to subcontract service delivery to two 
other provider organisations.  Provider B established a formal partnership with two day centres 
(where large numbers of their homeless group members were regularly found) in a central London 
borough.  This enabled wider buy-in from organisations they would be working alongside, while 
benefiting from their new partners’ relative experience and knowledge about the SIB client group.  
There was a tacit acknowledgement that partner working was important to programme success and it 
was important to corral others in the sector to enable wider buy-in and support for Provider B’s 
outcomes-based payment work with clients.   
 
“So instead of trying to put our own people into their centres, it made sense to recruit and 
have their people in their centres.  You get buy-in, all of a sudden they want to help you out.  
You get added value, in that you get the outcomes from work that you’re not paying for as 
well.  The day centres are achieving and things like that, so you get two big well-funded bodies 
working for you and instead of what [Provider A] did, was not to do that really, and they 
encountered probably more blockages I think, to them achieving stuff… it’s not best if you 
have lots of different people working in different ways and no one’s really talking.”  (B1) 
 
The difference in organisational approach to the wider sector is captured in the quote above and 
points to how the two SIB projects were conceptualised and implemented in different ways at the 
outset from the perspective of a senior manager.  This highlights the longer-term view that Provider B 
took for the organisation and delivery of services over the latter years of the intervention. 
 
 
6.4.  Framing and operationalisation of incentives and outcomes-based contracts 
at meso-organisation level 
 
Senior managers were influential in determining how the direct and indirect financial incentives 
embedded in the SIB contract were framed and understood by team managers. By considering how 
the case study providers communicated, measured and monitored team performance, it was possible 
to explore the impact of these new incentives for each organisation.   
 
6.4.1.  Communicating financial risk 
It is important to consider the influence of senior leadership and management on the actions of team 
managers.  For example, in Provider A, managers appeared to have been under substantial pressure 
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to meet outcome targets, and demonstrate that the project could be a financial success. The high 
organisational priority about this project resonated throughout the interviews with middle and team 
managers.  For example, the chief executive attended team meetings on a quarterly basis. Managers 
in Provider A also cited the rapid mobilisation process where they “had to hit the ground running” 
(A3) in the early days of the contract. 
 
Managers in Provider A viewed outcomes, and outcomes achievement, as key guiding goals that 
framed and oriented their work. They were reported to be a useful motivational tool for their staff. 
One team manager confirmed this articulation of these strategies in explaining how managers 
presented the achievement of outcomes to the front line staff team: 
“If you miss one, this [is how] much [money] we lose. And that motivated the team 
as I said before, to motivate the team outcome to make them outcome focused, 
we know the client is going to benefit in the end… we had to get people into 
accommodation” (A5) 
 
Senior managers exerted a strong influence over their team manager’s staff capacity and the service 
delivery model. Interview data revealed that Provider A’s low performance in year one had direct 
consequences for how the project was funded and staffed in subsequent years.  This limited the 
capacity of the team manager to staff her/his team as s/he wished to, or to invest in different areas of 
service delivery as s/he saw fit.  In this case, the outcomes-based contract resulted in a sense of 
resource scarcity23, and pressure to constrain costs by any means, rather than enabling the team 
manager to use upfront investment funds (from investors) to build capacity.   
 
“SIBs (sic) is very different, in that although the budget is set for what could be spent [in] 
year[s] one, two, and three, I think because of the overspend in year one and two, that 
although I’ve been given what I could ideally set as well, I’m more or less being told, “No, don’t 
spend any more.”  So in an ideal world, yes, I would have my own budget and I could be like, 
“Well, we’ve got client welfare, I’m going to spend an awful lot more,” but taking into account 
                                                          
 
23 If Provider A had met more outcomes targets in the first year, it is possible that the Senior Leadership might have made 
more resources available to the SIB delivery team in the second and third years.  Conversely, with more resources in Years 2 
and 3, it was possible that they could have hit more and more outcome targets, and therefore the staff could have gained 
more and more by way of resources over the course of the contract.  See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2., for a fuller explanation of 
target versus actual performance over the course of the contract.  
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[that] if we haven’t hit our targets in year one and two, that then has an impact, which 
naturally is staff numbers or how much extra resources there are.” (A4) 
 
There appeared to have been a less pressurised environment in Provider B.   Managers reported that 
low performance in the first year did not affect service delivery and staffing numbers.  The interview 
data from Provider B did not reveal an explicit emphasis on the link between payments and where 
effort should be exerted by staff: 
 
“I was very conscious that they didn't get wrapped up in the outcomes.  And that some of staff 
would get more outcomes than others, so it wasn’t a competition. I remember the first sort of 
quarter, one of them saying, “But I’m never going to get an outcome because of the clients 
you've given me.” And it was true that on paper she wouldn't have got an outcome in the 
sense that she had the extremely, complex cases with rough sleeping histories of 20+ years in 
some of her clients. And I said, “Well, you won’t get them as quickly as other people but you’ll 
get them, and we’re not, your salaries aren’t payment by results and we’re not doing a [sic] 
performance reviews of, you need to get X amount of tenancies, you need to get this, that and 
the other.” (B3) 
 
In Provider B, interviews found no evidence that team managers used the financial incentives for the 
organisation associated with outcomes-related payments to motivate their team.  Here, the SIB 
enabled personalised budgets and access to funds that were not otherwise possible in project funded 
through conventional commissioning.  There was evidence that team managers in Provider B 
monitored whether front line staff used personalisation budgets for the client group in an equitable 
way on a regular basis. 
 
“We did record how much money we spent on all individuals and then [team manager] would 
look at that and flag any individuals who we were spending a lot of money on and then he 
would do that by worker as well. So he would pinpoint any worker who was spending too, a lot 
of money and then question them about that and just try to make them more aware of if, if 
it’s really necessary or not.” (B10, administrator) 
 
By contrast, in Provider A, there was evidence that personalised budgets were sharply reduced across 
the group to mitigate the financial risk to the organisation throughout the intervention.  One team 
manager reflected on how s/he managed the consequences of the overspend in year one:  
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“I really just cut down on them using their credit card. [At the] team meeting, I was saying that 
we spent this much and we need to stop the spending. We need to stop taking out people for 
coffee. We've engaged with them now, we can do other things. We could do, you know, peer 
mentoring and getting for, going for walks and museum.” (A4) 
 
6.4.2.  Approach to service delivery 
At the operational level, each case study organisation’s approach to service delivery reflected how the 
financial incentives were understood and prioritised by the managerial teams.   
 
At Provider A, the leadership team enacted a front-loaded approach to service delivery, intended to 
introduce an external ‘shock’ to the homelessness system, with the intention of jolting clients and 
staff out of established patterns of working through an influx of personalised support and financial 
assistance through personalised budgets for each client.  Their team was smaller at the outset of the 
intervention with one team manager and seven front line staff, and reduced after the first year of 
operation to four front line staff. To compensate for the smaller team, the service delivery model 
relied on a mix of unpaid workers, including short-term social work interns drawn from a Scandinavian 
University partnership and volunteers.  The volunteers were described as ‘peer mentors’ – individuals 
with previous experiences of homelessness or substance abuse (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for details 
of the provider’s decision to use a front-loaded approach to intervention). This reflected the senior 
manager’s focus on breaking even, after lower than anticipated performance in the first year of the 
intervention: 
 
 “I mean, that’s important to us, because we want to make sure that we’re financially robust, 
but also, that’s important, we had to prove to ourselves that it could be done, because what 
we don’t want to do is embark on lots of exciting SIBs that give us high profile, and we find out 
that we’re essentially spending our reserves. But, that isn’t to say we didn’t also bring other 
resources from elsewhere to support the SIB...” (A1)  
 
At Provider B, the leadership team made an organisational decision to employ a consistent number of 
staff members over the 36 months of the contract. This enabled the organisation to take a gradual 
approach to outcomes’ achievement.  Both managers felt that they had sufficient credibility in the 
sector, and so pursued a slower approach to achieving outcome targets.  This was notable because 
they expressed that they were confident that if outcomes were not met in the early quarters, they 
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would be able to compensate for any losses in subsequent quarters. Provider B’s managers expressed 
a high degree of confidence and autonomy in how outcomes would be pursued. One team manager 
said: 
 
I think we had quite a slow start outcomes-wise. I think initially, the first couple of quarters, 
our tenancies were not great; we didn’t have huge outcomes, and I suppose there was a bit of 
concern at that stage, but we had taken this approach deliberately, so we kind of knew that 
that was what was [anticipated].” (B2) 
 
In Provider B, there were lower than projected outcomes achievement in the first year but team 
managers were confident that their approach to service delivery would result in outcomes-related 
payments in the second and third years of the intervention.  This reflects the finding that the 
managers in Provider B had a wide degree of autonomy and did not face strong organisational or 
strategic pressure to generate outcomes-related payments.  There was no evidence that the team 
managers faced pressure to pursue outcomes as a source of revenue generation to justify continued 
expenditures, such as staff salaries or client expenses.  Instead, team managers and their staff were 
cautious in how they framed service delivery, given the potential for adverse behaviour: 
 
“…people were concerned at the start about whether we would push people into things too 
early just to get the payment, when they weren’t ready. I really don’t think we did that. I think 
that’s part of the maybe slightly different approach we took, because we thought, well, that’s 
a, sort of, Housing First approach; that’s not going to work with everyone. We’ve got three 
years, we might as well take our time and give people a chance to get there eventually... 
That’s got more chance of sticking in the long run.” (B3) 
 
“There were some people that, kind of, were so chaotic and had been on the streets for so 
long … that the prospect of them sustaining 12 months in accommodation was so slim that if 
you thought like that, you probably just wouldn't work with them.  So, it was really trying to do 
whatever it took to minimise harm and stuff, and it was, the thinking was much more, like we 
spend the money where it’s needed, and the outcomes that we get with that client might not 
make up the money that we’re spending, but the outcomes we get with other clients will.” 
(B10, non-managerial staff) 
 
These quotes reflected the gradual approach to outcomes achievement taken in Provider B.  One 
manager added that her/his role was shield workers from outcomes, saying in the first instance, the 
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role of the manager was to worry about missed outcomes, so if targets were missed in one area, it 
was their responsibility to figure out if it was possible to “make it back” later in other areas (B3). They 
were confident that, over the course of three years, outcomes would follow, if given time for the 
project to bed in, and for the front line staff to establish relationships with the target population.  This 
highlights the importance of individual autonomy in how team managers responded to incentives 
and, in turn, the impact this had on how the incentives were articulated in terms of their effect on 
service delivery. 
 
6.4.3.  Data monitoring and performance management 
In these outcomes-based contracts, there were no process measures so providers had considerable 
freedom and flexibility over the structure of their service delivery team.  Here, the agents (senior and 
middle managers) were responsible for data monitoring and performance management.  The case 
study organisations differed in their approaches to internal monitoring and management which 
highlight the importance of examining how incentives are communicated through an organisation’s 
hierarchy to understand the impact of incentives during the implementation process.   
 
In Provider A, team managers were responsible for data monitoring and performance management.  
One team manager felt that this took ‘some headache off the [front line] staff’ (A4) by working to 
evidence outcomes. However, this was challenging as they felt that their front line staff often failed to 
prioritise outcomes, and pointed to a conflict between doing good work and the practicality of what 
needed to be evidenced.  
 “It’s all well and good that you’ve worked for over a year and that individual has 
transformed, and you can write an amazing case study, but actually, I haven’t got 
that piece of paper to them do the claims form to get the payment.” (A4) 
 
In Provider B, there was a dedicated outcomes officer responsible for data monitoring and 
performance management.  This created an independent in-house administrator who was removed 
from the managerial staff and the front line staff.  This was a distinct role that functioned as a means 
of creating distance between the actions of front line staff and the actions necessary to collect data to 
evidence outcomes: 
 
“A lot of the time that I was in the office talking to them, talking to the workers when they 
came back, it was almost like their break time when they came back to the office and they 
would let off steam about everything… I would always remember and then make a note, and I 
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had like my, my spreadsheet of outcome and potential outcomes and using that in 
collaboration with CHAIN meant that I was constantly looking at things from an outcomes 
point of view and they were giving me the qualitative information that I could then use to, to 
inform that.” (B10) 
 
6.4.4.  Staff structure 
In both sites, senior and middle managers focused on quickly recruiting and putting in place a project 
team, alongside team managers.   In Providers A and B, the service delivery teams were assembled 
within two months of the contract signing.  The service delivery teams in both sites were recruited to 
deliver the intervention on 12-month contracts in the first instance, with the potential for renewal.  
Most staff had previous work experience in street outreach, in hostels or housing assistance, or in 
mental health and substance abuse.  The staff were drawn from the homelessness sector and brought 
a wide range of previous experiences that ranged from two to over ten years.  There was a distinction 
between the more and less experienced staff.  Staff who had been working in the sector for a long 
time tended to be more experienced outreach workers.  They were excited by the opportunity to 
experiment with a new mode of service delivery that offered more freedom and flexibility over how 
front line staff could interact with the client group.  While the contracts were only for 12 months in 
the first instance, staff assumed that there was a strong chance their contracts would be extended 
because the broader SIB contracts were for three years.  This reflected the fact that working contracts 
in non-profit organisations tend to be short and, often, linked to the length of the grant or block 
contract available.  Staff were also drawn to the projects for the opportunity to follow clients through 
services that otherwise worked in silos to develop a pathway to sustained accommodation for the 
client group.  Other staff with less experience were attracted the SIBs because they were perceived to 
be a new and unique way of delivering services to an entrenched client group, and staff were drawn 
to work in a high-profile project.  
 
The SIB contract was for a period of three years, however the GLA was contracted to continue 
payments for one of the five outcomes, long term accommodation (payable for 12 and 18 month 
sustainment), for twelve additional months until October of 2016.  These extra 12 months of outcome 
payments were interpreted differently by each organisation.  Provider A interpreted the contract to 
mean that the service was funded for 36 months, and initiated plans to wind down the service at the 
30 month by formally referring clients back to other partner agencies and services when their service 
ended in October of 2015.  At the request of commissioners, this site agreed to keep one staff 
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member and one volunteer on the project for an additional five months after the project ended in 
October of 2015.  
 
On the other hand, Provider B thought it was required to run the service for the full three years and 
that the wind-down should only be initiated in the final month of the project.  They believed that the 
presence of some paid outcomes for a fourth year allowed them to maintain a reduced project team 
of four front line workers and one team manager to continue services for a reduced group of 
individuals until October of 2016.  This was intended to ensure some continued support for 12 
months after the client group had been referred back into conventionally funded services, as 
necessary.  In this wind-down phase, there was some evidence that front line staff received explicit 
instructions from their managers to select and support those group members that could still generate 
payments through sustained accommodation in the year after the contract ended as they winnowed 
down their active group.  Front line staff could keep one to two additional clients who would 
otherwise struggle under conventional services alone, to smooth the withdrawal process.  This 
selection process began in the final two months of the intervention and was specific to the wind down 
in year 3 as Provider B could only keep those clients who were eligible for accommodation payments 
for year 4, this is the point when they pared down the group from 415 to 140 individuals.  
 
6.4.5.  Use of unpaid labour 
There was a substantial difference in the use of unpaid labour that resulted from differences in staff 
structure between the two providers.  Interviews with volunteers in Provider A revealed that a great 
deal of service delivery was handled by peer support workers and volunteers.  Managers reported 
that the volunteers shouldered a larger share of responsibility for less complex clients.  However, 
interviews suggest that the peer support volunteers may have shouldered a larger burden of the case 
load than reported.  These volunteers had complex histories of drug and/or alcohol abuse and 
reported using their own personal histories of homelessness and substance abuse to support the 
client group. This reflects Provider A’s use of a ‘Navigator’ role where the full time front line staff were 
expected to do higher level work such as liaising with the local council, housing or benefits tribunals, 
and referring clients to the necessary services, while daily support for their straightforward cases was 
allocated to support workers or volunteers.   
 
At Provider B, front line staff were responsible for all contacts and interactions with the client group.  
The use of volunteers was very limited, but included accompanying a stable client to see the GP, 
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attending routine jobcentre appointments, or joining a lead worker on a home visit as part of safety 
protocol because front line staff were not to visit clients alone.  
 
6.5.  Conclusion 
This chapter provided an examination of the senior leadership’s interpretation and prioritisation of 
the incentives embedded in the SIB contract and how they were communicated through the 
organisation’s hierarchy and implemented by the team managers.   This chapter explored the impact 
of the outcomes-based SIB contract on the agency relationship, particularly with attention to the 
impact of new principals on the priorities of senior and team managers.  The high-powered 
articulation of incentives affected how middle- and team managers saw their roles.  This highlighted 
the inherent difficulties in contracting on outcomes alone, given the difficulties implicit in public 
services delivery where there are multiple principals with potentially divergent interests that can 
change the agency relationship.   
 
This chapter found that the introduction of new principals, particularly in the form of social investors, 
influenced senior and middle managers in both organisations who felt it was important to 
demonstrate a more business-minded approach.  The strategic value placed on the direct financial 
incentives for the organisations and importance of successful SIB implementation were strongly 
communicated to team managers and influenced their approach to service delivery, staff size, and 
personal budgets allotted to the client group.  There was evidence that senior and middle managers 
at Provider A placed overt pressure on their front-line staff to generate outcomes-related payments 
that was not found in Provider B.  There was a stronger focus on mitigating financial risk by pushing 
team managers in Provider A to strongly link client outcomes to financial rewards.  In Provider B, it 
appeared that the contractual structure (of the SPV) was a factor that mitigated the financial risk to 
the organisation, whose managers felt that the project’s success was less important than ensuring 
that the intervention remained client-focused.  This was perhaps because the marginal financial effect 
on Provider B was smaller for three reasons: because the senior managers saw it as a pilot, proof of 
concept regarding the use of SIBs in the homelessness sector, it was a much larger organisation, and 
the SPV shielded the organisation from financial risk.  It should be noted that the SPV was a 
contributing factor in that it financially insulated Provider B’s wider organisation from the financial risk 
of failure but there were other important factors that contributed to the differences in how incentives 
were communicated through the organisation, namely Provider B’s larger size, role in the 
homelessness sector and greater financial stability.  This chapter provided evidence that senior 
managers’ perceptions of risk and reward were communicated through their respective organisations 
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and were important factors in determining how team managers prioritised and implemented the SIBs.  
The next chapter will explore the impact of these findings on front line staff and their behaviour. 
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 Front line staff experiences 
 
This chapter explores the impact of the incentives embedded in the SIB contract on the behaviour of 
front line staff.  The analysis of senior and team managers’ responses to incentives found in Chapter 6 
(Managerial experiences) highlighted the implications of outcomes-based contracting for the agency 
relationship, staff structure, task allocation and service delivery.  This chapter builds on those findings 
by considering how front line staff in the two provider organisations responded to the incentives in 
the SIB contract and how, and in what ways, it affected service delivery with the client group. 
 
In the case studies, the success of the projects relied on front line staff to deliver bespoke services to 
a predefined group of individuals. There were no financial incentives for front line staff based on their 
performance.  Team managers and front line staff received no monetary rewards linked to outcomes 
generation; staff received fixed salaries and were hired on twelve month contracts, with the 
possibility of contract renewal (not linked to their capacity to generate outcomes-related SIB 
payments).  It was of interest to this thesis to consider how the indirect financial incentives in the SIBs 
were communicated and operationalised in a setting where no staff remuneration was linked to 
outcome payments. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2 (Theoretical background), incentives have the potential to affect the agency 
relationship, particularly when there exist information asymmetries. As outlined in the framework for 
analysis and established in Chapter 6, the SIB’s approach presented managers with a range of 
potential actions to encourage front line staff to meet outcomes, for example, through greater 
performance management or managerial pressures.  This chapter draws on interview data to 
understand how front line staff responded to the incentives in the SIB contract as communicated by 
managers.  
 
This chapter argues that at the micro-level of the organisation, the introduction of incentives was 
more complex than the standard neo-classical economic view of agents as rational actors who will 
respond to incentives in a predictable way.  Front line provider behaviour varied due to different 
preferences regarding the SIB outcomes, their views on client needs, and the way that managers 
communicated the importance of meeting outcomes and staff structure.  While the SIB was well 
received by staff who were more focused on meeting outcomes, there was the potential for both 
positive and negative unintended behaviours by front line staff. 
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The analysis in this chapter is based on data from interviews with front line staff, volunteers, and 
administrators in the case studies.  This chapter explores the impact of incentives on front line staff’s 
attitudes toward outcome targets, and the selection of, and relationships formed with, intended 
beneficiaries.  First, the chapter examines whether front line staff supported the SIB’s outcomes and 
understood the financial risk faced by their organisations.  Second, the analysis turns to front line 
staff’s responses to managerial techniques, and the role of data monitoring and performance 
management, to understand how front line staff prioritised outcomes.  Third, the final section 
explores the impact of incentives on front line staff behaviour, particularly in how they selected and 
allocated their time and personalisation resources with the client group. 
 
7.1.  Understanding and support for outcomes  
In non-profit organisations, agents serve multiple principals and pursue multiple objectives.  In the 
case studies, front line staff were hired to undertake the delivery of services on an outcomes-based 
basis to the target population on behalf of their non-profit provider employers.  Front line staff 
(agents) were responsible to several principals: their clients, their team managers, the senior 
leadership team, and their peers and teammates.  The presence of multiple principals can change the 
agency relationship between the agent and their employer (principal) because the agent may choose 
to pursue the best interests of their clients (e.g. by choosing to pursue what was best for the client 
instead of what would lead to an outcomes-related payment), rather than those of their employer 
(e.g. to generate the most outcomes to ensure financial sustainability) who often have mixed 
interests. 
 
This section assesses how the SIB had the potential to affect the agency relationship between front 
line staff and their employer to examine what staff understood about the incentivised outcomes, and 
their understanding of the financial risk their organisation faced.  
 
7.1.1.  Support for outcomes 
Given the potential for changes to the agency relationship, it was therefore important to consider 
how front line staff understood, and to what extent, they agreed with the outcomes in use.  For the 
non-profit, it was important that front line staff supported the use of outcomes-based payments and 
incentives in their work, as it was possible that they could purposely choose to ignore some 
outcomes, or they could be induced to engage in unintended behaviours if they disagreed with the 
organisation’s approach to meeting certain outcomes.  This section describes front line staff’s views 
about the SIB outcomes and whether they felt they were appropriate for the sector.  See Chapter 5, 
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Table 5.2. for an overview of the outcomes and Appendix 5 for a detailed description of the outcomes 
and how payments were triggered. 
 
Primary outcomes 
Outcome 1:  Reduction in rough sleeping 
Staff in both sites supported the primary outcomes of reducing rough sleeping among the group.  All 
staff interviewed agreed that reducing the number of individuals sleeping rough was a positive 
outcome and this first SIB outcome provided them with the opportunity to establish long term 
relationships with the group to enable the transition to settled accommodation. 
 
“You got a bit of period where you can make longer lasting change rather than, like you say, 
there’s people just coming in and you just kind of start the process and then they move on 
somewhere else, so it felt like you would start the process and you could really develop 
people.” (A9) 
 
“I liked the idea of working with a set group for a longer period because many of the people I 
work with complained that it was quite fatiguing and emotionally tiring to constantly have to 
tell their same story to a new worker… It was interesting to me to,, to take that feedback and 
think about the opportunity to build rapport and start working with someone and then 
continue kind of coordinating their journey through services.” (B11) 
 
Outcome 2:  Sustained accommodation  
Staff embraced the focus the SIB placed on facilitating a transition into stable accommodation.  They 
were motivated to move clients away from rough sleeping into accommodation.  Payments were 
possible at entry into sustained accommodation, and for remaining in accommodation for 12 and 18 
months afterwards.  Staff reported that they aimed to first move people away from the street into 
housing or hostels, and second to bypass conventional routes to housing homeless individuals 
because they were now able to fund deposits in the private rented sector.   
 
For front line staff, it was important that they felt they could develop pathways for care and 
reintegration that they considered reflective of the best interests of the individuals in the client group 
over the three years of the intervention.  This was an important enabling factor that allowed them the 
freedom and confidence to experiment with different approaches to service delivery because they 
had the time and resources necessary if their clients could not sustain accommodation.  Moreover, 
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staff were confident that they would be supported to advocate for clients when issues arose with 
local councils and housing or benefits-related tribunals.   
 
“We would pay deposits on private rental flats for people that needed it, and we would have, 
we were told we had the money to do that.” (A11) 
 
“The chosen outcomes, I guess, needed to be something that would be generally beneficial to 
people and it would [be] an indication that other parts of their lives were progressing well. So, 
the idea of someone sustaining their own accommodation, having kind of moved out of the 
sector, and incentivising that, because that seemed to be beneficial to the people who’d be 
using the service.” (B11) 
 
Front line staff felt that the focus on outcomes enabled experimentation that would otherwise be 
risky or unrealistic under conventionally funded services in the sector: 
 
“I’d definitely say there was probably more positive risk-taking than maybe a conventional 
other team would take.  I’m a manager of a hostel now - and we certainly probably have a 
more stringent process of assessing people that are going to go into their own 
accommodation.  But I guess the difference is that we had … we could put in a lot more 
support around the tenancy than perhaps other people could, because we did, you know, our 
nine to five job was just working with all these people, so if we got them a flat, we could go 
and see them.” (A13) 
 
Outcome 3:  Repatriation to country of origin 
There was some resistance to carrying out the ‘Reconnections’ outcome where non-UK citizens were 
repatriated to their country of origin.  Some staff expressed ambivalence about this outcome target, 
and reported that in the first instance, they were willing to explore options for the individual to stay in 
the UK particularly because many of the non-UK nationals were capable of, and eager to take on paid 
work once their accommodation needs were met.   
 
“I was really very worried about this and how, as well, [sic] the project, and if there would be 
any pressure for that, for those reconnections, but I think generally we’ve been put in a 
situation like, you know, person-centred and let’s try this to help this individual as much as we 
can. Let’s try to find a route for him for how to place here and if it’s not possible, then we’ll see 
what can happen anywhere else.” (B4) 
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“I remember especially the Reconnection clients, some have been here for years and they're 
never going to go back. So, we shifted the focus and said, they don't have to be reconnected. 
They can be finding work here and they can be living in accommodation. And there're some 
results we got that way because that was a better option for the client.” (A3, manager) 
 
In cases where the first efforts to house non-UK clients were not successful, or broke down, staff in 
both sites supported the repatriation of their clients to their home country where feasible.   
 
“Initially you'd feel Reconnection was the best option. However, the client, you know, did say, 
well, I'd like to stay here. You know, I've been here for six years.  Let's look at accommodation 
and look at meaningful occupation. Things that you'd want to do. And initially it went well. 
And as [manager] said, once that broke down, it's Reconnection.” (A6) 
 
This outcome remained challenging for staff and was exacerbated by changes to UK welfare policies 
under the Coalition government (2010-2015) that made it more difficult for group members from 
Eastern Europe to access housing benefits in the second and third year of the program.  This limited 
the options available to place group members into housing in either the local authority-funded or 
private rented sector, or to link them to support to find work.  Following these changes, some front 
line staff felt that their clients would fare better in their home country than to continue living on the 
street without recourse to public funds or support.  In a small number of cases where front line staff 
felt clients could not be repatriated to their home countries in good conscience, Provider B provided 
support for their clients’ asylum claims, with one of the subcontracted providers providing 
immigration law support. 
 
Secondary outcomes 
Staff felt that the secondary outcomes for education, volunteering or employment and reduced use of 
A&E services reflected their own positive expectations for the group, independent of the SIB.  
 
Outcome 4: Education, volunteering, or employment (part and full time) 
Staff suggested that the outcomes were set too high for their client group.  Staff in Providers A and B 
felt that better measures of employment, training, and health care use could have been used.  For 
members of the group that were willing and able to undertake work or education and training, staff 
felt the NVQ target was too ambitious and noted that these clients were more interested in seeking 
out gainful employment.  They suggested that lower targets such as the completion of an 
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apprenticeship were more appropriate to the group.  They reported that they continued to facilitate 
training (e.g. building courses) that did not generate outcomes-related payments but were more 
appropriate to the needs of their clients.  They said it could be discouraging to know that there were 
no paid outcomes or recognition for the hard work required to get clients that into training courses.  
 
“If you’re looking at [a situation] maybe where lots of people who’ve got no skills, haven’t 
worked for numbers of years, then the employment and education needed to be softer.” (A9) 
 
“We don’t get a payment for it, so yes, that’s just an example of where the metric’s not quite 
right, so, were we not just doing what we think is best for the client, and doing what’s best for 
our outcomes, we would maybe be pushing them into these slightly odd sectors, training 
courses that aren’t in their best interests, computer courses they don’t need, all these kind of 
things, which wouldn’t benefit them, but might just get us a few quid.” (B3, manager) 
 
 
Outcome 5:  Health 
There was limited support for the health outcome of a reduction in admissions to A&E services 
compared to a historic baseline of the number of unplanned A&E admissions per year for the cohort.  
Measuring the health outcome was more complex as it became impossible for the GLA to access the 
data required from the HSCIC (now NHS Digital) to evidence whether there was a reduction in the use 
of unplanned A&E admissions among the group (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3, Outcome 5 for further 
details).  
 
Instead, staff felt that a health outcome should have accounted for the successful completion of an 
alcohol or substance misuse program given the complex needs of homeless people.  In both sites, 
staff reported that clients received support and assistance for substance abuse services.   
 
“They seem to have set the bar in a really strange place with [education and training targets] 
and also with the lack of any sort of recognition for any substance misuse progress at all.” (B7)  
 
The introduction of outcomes-based rewards via indirect incentives on the organisation was positively 
received by managers and front line staff who felt that the outcomes-focused approach allowed them 
greater freedom and autonomy in working with their client population.  Front line staff felt the SIB 
outcomes were beneficial for the target population, and allowed workers to provide ongoing support 
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for individuals, instead of passing clients between agencies.  Staff felt that such improvements would 
not have been possible without the operational freedom and flexibility that SIB financing entailed 
because conventionally funded services (e.g. block contracts) in this sector (rough sleeping and 
housing transitions) tended to operate in silos, making it difficult, if not impossible, to follow up with 
clients once they were referred to other services or boroughs.  Unlike conventionally funded projects, 
the SIB enabled a cross-borough, London-wide approach that allowed staff ‘navigators’ to deliver 
highly personalised services and assistance.   
 
7.2.  Prioritisation and communication of outcomes 
This section explores how front line staff prioritised incentives, and to what extent they pursued SIB 
outcomes in their work.  By examining how front line staff responded to managerial techniques and 
the role of data monitoring and performance management in their work, it is possible to build a 
better understanding as to how incentives were communicated through an organisational hierarchy.  
 
7.2.1.  Response to management technique and outcomes 
Given the potential for changes in the agency relationship, it was important to consider how team 
managers encouraged front line staff to pursue SIB goals and to what degree those reasons resonated 
with front line staff.  This is of interest to understanding how, and to what extent, front line staff 
valued and prioritised outcomes achievement.  
 
In both organisations, team managers gave front line staff the freedom and autonomy to meet 
outcomes through creative methods rather than applying direct financial incentives or process 
measures as proxies for progress towards outcomes.  This reflects each organisation’s choice to 
embrace the outcomes-based approach by not introducing intermediate process measures to control 
for front line staff’s behaviour that could not be fully observed.  In both organisations, front line staff 
reported that there was a supportive environment, high levels of autonomy, and the opportunity to 
be flexible and creative in their approach to service delivery.  An important theme that emerged from 
the data was the importance of managers’ trust in the capacity of the front line staff to be 
autonomous and confident in their work.   
 
Staff at Provider A described themselves as entrepreneurial and outcomes-focused.  They did not 
modify their responses with reflections on the potential of incentives to lead to unintended 
behaviours.  Front line staff at this provider were supportive of the outcomes-based approach to 
funding their work and described themselves as very target-driven and outcomes oriented.   
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“I was driven to do it is because I kind of like to work towards outcomes. I think that in itself is 
quite rewarding, when you have a sort of like structure to work towards then you can persist 
to really, not that you wouldn’t go onto support a client but I think it’s quite an incentive when 
it comes to quite a challenging chaotic [person]” (A8)  
 
One front line staff member who was with the team throughout the first year of operation felt that 
Provider A’s managerial staff should have focused more on specifying organisational goals and 
translating that down to individual actions.  This informant suggested that the SIB team would have 
been more successful had they set out firmer targets and guidelines to capture staff’s willingness to 
seek outcomes.  This reflected the organisation’s choice to select staff, who like their managers, were 
focused on achieving outcomes: 
 
“We were never even set targets, you know, which I think’s a real, again, you know, you could 
easily have internal targets to work towards, which would have, you do it as part of the 
strategy I think, like, this is where we need to be at the end of this quarter” (A11) 
 
At Provider B, staff reported they had a strong rapport with managers who were empathetic about 
the clients’ issues, and supportive when troubleshooting was required.  Staff did not feel that they 
were pushed to link their efforts with clients to the potential outcomes-related payments that could 
be garnered from each client.  Front line staff were consistent in reporting that they had autonomy 
over their decisions as to how, and who, their time was spent with.   
 
“I wasn’t very happy at the beginning, because when you hear payment by result[s], you think 
that you need to do certain things with the clients, so almost like the clients are second. You 
don’t put the clients first. You put the results first and then you work with the clients just to 
achieve those results, regardless what the clients need. But the most important thing in that 
team was that I’d been told, and we’d all been told, you work with the client, and you look at 
their needs and not necessarily at thinking I need to get results so I’m going to push the clients 
to accommodation, when I know the person won’t sustain that accommodation.” (B5) 
 
Front line staff in Provider B felt that they were not pushed to achieve outcomes.  Some reported that 
their managers instructed them to ignore outcomes and focus instead on providing the service, with 
the assumption that long term outcomes achievement would follow.  Staff reported that their service 
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delivery model was person- not outcomes-centred.  One staff member reported that her line 
manager directed her to separate the client from finances and to frame her work through what was 
best for clients rather than on the outcomes.   
 
“I was very focused on the targets, aware that I had to work with people but actually after like 
quite a few times, it was [Manager 1] specifically, and I was really grateful that she sort of said 
this, you know. [Manager 1] kind of kept saying, oh no, no, forget ... this is about people, if the 
targets come, brilliant, but this is about people. And that was really good, you know. I think 
they were a good balance in that, you know, [Manager 2]’s aware you need targets, so 
[Manager 1] is, but it was really good to know they weren't breathing down my neck expecting 
targets every 30 seconds” (B9) 
 
Provider B’s staff reported very positive relationships with their managers and approved of their 
approach to outcomes. These positive sentiments seem to flow from the strong sense of confidence 
that managers at all levels projected about Provider B’s capacity to be the best positioned to carry out 
the intervention.  This confidence, particularly in regard to Provider B’s choice to take a slow, long-
term approach to outcomes, resonated through the organisational hierarchy: 
 
“I think it’s very much up to [the] organisation, but if the organisation focus[es] just on the 
payment then it, it won’t work so well for them, but if they focus on working with the clients 
and give their time and know that it is a project and you need to put some work to sustain 
your accommodation or to sustain your, the outcomes, then yes it will work.  It won’t work if 
you’re just going to do everything without thinking and, and just rushing things and doing it 
quickly.” (B6) 
 
For both providers, at times, the outcomes did not serve as a guide for front line staff’s decisions.  In 
these cases, front line staff from both organisations provided examples of instances where they opted 
for the client’s needs, over actions that could have generated outcomes-related payments.  Most 
front line staff in Provider B shared examples from their work with clients in support of this assertion.   
 
“If I had the option of moving someone into a hostel or into a flat, when actually what they 
really needed was a supported hostel, and I sort of said at the time, you know, I could put him 
here and get the outcome but actually he really needs to be there, yeah, right, we'll put him 
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there then.  You know, forget that, this is [outcomes-based], it has to be what is best for [the 
client].” (B7) 
 
This was echoed by the staff at Provider B’s subcontracted organisations, they reported they 
experienced no strong pressure to pursue outcomes that they did not deem suitable to the best 
interests of the group.  These staff confirmed that when managers suggested they proceed in a 
certain way, they did not hesitate to push back and assert their stewardship over their client cases 
and reported a strong sense of confidence in saying they knew what was right for their clients.   
 
7.2.2.  Understanding of financial risk 
It is important to consider front line staff’s understanding about the financial risks that each non-
profit faced due to the SIB.  If senior and team managers chose to communicate the importance of 
outcomes in relation to the organisation’s own risk, it was possible that front line staff would interpret 
this as meaning that their employment was in jeopardy if they did not focus on generating outcomes-
related payments.  This could affect the agency relationship where front line staff prioritised 
outcomes payments for the organisation, over the needs of their clients, or working effectively to 
support their teammates.  
 
There was an openness in both organisations about the potential financial ramifications of success 
and failure for each non-profit.  In both organisations, staff expressed a clear understanding that 
payments for outcomes were the source of all the project’s revenue but they articulated that there 
was a separation in how they framed their work and how their work was funded.  At times, they 
attributed this separation to clear instructions from their team managers. 
 
“We were not pushed at all by management financially-wise, like you must do it.  Because I 
was allowed to work with clients we knew we were not going to get payments.” (B5) 
 
Front line staff in both organisations were aware of the potential conflict of interest in working with 
clients while seeking outcome payments.  Some were explicit in explaining that meeting outcomes 
was both a source of revenue and a measure of success.  
 
“We understood that we worked, you know, for a payment by results service and that we need 
to balance the need of the stakeholders. So, whilst saying, you know, that we had to – 
ultimately, you have to work at the pace of someone that someone’s prepared and able to 
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work at. You're also conscious of the fact that if you don’t perform, then the service may not 
continue, or so, yeah, I think we all felt pressure, we all felt a certain pressure but I quite like 
that in a way.” (B11) 
 
“[Manager name] was quite open and transparent about the, the money and by, the payment 
by results aspect and, you know, telling us what the bigger figures were, you know, in terms 
of, I suppose, getting someone into a private rented tenancy or something like that, and then 
sustaining it and stuff like that. That was a higher payment than, for example, sustaining 
someone in, in the hostel that they were already in… I don’t think it was ever, you know, the 
money side of it was ever hidden. I think it was quite open and I think it was quite… in a way, I 
think it worked well because it, it was a target that people wanted to get. People wanted to 
obviously get the higher numbers, and it felt quite satisfying as a worker to, to gain, not 
obviously personally gain money, but to gain money for your team, because we were being 
measured on our success in that way.” (A13) 
 
Staff at Provider A were often able to state the monetary reward associated with outcomes.  For 
example, one staff member was interviewed over a year after leaving the team, and when asked 
about their knowledge of the financial reward associated with the repatriation outcome, the 
interview subject said: “I still know. Reconnection is £X” (A6).  While front line workers were very clear 
about the financial impact of achieving outcomes to the organisation, there was an effort to shield 
the volunteers and support workers in Provider A from the reasons why outcomes were important to 
the longevity of the program: 
 
“I might not have been party to that to be fair, because I was just a lowly support worker so 
[laughs], but as far as I was concerned, I was kept, I didn’t really, to be honest I didn’t really 
think about it. I was thinking more about having access, of money, to help the clients as 
opposed to the other way around, if you see what I mean.” (A12) 
 
By contrast, staff in Provider B were aware that of financial figures associated with outcomes, but 
demonstrated less clarity over the precise amounts.  There was no evidence from interviews that 
financial figures were communicated to staff with the intent of reinforcing how specific actions with 
clients would generate money for the organisation through outcomes-related payments.   
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“You just do what best for clients and you try, and if you know that it’s working, you’re just 
kind of supporting them as, as we will usually do, and we were not thinking how much money 
we can get for them, for that. Obviously, we all got a list and we knew that that’s how much 
we got for accommodation, but to be honest with you, I don’t even remember how much we 
can get.” (B6) 
 
“…even if I'd had internalised all those figures, it wouldn't have made any difference to the 
way I was working anyway. So, I didn't, because I was, I was trying to get outcomes for 
whoever I could anyway, the money was more of a side issue.” (B8) 
 
In both sites, frontline staff’s perceptions of outcomes and organisational priorities reflected how 
managers communicated about outcomes, particularly about financial risk.  For example, front line 
staff often echoed the language used by managers.  This suggested that the use of strong managerial 
language at the macro- and meso-level might have had an impact on front line staff behaviours in 
how success was framed, seen in the use of language around ‘easy wins’ and their eagerness to 
achieve outcomes in Provider A.  By contrast, in Provider B, staff were supportive of the end goals set 
out through the outcomes but were cautious about the potential pitfalls of an outcomes based 
approach to helping clients.  
 
7.2.3.  Monitoring of outcomes and performance management 
Front line staff in both case studies were asked about their working relationships with managers to 
understand how performance was measured and monitored, relative to the incentives driven by the 
SIB.  It is helpful to draw out the distinction between external and internal monitoring.  Here 
monitoring refers to internal monitoring practices, unlike in Chapter 6 (Managerial experiences), 
where external monitoring referred to the introduction of different governance relationships related 
to the SIB (with the exception of Section 6.4.3. which also referred to internal monitoring).  Internal 
monitoring is of interest to this study to understand how providers behaved in response to top-down 
outcomes incentives and it is helpful to first establish how staff were monitored and how the front 
line staff’s performance was measured.  
 
Performance management of team 
In both providers, there were monthly team meetings to discuss the progress in meeting outcomes 
and to share approaches for working with clients.  Team meetings were a way to monitor and 
measure progress towards outcomes and to share best practice among front line staff.  
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The Chief Executive in Provider A joined the team meetings on a quarterly basis, which team 
managers described as: “[Chief executive] would come to our team meeting so, you know, put a bit of 
pressure there” (A5).  The team meetings in Provider A were used to focus the team’s attention on 
organisational priorities.   
 
There was no evidence that the team meetings were used to promote the profile and importance of 
the SIB by senior leadership in Provider B as they were in Provider A.  In Provider B’s monthly team 
meetings, one staff member described the team meetings and focus on monitoring style as follows: 
  
“They'd start off with the figures of how we'd done that month as, as opposed to the target. 
Or if we've met the target. Or, not met the target. Or exceeded it. And sometimes there'd be a 
comparison with how [Provider A] had done… then the rest of the team meeting would be 
about, there'd be various sections to it. There'd be any practical issues or new housing projects 
that [team manager’s name] or someone had identified that we could refer clients to or new 
services that we could use. And then there'd be some sort of good news stories or, or if anyone 
wanted to raise any good news stories. Or, or alternatively, any clients of concern that people 
wanted to discuss with the team, or swap clients with another worker or something, if it 
wasn't working out.” (B8) 
 
In Provider B, team meetings were an opportunity to highlight achievements, often framed in contrast 
to Provider A’s performance, highlighting a focus on measuring team success relative to external 
monitoring targets. There were also visual monitoring tools used to track outcomes achievement for 
the team: 
 
“We had a board for example in our room and we’d put the outcomes for the quarter on that 
and, you know, when they saw their client’s name, you know, it kind of, I think they were really 
like, it was like a little bit of a, like a competition and they were like, you know, obviously 
happy for the client but, you know, it definitely gave like an extra impetus to things.” (B10) 
 
Monitoring of individual outcomes 
At the individual level, there were a wider range of monitoring and measurement tools used to track 
or influence performance.  These mechanisms influenced provider behaviour and illustrate how staff 
responded to the SIB’s indirect financial incentives.  This provides insights into how they approached 
their work and managed their relationships with the wider organisation and managerial structure.  In 
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Provider A, front line staff had individual meetings with managers every four to six weeks to discuss 
their client case load and to provide feedback on their experiences.  A few workers reported that it 
was difficult to go through their full caseloads during this time: 
 
“We bring up people who you’re struggling to work with. I think you have, we have supervision 
occasionally, though obviously way too many people to go through. There wasn’t a lot of 
oversight really in terms of how you were going to do what you were doing, and no-one really 
knew where you were.” (A11) 
 
In this provider, the managers did not have a caseload of clients and were responsible for managing 
their teams alongside the administrative duties related to evidencing outcomes and auditing team 
performance (aided by a part-time administrator in year one).  Here, staff were responsible for a large 
group of clients and the administrative record keeping related to the monitoring of outcomes. In this 
case study, staff were responsible for collating and evidencing outcomes achievement in the CHAIN 
database and for uploading all supplemental documentary evidence on a quarterly basis.  Front line 
staff at Provider A linked their efforts with the client group closely to the outcomes schedule as a 
result.  One staff member described the data monitoring as follows: 
 
“It was an open conversation and we had to put our data on, like, a spreadsheet each month 
and we were able to kind of vaguely keep a track on how we were doing.” (A13) 
 
In the second year of the intervention, the team manager asked front line staff to select a ‘top ten’, 
who were ten individuals each month who were likely to generate outcomes that quarter.  This was 
intended to focus front line staff’s attention on goals that were achievable to generate outcomes 
payments.  Each month, front line staff selected ten individuals they felt could generate an outcome 
and brought it to their team managers.  These names were placed on a wall in the team office and 
staff would present the results of their ‘top ten’ at the monthly team meeting.  A team manager 
described the 'top tens' as a way of: 
“…Really channelling down and saying, “Okay, in this quarter, in an ideal world, what would 
we like to achieve and how is that connected to an outcome?”  … it’s not always necessarily 
possible, but it’s what they would like to focus towards…That’s worked really well.  I think I 
was a bit hesitant, because that’s quite business minded, isn’t it? But thankfully it’s nice, it’s 
brought a healthy level of competition and also just a sense of achievement for themselves 
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that they get to tick off and so they’ve become even more aware of what these outcomes are 
and it’s become a team effort.” (A4, manager). 
 
There were, however, no real or perceived sanctions if ‘top ten’ nominees failed to generate 
outcomes.   
 
“I guess having the top ten up on the wall has been… at first I thought it was a competition, 
everybody felt it was a competition really and we didn’t really like it, but really we’ve all got to 
the stage now, our top ten can change from one week to another it all depends, because your 
situation with your client may change. The team are very supportive and because we change 
clients and staff have moved and we restructure the team each year, each year has been 
structured differently and we’ve all supported each other through it.” (A7) 
 
One front line staff member felt that this focus on the ‘top ten’ and generating outcomes payments 
were the result of the senior leadership’s demands on the team managers, saying “It’s been quite a 
change, I guess since the new management structure, but that’s kind of the managers behind my 
manager saying, “We need to try and focus on the top ten, try and work on these outcomes” and 
that’s what we’re trying to do.”” (A7).  This suggests that front line staff were aware that senior 
managers were a driving force behind the organisational language, and the top-down managerial 
pressure associated with the SIB in Provider A.    
  
Staff in Provider B had monthly individual management meetings with a team manager where they 
discussed their group and each client’s status.  There was a designated outcomes officer responsible 
for collecting the data required for the team to evidence outcomes. This outcomes officer was 
responsible for monitoring team outcomes, measuring performance, and collating the evidence 
needed to invoice the commissioner for outcomes on a quarterly basis.  The outcomes officer’s role 
contributed to a separation between the work needed to serve the team’s mission of helping the 
client group, and the surveillance needed to monitor outcomes to evidence and claim quarterly 
payments from the commissioner.   
 
“The workers knew that they needed to get somebody into accommodation but they don’t 
really have to worry about what evidence they need because they always just come and ask 
me.  So I was like the reference in that so I would have like the reference of like what the 
evidential requirements of what, what was required and then they would never need to look, 
they would just ask me.” (B10) 
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There was no overt evidence from interviews at Provider B about the use of any specific managerial 
techniques to focus front line staff on outcomes achievement or efforts that encouraged staff to link 
clients to payments on a quarterly basis during the three years of the planned intervention.  Instead, 
the managers and outcomes officer were responsible for tracking outcomes payments and ensuring 
financial sustainability while front line staff carried on with their work.  One administrator said their 
role was to forecast outcomes payments that would be achieved for the client group throughout the 
duration of the SIB contract to ensure that the project was sustainable at current staffing levels for 
the future. 
 
“I did like a forecasting document where I would look at what we’re expecting to achieve in 
the next quarter… We always had like an estimate of what we were going to achieve based on 
what we had now because obviously, it depended on how many people you had getting into 
accommodation as to how many would then have the potential to sustain like 12 months.” 
(B10) 
 
There were efforts in Provider B to monitor the allocation of time and resources on the client group 
as staff submitted monthly expenses reports on how their client personalisation budgets were used.  
In one case, a front line staff member reported that their team manager noticed a disproportionate 
allocation of resources to one of her thirty-odd group members and urged the front line worker to 
consider reallocating their time with clients in a more equitable way: 
 
“I'd spent more on that month, not significantly more, but more than the others.  And, 
[Manager] quite rightly pointed out, you know, this person gets every benefit going, she's 
probably earning month for month what we are, you know, and yet actually, so no, you know, 
it's not fair that she's had money thrown at her for years and she's still not necessarily 
progressing.  She's quite ungrateful in her attitude, this woman.  She's just very draining, you 
know, and actually, you can respond to that sometimes by [saying] like yeah, come on then, 
let's have a cup of coffee, just to get you to stop calling me every five minutes. It was just 
about being mindful of the balance I was spending with her as opposed to everyone else, like 
just because she's constantly demanding.  It was just highlighting the fact that maybe I didn't 
need to respond in that way.  So it wasn't about, it wasn't that [manager] begrudged the 
money, but she was questioning why everyone else was [the same] rate, was this person that 
much more.” (B7) 
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This indicated that managers in Provider B did not communicate financial figures and risk to staff with 
the intent of reinforcing how specific actions with clients would generate money for the organisation 
through outcomes payments on a quarterly basis.  Instead the managers and administrators assumed 
that responsibility so front line staff could focus on clients. 
 
7.3.  Impact of incentives on front line provider behavior 
This section further explores the implications of the SIB incentives on front line staff behaviour.  This 
is explored through the following themes that emerged from analysis of the interview data: flexibility, 
unintended behaviours, creaming or parking, and gaming and moral dilemmas.   
 
7.3.1.  Flexibility 
The SIB enabled greater freedom and flexibility in the delivery of services to the client group.  
However, flexibility is not inherent to an incentives-based approach to commissioning services.  In the 
case studies, the outcomes-based nature of the SIB contract enabled greater flexibility due to the 
absence of process measures.  Managers played an important role in framing what was, or was not, 
possible within an outcomes-based contract and held an important role in the implementation 
process and thereby how staff behaved.  Under the SIBs, front line staff members praised the 
flexibility and creativity unleashed by working in outcomes-based contracts.  Without the constraints 
of processes, institutional silos, or cross-borough bureaucracy, staff were more able to work freely 
and deliver services to improve the circumstances of their clients for the three years (plus payment 
tail) of the SIB contract.  In both sites, staff reported that the availability of funds, the freedom to 
allocate their time, and autonomy on how to best serve the interests of the client group was a key 
contributing factor to the perceived successes of both SIB sites.   
 
Many front line staff welcomed the opportunity to build multiyear relationships with clients and work 
outside the constraints of conventional front line work.  Staff in both organisations felt the SIB 
represented an opportunity for them to take their clients out of the cycle of conventional 
homelessness services and so they used a wide range of traditional outreach mechanisms to place 
clients into accommodation.  They also assumed stewardship over clients in a way that was not 
possible under conventionally-commissioned services to ensure that their clients had access to social 
welfare benefits that enabled their re-integration into society. 
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“I’m an extra support worker for you. Extra, which means whenever, if you’re going to move 
somewhere, or you’re going to change location, I’m going to be there still, even if you’re going to 
[move].  Just for you to have someone all the time, so we’re going to work on your goals and 
things like that. So, I was trying to let them know that it’s not around either organisation which 
they are working or they are now attending, or it’s not about the borough where they are. It’s 
about them themselves for three years.” (B4) 
 
“You can make longer lasting change rather than, like you say, there’s people just coming in and 
you just kind of start the process and then they move on somewhere else so it felt like you would 
start the process and you could really develop people.” (A9) 
 
“It’s a bit like a social worker role, where you’re commissioning work, but you’re working with a 
client.” (A7) 
 
Staff were supportive of the flexibility that the SIB allowed because it gave them the freedom to fully 
engage with clients on an ad hoc basis.  
 
“That's something that's really good for SIB, the managers, but also the structure of the whole 
team. It gives us the freedom that actually if someone needs an entire day focusing on them then 
that's what we can do, you know, and that's something that I, I really enjoy that.” (B7) 
 
“The main thing is just making sure that they’re getting the right service where they’re linked into 
a treatment centre or a day [centre], or that sort of thing, but it could mean other things, like at 
times, I’ve had to go to court, [to] deal with council tax issues” (A17) 
 
 
This freedom to take risks was at times unsuccessful but staff in both sites said that the venture 
allowed them to work constructively with clients who failed at sustaining outcomes for 
accommodation.  When clients failed to remain in their accommodation, staff were then able to point 
to previous failures to demonstrate why it was important to take advantage of their selection into the 
SIB group as a time-limited opportunity to engage with other services, such as drug or alcohol 
treatment or rehabilitation services, before further attempts to secure housing were made.   
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“Sometimes it’s good to just go through the motions and try and get people a flat and give 
them a chance and put loads of support in around it, and then if it fails, which at times it’s 
going to, you’ve kind of got a bit of leverage to then work with that person again from a 
different perspective and say, “Look, we tried this before, we put in all this support, it didn’t 
work.”  Therefore, this time we’re going to need to really address with the people that didn’t 
work, you know, “Maybe it’s your drinking, maybe it’s your budgeting or your this and that, 
and then we’re going to have to really conquer those before we think about you living 
independently again, because it didn’t work before.”  We were quite privileged in that sense 
that we could actually try that with people and give them an opportunity that they’d forever 
been asking for, and always been turned down for.  It was quite liberating, I suppose, to be 
able to at least try.” (A13) 
 
Staff said the SIB’s financial structure allowed them to set up opportunities to foster confidence and 
self-esteem for the client group to ease their reintegration into society.  Both case studies provided 
examples where SIB funding was used to invest in self-esteem building activities that were not 
possible with conventional financing, such as buying new clothing for job interviews, providing 
swimming lessons, or bringing them to have lunch in a chain sandwich shop or to meet for a beverage 
at a coffee house.  Staff described these activities as important to the wellbeing and integration of 
their clients who were often very aware that they did not ‘belong’ in public spaces.  The SIB funding 
was important to normalising their participation in everyday activities the client group otherwise felt 
excluded from.   
 
“It was going to improve their self-esteem, their motivation to do things like maybe even on 
their own, diet, fitness, you know so there was loads of things, different things that all end up 
[helping] with their wellbeing.” (A9) 
 
“Even taking some of my clients for a coffee in a Starbucks, for example, blew their mind 
because that happens all day every day in London to, “normal people,” so for them to be in a 
position where they’re sitting in Starbucks having a coffee with all these people, it was so 
interesting because they just, it was just like, it wasn’t a natural place for them to be… I 
definitely feel that their self-esteem was boosted in doing that” (A13) 
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“I wanted to help them to see that their lifestyle can be different, that you can paint a 
different picture for yourself and that a lot of it does kind of count towards your environment 
around you.” (B7) 
 
These instances above applied mainly to clients with less entrenched problems who were capable of 
sustaining accommodation, pursuing employment or training, or were more ‘job-ready’ than those 
with severe mental health or substance abuse problems.  However, both sites reported that the SIB 
allowed them to fund alcohol or drug treatment and rehabilitation, or to try new approaches to 
engage clients who had not benefited from conventional programming so resources were not solely 
focused on the ‘easy wins.’  One staff member described the benefits of the SIB’s freedom, positive 
relationship with their team manager, and their autonomy in deciding what was the best course of 
action, with a client example: 
 
“So, we sorted out getting a clinical psychologist to come on outreach shift with me to meet 
with the guy and run a report on his, mental health and how it impacted on his ability to 
access services which turned out to be priceless going forward… So the approach with him was 
well, this guy’s been rough sleeping his whole life and he’s really poorly and we need to try 
something different. So I think having that ability to, to work in that way and again having 
managers who, yeah, would trust me when I came in and said, “I’d, I’d like to try this,” and 
they would be like, “Okay. It sounds like, from what you say, that that is useful.” And then that 
helped [to] no end.  I mean he’s been in some flat now for nearly 3 years, and he hadn’t had 
any accommodation prior to that to speak of for 20-odd years.” (A13) 
 
While staff in both case studies reported using similar techniques and methods to work toward the 
SIB outcomes, it is important to also note that staff quoted above from Provider B often prefaced 
their remarks with comments about how the outcomes were just a guide, which reflects findings 
presented above in Section 7.2. Their language about working with clients reflected how Provider B’s 
managers described the SIB as a way of funding services to the whole group for three years, 
regardless of how many outcomes they generated.   
 
7.3.2.  Unintended behaviours or consequences 
In both case studies, front line staff were asked to reflect on their experiences with the client group, 
relationships with management, and the actions they took in response to extrinsic organisational 
rewards.  It is interesting to note that front line staff reported a wide range of responses to the SIB 
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outcomes that can be categorised into different types of unintended behaviours that range from 
fostering too much dependence to meet outcomes to having clients take advantage of their 
eagerness to help. 
 
One front line staff member provided an example of a difficult situation where s/he provided a very 
high degree of support for one client, who would not have been able to live independently without 
her/his support.  This front line staff member was conflicted because the support s/he provided was 
in the best interests of the client, but s/he was conscious of fostering an unsustainable level of 
dependency that could not be sustained without the SIB. 
 
“He actually did better in the flat for a while [because], he was on his own. He'd wash up, he'd, 
you know, make himself food. He wouldn't, he didn't change his bed sheets for like a year or 
something. But this meant he wasn't really ready for a flat. He wouldn't, you know, he couldn't 
really manage any bills. So I did all the bills, sorted it all out, all the housing benefits. He 
couldn't really cope with that side of things. But in some ways he did better in the flat than a 
hostel. I mean, the hostels wouldn't have him any longer, that's the thing as well, because he 
wouldn't engage with any support workers. He wouldn't, he was not interested in get, he can't 
get a job because of his mental health. Was not interested in doing any voluntary work. Not 
interested in doing any key work. Not interested in anything other than staying on his own. So 
the hostels got fed up with him, you know. Wouldn't pay his service charge. So we got him a 
flat and he stayed there for two years but, really the SIB was sustaining him in the flat, I have 
to admit.” (B8) 
 
While the staff member agreed that this client example was an outlier in terms of the intensity of 
effort and time allocated towards keeping an individual in accommodation, this was not an isolated 
example from front line staff.  In the absence of the SIB, the individual would have remained 
homeless and another front line staff member suggested that it was better to have housed someone 
for a set period of time as this prevented costly or chaotic interactions with the state that were not 
measured: “there’s a lot of peripheral stuff that’s not judged that would’ve come down with regards 
[to] court costs, prison costs, hospital costs, police costs” (B9).   
 
Managers in Provider B agreed that the SIB enabled the team to foster too much dependency on 
them by clients.  Several front line workers expressed frustration regarding the degree of dependence 
that the SIB fostered among the client group.  For example, at times clients manipulated their front 
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line staff member because they knew that they were able to call on them for such a high degree of 
personal or financial support: 
 
“The nature of these individuals we have is that they might come back [to the street] for a little bit, 
or their version [of a] meal – you might go out, you don’t intend to get a cab home but you get a 
bit too drunk and you get a cab home. Their version of that is “We’ll sleep in a doorway.”  It was 
almost like, there’s your success [gone], there’s the thing you’re being paid to do and the guy in a 
year has been seen sleeping out twice; the year before he might’ve been seen sleeping out 60 
times…  The other side of it was reducing the overall number of bedded down contacts on our list 
and that was the one where this guy, and he’s lost the tenancy so that bit didn’t matter, but it was, 
“Oh, no, he can’t be, he can’t get that ‘cause that erases that, we won’t get paid” - and that 
increased that individual being [dependent] because, “This is what I’ve done and you will sort me 
something else out; you will sort me something else.” (B9) 
 
The benefit of the flexibility described above in Section 7.3.1. was that it allowed front line staff the 
resources and freedom to provide accommodation in the private rented sector for members of the 
client group on a previously impossible scale.  This allowed staff the freedom to act quickly and house 
clients at their discretion.  Some staff reflected on this process and felt the ready access to funds, and 
desire to generate outcomes, may have caused them to act hastily, leading to unintended provider 
behaviour: 
 
“At the beginning, some of our colleagues came in and they were so willing to help and give 
the best possible care to these clients. Sometimes they went in, took someone from the street 
without a proper assessment – a long chat and long plan. They put them in straight to a hostel 
let’s say for a couple of weeks. Then we spen[t] a lot of money for clients. And then after two 
weeks, three weeks in the hostel they would realise that the client basically in a way tried to 
use them - to get things from them without engaging and without doing things. Then after 
two, three weeks, four weeks when we had a huge bill for the hostel then at the end he just 
moved out and he went and he was doing his own thing.” (A10). 
 
Across both case studies, front line staff reported that they undertook actions that reflected a 
outcomes-focused approach to service delivery.  In some cases, staff reported that they were guided 
by the outcomes, which resonated with their own beliefs about the best outcomes for the clients 
while at other times, it was possible that the presence of outcomes encouraged staff to exert 
additional efforts to achieve or maintain outcomes for clients in unintended ways.   
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7.3.3.  Creaming or parking 
If an agent acts to serve the interests of some principals (such as the investors by maximising profit 
generation for the organisation) over those of the public commissioner, they might work harder on 
behalf of some individuals that will maximise revenue in the form of outcome payments.  This 
problem is known as ‘creaming’ (i.e. choosing to focus on those that are most likely to generate 
outcomes with minimal effort) or parking (i.e. putting aside difficult cases that are unlikely to 
generate outcomes payments).  Where it arose, it was to the detriment of the service provision to the 
wider target population.  
 
Some front line staff affirmed that they did seek out clients who were amenable to outcomes 
achievement in the first year, describing such individuals as ‘easy wins.’ 
 
“In the beginning, it was a lot easier, because we were looking at the easy wins. Now we’ve 
got clients which are very difficult to fit into that kind of payment bracket.” (A7) 
 
There was some evidence that front line staff in Provider B did engage in ‘creaming’ when choosing 
which group members they would continue to support in the pared-down fourth year24 of the project. 
In September of 2016, staff were told that they would only keep clients who were in accommodation 
for less than 12 months at October of 2015 and a small number of difficult cases to ease their 
transition back into conventionally funded services.  In the fourth year, the active group was reduced 
from 415 to 140 individuals. 
 
“We only really kept on the people that were in accommodation that hadn’t continued with 
their, that hadn’t sustained 12 months or we thought had sustained 12 months but were still 
vulnerable in some ways so we should keep, keep working with them.  Like you say that we 
identified maybe one client for each, each staff member who hadn’t achieved an outcome and 
we couldn’t get an outcome in the last year but they were still responding to our support more 
than any other support, so it would be, it would've been a bit rough to, to, to just cut that off.  
Which was kind of, you know, a slightly altruistic way of doing it, there’s no financial reason 
                                                          
 
24 In the fourth year, from November of 2015 to October of 2016, the contract stated that payments would only 
be made for sustained accommodation of 12 and 18 months for clients who were in accommodation for less 
than 12 months in October of 2015.   No payments were made for any of the other outcomes after October 
2015.  See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 for further details about Year 4/ the payment tail. 
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for us to do that and there’s outreach teams out there who should be targeting those guys 
but, yeah, it just seemed like the right thing to do really.” (B2, manager) 
 
In Year 4, front line staff also selected one to two clients that they continued to see despite the fact 
that they would not generate outcomes payments.  Managers were supportive of this but felt that 
they had to draw a line as to how many such clients should continue to receive services given that all 
clients were to be referred back into conventional services within 12 months.  One front line worker 
described how they chose which client files to close at the end of three years compared to those who 
received a fourth year of support: 
 
“I had a client who was accommodated in the long term, supported accommodation, linked 
with the mental health team, engaging really well, taking medication, no relapse for the last 
year and a half, re-established family connections, you know, family’s there so, so he had 
loads of key workers so everything is kind of gelling to one, one, one place and works well so, 
you know, I’d close him down. The clients who I wouldn’t close down, that I kept open were 
the one that wasn’t, were not keen on working with other services, didn’t have good relations, 
wouldn’t talk to other services so I kept somebody who was rough sleeping, or we were never 
going to get any payments for, but specifically wanted to talk to me only, so I kept him open so 
that I can still go and see him when the other service[s] needs, you know, assistance.” (B5) 
 
There was evidence that front line staff in Provider A were instructed to ‘park’ more entrenched 
clients who were unlikely to generate outcomes payments, particularly in the second and third years 
of operation when staff were assigned new client lists based on outcomes area (i.e. a front line staff 
member was responsible for all clients in sustained accommodation while another was responsible 
for repatriations to home country).  One front line staff member expressed frustration that they were 
explicitly told not to work with entrenched clients who would not generate outcomes: 
 
“I think when [Manager 2] came in, [they] kind of changed the angle of how we work. This 
blind guy for instance, I met him from prison, we met a couple of times from prison, many 
times from prison, take him to the homeless persons’ unit and [manager’s name] said, “Look, 
this is the last time you’re going to meet this guy and if he drinks… “So, we warned him, before 
he comes out, “You must not drink. When we meet you, you must not drink, because you get 
chaotic and you become violent” and the first thing he done, he went into get a drink, a bottle 
of vodka. So, I had to say, “Look, I can’t work with you today” and I didn’t realise it was going 
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to be full stop, that’s it, but I was told, “We’re not going to get a paid outcome with this guy 
[FLS name], you’re going to have to hand him over to the other services in the borough.” (A7) 
 
By contrast, front line staff in Provider B felt that their clients who were in accommodation and 
meeting outcome goals were low needs, which freed their time to work with more entrenched 
individuals.   
 
“If it’s easy to achieve the outcomes with them, you just achieve the outcomes with them and 
then you don’t need to spend lots of time, what’s the point of like somebody that’s doing well 
in their accommodation and you're going to get that 12 months sustained of payment and 
they only need like a visit a fortnight or a phone call a fortnight or a visit a month? Why would 
you spend more time with them if you don't need to?” (B10) 
 
In some cases, the direct financial incentives to the organisation for meeting specific targets led 
managers to use non-monetary sanctions or rewards on front line staff to motivate them to meet, or 
prioritise certain targets over the well-being of other, more entrenched members of the SIB cohort.  
In such cases, there was evidence that front line staff disproportionately allocated their time and 
effort to ensuring that some individuals generated outcomes-related payments.  As a result, they 
were unable to dedicate time to other cohort members, resulting in a suboptimal allocation of 
resources and services for the wider target population.  
 
7.3.4.  Gaming and moral dilemmas  
In a SIB contract, where outcomes-related payments are the only mode of remuneration available, 
agents may take advantage of asymmetries of information between principals and exaggerate or 
falsify outcomes data, to meet targets.  This problem is known as ‘gaming’ (i.e. massaging progress 
towards targets in a performance management scheme to appear more successful than in actuality).  
It can arise as a mechanism that enables the agent to change their behaviour for personal gain (e.g. to 
appear very productive and efficient in meeting outcomes), or to shirk their responsibilities (e.g. exert 
less effort overall once they have generated a fixed amount of money).  At other times, ‘moral 
dilemmas’ can arise, where front line staff face a conflict of interest between what was best for the 
client, and what was best for the organisation (i.e. to pursue actions that are not sustainable for the 
client but will generate an outcomes-related payment in the short term).  In practice, this behaviour 
would be detrimental to the quality and volume of services rendered to the target population.  
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There was evidence that to gain outcomes for accommodation, Provider A took aggressive actions to 
procure a house through the private rented sector.  This was problematic because they acted as the 
landlord for this property when housing SIB clients and claimed housing benefit for the clients they 
placed in the house they rented so were doubly paid.  This was because they received an outcomes 
payment from the public commissioner and the housing benefit payment from the government.  
 
“That was, like, temporary accommodation which they got themselves, and put people in and 
they had people living in that house all together. No, that was just nuts looking back on it, but 
anyway they got the[m] safe from that point of view and then they claimed housing benefit 
and got the money and applied that and then they were housing people there temporarily.” 
(A11) 
 
This organisational decision was sharply criticised by a front line worker at Provider B.   
 
“The pressure was put on you know, especially the initial lot you know, “You have to get this 
many people in flats, you have to do this, you have to do this” - things that organisations like 
[Provider A], and it’s been around a long time, they should’ve known that wasn’t gonna work - 
you can’t – they were taking people with massive problems, taking ‘em outta [name of] hostel, 
stick[ing] ‘em in a private rented flat…  Just managed very badly in that respect you know, 
pressuring the staff to fulfil these stats you know, criteria, whatever staff not having as much 
experience with the confidence maybe to go, “[Expletive], that’s not gonna work.” … I said, 
“I’m not doing that, it’s a bloody nightmare.  Categorically I’m not doing that” I’ve got the 
experience and the confidence to say that to all my managers - “To hell with that, I’m not 
doing it” – I don’t know if they had that.” (B9) 
 
To meet employment outcomes, one staff member said they hired group members to do work for 
other group members: 
 
“Maybe I shouldn’t, okay, yeah, I guess, one of the things I’ve found quite easy to do was I 
would get my more stable clients to do DIY tasks for people that have recently moved into 
housing and I created employment contract which [Provider A] would pay them, and then that 
would be an outcome, so you know that’s like just a bit of a loophole in the system really, isn’t 
it? …  So it would be like going around, put up a pair of curtains or something; here’s £30 for 
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doing it, side contract, thanks very much, and then you put that as an employment outcome 
on the chain … so we would just draw up an employment contract and pay him to do it.” (A11) 
 
There was evidence that staff falsified records to garner outcomes payments.  One front line worker 
remarked on the ease with which documentation to evidence outcomes could be claimed.  This 
indicated that information asymmetries between providers and commissioners enabled a small 
number of staff members to describe opportunistic behaviour. 
 
“Respondent: It, well, it should be difficult, it should have been difficult, it should ... I can’t ... 
you shouldn’t be able to turn up and be, like, I want a copy of someone’s 
tenancy who you’ve not met before, stick it on a database which they probably 
don’t even know they’re signed up to, which, which, I mean the breach of data 
confidentiality in CHAIN never ceases to amaze me. But it was, there was never 
a problem really, to be honest with you.  
Interviewer: So you never had any issues like getting someone’s tenancy if you hadn’t met 
them?  
Respondent: No.  
Interviewer: What kind of, can you give me an example of that?  
Respondent: So if someone was in a care home, they had gone into the care home in between 
the project officially starting up and I was actually coming in and I just rung up 
the care home and said, hey, please can I have this and they sent it through to 
me, it was pretty amazing (laughs).” (A11) 
 
This was corroborated by front line staff at Provider B who commented on staff flux at the GLA, and 
how there should have been more attention paid to the monitoring of outcomes and auditing of 
documents: 
 
“I mean the GLA, the person who started it, we went through about three different managers. 
The last one didn’t know what’s going on, we could say lie to them and say anything at the 
end of the day even if you’d not done it.” (B9) 
 
While there was an expectation that non-profit staff in the case study organisations would be 
altruistic and would act in the best interests of their clients, interviews with staff revealed examples of 
moral dilemmas they faced between what was best for their clients and what was best for the 
155 
 
organisation.  This occurred alongside a few instances of gaming.  There was anecdotal evidence from 
a very small number of informants that suggested that staff did exploit these asymmetries of 
information to achieve outcomes for a range of different reasons. 
 
7.4.  Conclusion 
This chapter explored the impact of the incentives embedded in the SIB contract on the agency 
relationship between front line staff and their team managers and the senior leadership teams in two 
non-profit case studies.  At the micro-level of the organisation, front line provider behaviour varied 
due to how front line staff approached and prioritised outcomes and the wellbeing of their clients.  
This was particularly affected by the way that managers communicated the importance of meeting 
outcomes and staff structure. Overall, the primary outcomes were understood and supported by 
staff.  The relationships between front line staff and managers and how financial risk was 
communicated, was an important factor in shaping the balance of a client centred or outcomes-
centred approaches to service delivery.  For front line staff in Provider A, the strong focus from team 
managers on mitigating financial risk to the organisation manifested itself in evidence of ‘creaming’ 
and ‘parking’.  There was some evidence of gaming through the falsification of documents.  These 
adverse behaviours were likely due to staff’s desire to appear productive in generating outcomes 
payments from commissioners and sharper managerial techniques.   By contrast, in Provider B, it 
appeared that front line staff were not directed by managers to select ‘profitable’ clients.  This 
chapter found that where staff were more focused on meeting outcomes, the allocation of financial 
risk was of importance, as the more highly powered the communication of outcomes, the likelier staff 
were to engage in unintended behaviour, to the potential detriment of other clients in the group. 
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 Impact on motivations  
 
8.1.  Introduction  
The impact of incentives on the motivation of non-profit staff requires greater examination, especially 
as non-profits take on an increasingly important role in the provision of public services in England.  
This chapter considers the impact of introducing financial incentives through SIB contracts on the 
motivations of managers and front line staff.  This analysis builds on two main findings from Chapters 
6 (Managerial experiences) and 7 (Front line staff experiences).  First, the introduction of new actors 
affected the agency relationships in each non-profit provider.  Second, the financial incentives in the 
SIB contract influenced how managers organised and prioritised the intervention and so affected how 
front line staff selected and worked with clients, and the degree of autonomy available to do what 
was best for clients.  This chapter expands on those findings by examining the impact of incentives on 
staff motivation, particularly to examine whether it crowded in or crowded out their intrinsic 
motivation to do their work.  
 
This chapter argues that the introduction of direct and indirect financial incentives in the case studies 
was complex and could lead to both crowding in and crowding out of intrinsic motivation. This 
chapter draws on recent theoretical work that moved away from the dichotomisation of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation in work (Gagné and Deci, 2005) to understand how financial incentives can foster 
autonomous motivation in some while impeding it in others.  This approach to intrinsic motivation 
considers an individual’s sense of autonomy in how they respond to incentives, suggesting that 
incentives can crowd in an individual’s intrinsic motivation where they have an internal locus of 
causality, so that incentives provide intrinsic task enjoyment or personal meaningfulness that reflects 
the individual’s goals and values (Lohmann et al., 2016).  The data from both case studies found that 
the introduction of incentives was broadly positive.  The findings supported existing empirical 
evidence (presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.4) that strongly suggested there was, first, a continuum 
of motivation crowding behaviours that varied according to what was incentivised and second, that 
the success of a p4p initiative is often linked to the degree of autonomy providers have in the 
implementation and operationalisation of the scheme.   
 
This chapter begins by considering the role of intrinsic motivation for staff in the case studies.  It 
examines why, and to what degree, staff were intrinsically motivated to do their work and the factors 
that drove them to work in the non-profit sector.  Second, this chapter discusses how incentives 
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crowded in, or crowded out managers and front line staff’s motivation and the impact on provider 
behaviours.   
 
8.2.  Intrinsic motivation 
The empirical literature suggests that individuals can be intrinsically motivated for two main, and 
closely related, reasons, because it makes them ‘feel good’ or because they want to ‘do good’ for 
others or serve the public.  The intrinsic motivation to do something because it ‘feels good’ was 
defined by Deci (1972) as where individuals pursue actions out of enjoyment of the task itself, where 
they receive no apparent rewards except the act of doing the activity itself.  This is often termed 
‘warm-glow altruism.’  In this study, intrinsic motivation was defined as actions an individual 
undertakes for the enjoyment of the task itself, or out of pro-social or public service motivation to ‘do 
good’ (Lohmann et al., 2016, Gagné and Deci, 2005). 
 
This section draws on staff responses in interviews to understand how they articulated their 
motivations to self-select into the non-profit sector, and how they came to work with the homeless 
population.  This considers how staff described their overall satisfaction and defined success in their 
roles, and for their clients.  This is to understand their values and goals of working in the non-profit 
sector, and how those contributed to their conceptualisations of successful work. It is worth noting 
that these findings are derived from interviews held with staff while the SIB was operational so it was 
not possible to measure what change, if any, occurred in their levels of intrinsic motivation after the 
introduction of the SIB.  Some staff were interviewed after they had left the SIB intervention and were 
able to comment retrospectively on what they found to be motivating during their time with the 
intervention.   
 
8.2.1.  Motivation to ‘feel good’ 
Staff members in both case studies described their intrinsic motivation as pursuing actions out of 
their enjoyment of the task itself, where they received no apparent rewards except the act of doing 
the activity.  One front line staff member said that that the act of helping others gave them a positive 
feeling and described it in the following terms: 
 
“I find just the daily challenges satisfying. I love being able to, like, get through a list of things 
that needs doing, like just, just stuff. I'm obviously deeply disturbed [laughs]. ” (B7) 
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Front line staff members said working with homeless people was motivating because it was 
challenging and also rewarding when positive results were achieved.  Others cited the enjoyment they 
derived from the diverse nature of the work. 
 
“I just like working with the clients face-to-face and especially [if] they’re, like, not [a] fully 
open book and, you know, that is what motivates me. I want to find out, you know, why is this 
guy [homeless for] ten years, you know, to me, that’s what does it for me. And especially if he 
manages to find out and things move on and progress well, then you are on this natural high, 
you know. It is lovely. You can’t take away that feeling. No one can. It’s just so nice to see 
somebody, things, like, falling into place.” (B5) 
 
“[What’s] motivating is I like the clients most of the times.  I really like the fact that, because 
they’re adults, they’ve got their own story and their own personalities, and I get to know them. 
It’s very satisfying working with people and seeing them progress, and move through.  I also 
quite like the drama of it all sometimes and, you know, a lot of the shoutiness [sic] and the 
incidents and stuff. It’s never boring.  You know, never a dull day working with homeless 
people, I don’t think.” (A13) 
 
Front line staff framed the rewarding aspects of their work in a range of ways, for example, one front 
line staff member expressed that it made them feel good to be challenged and that led to personal 
growth as an individual. 
 
 “I mean first of all, I find it incredibly challenging, I love a challenge.  It’s a lesson in patience 
and, I mean it’s helped me develop enormously as a person. I find it incredibly- it’s a chance to 
try and be creative and to build, you know, to put together a different way of trying 
something, you know, to try different things with people, to listen to people, to try and 
understand the human experience and to try and work with people around, you know, 
achieving what they want.” (B11) 
 
8.2.2.  Motivation to ‘do good’ 
In both case studies, staff said that working with the homeless was a positive experience that made 
them feel that they were making a positive contribution to their clients’ lives.  Staff reported that they 
felt they were doing good by helping others.  Informants often said that they derived personal 
satisfaction from their work because it made a positive impact on others.  Staff in both providers 
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indicated that they received a sense of satisfaction from working with clients.  They said that they 
enjoyed the opportunity to support their clients, and derived motivation from being able to improve 
their overall quality of life. 
 
“It’s an incredible experience to see people recover. You know, some people I’d known for 15 
years who’ve now been clean and sober 3.5 years and they're married and in a flat and all 
those kind of things. There's not many jobs I don't think where you could see that kind of, you 
know, transformation.  So I just find it really inspiring, and also, it reminds you that there's 
hope.” (B11) 
 
“I've really enjoyed this role.  It's really creative.  And really it gives you a chance to, well it 
gives me a chance to really get stuck in with people and help them in the smallest ways that 
can have really like large repercussions and sort of far-reaching ripple effects, as well as the 
big stuff, you know, being able to support someone to get themselves off the street into a flat. 
And just a real sense of achievement with it all.” (B7) 
 
Staff in non-profits (and in the public sector) are willing to trade off financial gain for the positive 
feelings derived from ‘doing good’, or to work for lower wages because they gained additional, 
personal benefits from their work (Frank 1996; Benz 2005).  Staff in the case studies acknowledged 
they were willing to donate labour and chose to trade off monetary gain because they were able to 
do good through their work in the homelessness sector: 
 
“…sounds a bit kind of clichéd really but I suppose it’s always quite a positive thing to earn 
money by helping other people basically. The money in the sector’s not great. I think we all 
know that but it can be as rewarding as it can be frustrating” (A12) 
 
One staff member noted that they left a career with better pay because they enjoyed how the work 
had a positive impact on others. 
 
“It’s interesting, being part of working with people and helping them to achieve a positive 
change or something. Then it would be much more rewarding than the money.” (A10) 
 
Some staff members expressed a commitment to doing good that can be as public service motivation, 
where an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives that are based in, or unique to, public 
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institutions and organisations (Perry and Wise, 1990).  Staff in both providers reported strong public 
service motivations in their decision to serve others through their work.  A few staff members were 
precise in noting that they were driven by a desire to work in public service, or that they saw working 
in a non-profit in a positive way that was distinct from work in a for-profit company. 
 
“I’ve always wanted to be involved in – sounds grand, but public service of some sort… I’ve just 
really loved it. I really enjoyed the people, [they] are great in the sector.  Obviously, you feel 
like you’re doing something... For the most part, you feel like you’re doing something that is 
really helping people, which is a good thing to be feeling, I suppose. I don’t go home and feel 
like my job’s pointless, like I’m sure some people do.” (B2, manager) 
 
“I knew I never wanted to make someone else rich, that was the only thing, I just couldn't work 
for a corporate business.” (B3, manager) 
 
Some staff qualified their motivations in comparison to the private sector where doing good was not 
the main objective.  
 
“What do I like about it? I mean it’s a good job yeah.  A lot of people in their life, well they’re 
gonna [sic] turn around and say, “I sold more cars”, [expletive] that - not that I came into it for 
this. At the end of the day no, I mean my work has changed things for people, we’ve done 
good things for people and a lot of people can’t say that.” (B9) 
 
One staff member noted that this field of work allowed them to help people in a meaningful way that 
was driven by their personal faith, which placed a high value on service to others. 
 
“I'm motivated by service to other people, from a religious perspective. And there's a, in this 
sort of sector, there's unlimited opportunities for that type of vocation or commitment. Like if 
you, if you're in, say you're not, you're just in another sort of job, you might give some money 
to charity or whatever if, if you feel minded to do so. But here, if you're working in the 
homeless charity, the day to day job is serving homeless people.  So if you want to do that, 
there's sort of unlimited opportunities to assist people and [to] try and improve their 
situations.” (B8) 
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While paid staff reported high levels of intrinsic motivation to either feel good or do good, volunteers 
in Provider A did not respond in the same way.  Volunteers were asked what they enjoyed as part of 
the SIB intervention and then questioned about whether this would be beneficial to their career 
plans.  A small number of volunteers (2) were interviewed. Both did not express high intrinsic 
motivation to conduct their work and said that monetary compensation would be an important 
motivator for them if they were to take up paid employment in the homelessness sector, or as part of 
a SIB project team.  One volunteer said that their work was helpful to clients but was clear that s/he 
was primarily motivated to gain work experience that would assist her/him in a transition to paid 
employment.   
 
“Money’s got to be really good, that’s all I can say… I don’t mind supporting my colleagues 
because they’ve supported me”  (A17) 
 
The paid staff members interviewed did not present divergent views on their intrinsic motivation and 
often reported that they were motivated for reasons that either made them feel good, or because it 
was the right thing to do.  In some cases, their motivations were drawn from both aims of feeling 
good and doing good.  For example, some staff said they chose to work with homeless people 
because it made them feel good while doing something positive for society.  While some staff 
members were more effusive than others about how they derived a ‘warm glow’ from their actions at 
work or that they wanted to do the right thing in their work than others, no informants described 
alternate motivations that were inconsistent with the views presented above.  In both case studies, 
staff members described high levels of intrinsic motivation for doing their work that made them feel 
good or that they were doing good.  
 
8.3.  Impact of incentives on motivation  
Chapters 6 (Managerial experiences) and 7 (Front line staff experiences) established that managers 
and front line staff members were supportive of the outcomes introduced by the SIB.  Chapter 7 
illustrated how front line staff differed in their responses to the incentives, with some prioritising 
outcomes-related payments while others stressed the importance of meeting clients’ needs.  That 
chapter examined the impact of incentives on provider behaviour and found that front line staff 
demonstrated autonomy in how they responded in both creative and sometimes, adverse ways.  This 
section expands on those findings by examining the impact of incentives on staff motivation, 
particularly to examine whether it crowded in or crowded out their intrinsic motivation to do their 
work. 
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It is useful to examine how intrinsic motivation interacts with, or is influenced by, extrinsic motivation.  
Extrinsic motivation refers to activities that are not interesting to the individual (i.e., not intrinsically 
motivating), for example, externally or internally imposed pressures that do not correspond to an 
individual’s goals, values, or preferences (Lohmann et al., 2016, Gagné and Deci, 2005).  This 
approach to examining intrinsic motivation considers an individual’s autonomy25 (locus of control) in 
how they respond to incentives, suggesting that there is an internal locus of causality when 
incentivised work provides intrinsic task enjoyment, or personal meaningfulness so that it reflects the 
individual’s goals and values (Lohmann et al., 2016).  For example, where a staff member feels that 
they do not have control over how to respond to, or whether to accept outcomes targets as aligned 
with their own motivations, it will feel externally imposed and may crowd out their intrinsic 
motivation.  Conversely, a staff member who believes that they have autonomy over their decisions 
may internalise the outcomes-related incentives, so that it then crowds in their intrinsic motivations.   
 
8.3.1.  Crowding in 
In both case studies, staff reported that they had more autonomy over their work than in their 
previous roles in the sector because of the introduction of outcomes-focused goals.  This allowed 
them more flexibility to set out their daily plans and to be more creative in how they interacted with 
clients.  When combined with staff’s intrinsic sense of task enjoyment or the personal meaningfulness 
derived from a sense of doing good, the influence of incentives in the SIB contract crowded in staff’s 
intrinsic motivation.  For example, one front line staff member said they were drawn to work on the 
SIB project for the opportunity to deliver services in an innovative way.   
 
“It was quite target-driven but to be honest, we all thought, well, my personal opinion, which 
was kind of matched by my colleagues, was, it was very, it was a very good idea basically 
because for most of us working in the sector, we’d never had the chance to have any access to 
any funds and suddenly we could try all these different techniques to challenge long-term 
rough sleepers.  So, for example, I’d been working in street outreach before, and I used to hear 
all the time, “Oh, if I just had the key to a flat or if I just had a leg up into getting to the 
property, blah, blah” and obviously we could never do anything about it, whereas with [the] 
                                                          
 
25 While Lohmann et al.’s (2016) framework notes the importance of autonomy alongside competence, the 
findings presented in Chapter 7 demonstrated that staff especially welcomed the freedom and flexibility of 
working in the SIB initiatives compared to the process-driven environments that characterised many of their 
pre- and post- SIB experiences in the homelessness sector.  To reflect that finding, this chapter examines 
intrinsic motivation by considering the impact on front line staff’s autonomy.   
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SIB, suddenly we had access; if someone wanted to come off the street I could get them the 
money to get their first month’s deposit.” (A12) 
 
One front line staff member also reflected on how their personal fulfilment from doing good was 
matched by satisfaction at generating outcomes-related payments for the organisation. This reflects 
how the presence of incentives had the potential to crowd in their intrinsic motivations to pursue 
work that they already viewed as challenging and rewarding.  This was particularly so for the team as 
a whole when reflecting on their joint successes in meeting outcome targets.  However, in the latter 
part of the quote below, one front line staff member reflected that they were somewhat ambivalent 
about being motivated by the presence of rewards.   
 
“It is, you know, great that someone’s been reconnected or accommodated because when you 
think about or look back on their journey, like oh my days, like this is actually so good for this 
particular client, especially because they’ve been known to services and you never really 
thought... I love experiencing that with someone. My ones that I’ve been working with and just 
speaking to them and just you know, meeting up with them and hearing where they’ve come 
from and now they’re working, volunteer[ing], and aspiring to move to their own place and 
that, it’s really rewarding in a way and so you speak about those stuff but obviously as a team 
because we know what we’re working towards and we know what SIB is about, that’s also 
rewarding for us in a way, like oh my God, this is another outcome, this is another payment, it 
sounds so... Yeah, for some reason, now it kind of does really feel, it does feel bad in a way, I 
don’t know why,” (A8) 
 
Another front line staff member who was supportive of the outcomes-based approach emphasised 
that the SIB was positive in that it enabled personal growth and increased competence for a few staff 
members, specifically a small number who chose to pursue further training in addiction or mental 
health counseling.  These staff were motivated by the potential for professional development 
opportunities and so demonstrated how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations can interact in a positive 
way among staff that crowds in intrinsic motivation. 
 
“The people that I worked with on this were in this because they really wanted to help the 
clients and they wanted to do something good for them. You know, they're interested in things 
like, you know, psychology and like addiction and, and they wanted to further their knowledge 
and how, you know, in that and become experts.” (B10) 
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Front line staff in Provider B emphasised that they were motivated by a client-focused approach that 
prioritised doing what was right for clients ahead of meeting outcomes.  This approach provided them 
with the space to act autonomously and assist clients as they saw fit.  The staff interviewed in this site 
were consistent in reporting that they had the freedom to place client needs ahead of financial 
concerns for the organisation.  This was reflected in the language they used to describe the trade-off 
between their motivations and the presence of extrinsic rewards.  There was a crowding in of their 
intrinsic motivations because staff felt supported by managers and peers to do what was best for 
clients on the understanding that outcomes would often follow from that – and where they did not, 
they team could make it up with other clients.  One front line staff member explained that the success 
of the intervention was due to the team itself and how they were motivated to help clients through a 
person-centred approach: 
 
“I think if you've got motivated individuals, which they've been very careful to make sure 
they've hired, I think, then those outcomes will come. I think if you've got lazy unmotivated 
workers that are only doing stuff for the outcomes, well yes, yes, you're going to have a 
problem. But I think if you had lazy unmotivated workers you've got a problem anyway, it's 
just a different sort, you know. But if you've got a good strong team with people that are very 
person-centred in the way that they work, but that are very capable, yeah, you know, it was, it 
was made clear that this is about the people we're working with and not just about the 
money. It's working the balance out.” (B7) 
 
One front line staff member said their manager encouraged them to focus on the clients, rather than 
the outcomes.  This crowded in their intrinsic motivation to serve clients and allowed the front line 
staff member to focus on the client in the hope that outcomes would follow, but that there were no 
penalties for a failure to generate outcomes. This front line staff member said they were told to: 
 
“Just focus on the client. Don’t, don’t think that, that’s [it’s]a payment by results [project] and 
you need to get results. The results will come when you do a good work with the clients in the 
first place. Don’t rush. Just make sure that people are ready and you don’t set them up to, to 
fail because that is two steps back for everybody, for a client and, you know, it’s not healthy 
for, for people anyway.” (B6) 
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Managers and front-line staff in both providers were positive in how they described the opportunities 
that the SIB enabled in a positive way.  For the most part, they viewed it as a new service delivery 
model that allowed them to do more to meet client needs than in their previous roles in the non-
profit homelessness sector.  In such cases, the introduction of incentives crowded in their intrinsic 
motivation because they felt they had a strong locus of control over how they chose to work toward 
outcomes-related payments.  For front line staff members in particular, the SIB granted them greater 
autonomy over how best to meet the needs of their clients through new pathways into housing and 
more stable lifestyles.   
 
8.3.2.  Crowding out  
The introduction of incentives has the potential to crowd out staff member’s intrinsic motivation to 
do their work.  This is particularly true where the incentives placed upon staff do not resonate with 
their intrinsic motivations, staff are compelled by rewards or punishments related to their career 
options, or there is a fear of forgoing potential benefits.  This can lead to the crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation if staff feel their actions conflict with their intrinsic motivations.  This is heightened when 
staff feel they are not free to pursue actions that provide task enjoyment or personal meaningfulness 
or that goals do not correspond to an individual’s goals, values, or preferences.  This is especially the 
case where staff do not feel that they have autonomy in their actions or constructive relationships 
with their managers.  
 
In a small number of cases, front line staff reported that their intrinsic motivation to do their work 
was eroded by the introduction of the indirect financial incentives in the SIB contract.  These 
instances fell into two types, first, a small number of staff reported that they felt the introduction of 
incentives was negative in that it implied that they would not have done their best for clients in the 
absence of them. In the second instance, crowding out was the result of managerial choices that led 
to uncertainty or job instability. 
 
Crowding out by financial incentives 
There was some evidence that the incentives in the SIB contract crowded out intrinsic motivation 
where staff were asked to make trade-offs between the wellbeing of the client in favour of the 
organisation’s financial goals.  
 
“It’s an interesting model, but I’d like to see it more broad on its payments, so we’re not under 
so much… because it’s quite demoralising when you have to say to that person, “Sorry…” you 
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can’t say to them, but you have to say, “Sorry, mate you’re not really going to make a 
payment for us, so we can’t really do anything for you.” (A7) 
 
One front line staff member corroborated their manager’s sense that they did not share the rest of 
the team’s positive sentiments about the SIB service.  This is a notable contrast to the glowing 
accounts provided by the other front line staff at this provider.  This front line staff member who 
expressed dissatisfaction with their experience in the project did not find fault in how outcomes were 
framed, or in relation to how their performance was monitored. Instead, they expressed broad 
dissatisfaction with their work in the homelessness sector as a whole and embarked on a sabbatical 
after their contract with the SIB team was complete.  This staff member’s account noted that the 
erosion of their intrinsic motivation was exacerbated, in part, by the introduction of indirect financial 
incentives. 
 
“Obviously, your manager’s there to push you, but for me, and something I would often say 
back is, ‘You need to tell them this is unrealistic.’” (B9) 
 
“I can see that they were pushing you know, explore all avenues, but for me it was important 
for me to go, ‘Just that’s not happening.’” (B9) 
 
This front line staff member described the imposition of incentives to work they felt they previously 
performed without incentives as demotivating but still chose to work towards outcome targets 
because they were motivated to contribute to a successful project.  This was of interest as this staff 
member described having a strong locus of control and autonomy over how they selected and 
prioritised outcomes along a continuum of potential responses. 
 
“Again, it’s this thing of, “Oh, you’ve gotta do these outcomes,” it’s like, “Are you suggesting I 
wouldn’t be doing my job otherwise?  You want me to do something other than the job I 
would’ve been doing without this.  You know, I’m gonna [sic] do my job with my hours and 
you’ll get what you’ll get.” It was just with the clients you know, I guess I did, I did have that.  I 
guess you did want things to work you know, regardless of me saying that and everything, if 
you’re involved in a project you want it to be successful and no one wants to say, “I did this 
project and it was unsuccessful.” (B9) 
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In other cases, front line staff found it difficult to reconcile doing what was positive for the client with 
what supported the success of the project.  For one front line worker, who was supportive of the 
outcomes-focused approach, this was a difficult balancing act at times.  
 
“I’m trying to build a relationship, I’m trying to get people off the street, I’m trying to get them 
engaged with treatment and although that’ll be good for them in the long run, within that 
quarter there will be no positive, real positive outcome in terms of what the GLA then everyone 
expects, you know, you still have that, you know, sort of like the hierarchy sort of like 
expectation of what outcomes you should be producing and things like that so yeah, it’s kind 
of balancing the expectations.” (A8) 
 
In some cases, front line staff felt that their efforts were not rewarded, or worse, that they were futile 
in achieving outcomes.  This was more pronounced among the front line staff at Providers A and B 
who were assigned the most entrenched clients in a Central London borough.  In the example given 
below, the front line staff member explains that they were working with a very entrenched group who 
were not generating outcomes and were discouraged by managers from continuing to do everything 
they could for the client: 
 
“The ethos of payment of results don’t work in the context of when you work with complicated 
people, because you’re putting more effort in, more time in, more resources in, but you’re not 
getting anywhere.” (A7) 
 
In another case, one front line staff member described how their first instincts were to help the group 
members improve their circumstances in any way possible through the freedom of the SIB, but that 
this impulse was tempered by the need to demonstrate success in reaching outcomes targets.  Below, 
this staff member described how the SIB enabled them to support a group member to complete a 
substance use rehabilitation course but that this was not a paid outcome so it crowded out their 
sense of fulfillment at doing their work well.  This was because there was no recognition for 
achievements outside the parameters of the outcomes-related payments prioritised by their 
managers. 
 
“…for them it is a positive outcome that they’re in treatment or doing detox and rehab but it’s 
not a payment [for us] but for them…it’s quite disheartening because you’re just like, I can’t 
really, you know, lose focus on that one because he’s just right there, like if I just do one more 
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thing he’ll be right there and you know, so I think that’s a conflict in itself as well just 
managing those expectations and what we consider as positive outcomes and what might be, 
you know, the aim of the project as positive outcomes may be different to our interpretation 
on what a positive outcome would be and especially for that individual client.” (A8) 
 
These examples illustrate how staff responded to incentives through a range of behaviours that 
simultaneously ranged from altruistic to opportunistic.  These responses often varied in relation to 
the degree of autonomy staff had over their decisions regarding service delivery and the degree to 
which the outcomes-related incentives resonated with their own intrinsic motivations.  
 
Crowding out by managerial decisions 
Managerial choices had the potential to crowd out intrinsic motivation and lead to job insecurity or 
dissatisfaction, particularly when staff felt that they were not able to influence or change their 
circumstances.  For example, in Provider A, the approach to service delivery and task allocation was 
characterised by a clearly defined link between achieving outcomes and maintaining the size of the 
outreach team after the first year.  Interviews with staff suggested that the approach to outcomes 
could have benefitted from a more drawn out, incremental approach. Instead, the organisational 
decision to deploy a front-loaded intervention resulted in two main critiques: first that this led to 
aggressive and unsustainable pursuit of outcomes in the first year; second, that the lack of assurances 
that staff received about their continued employment after the first year of the intervention (as most 
were on 12 month contracts and were reported to have been renewed on a monthly basis after the 
first year) contributed to staff attrition.  Staff were also quick to note that there was a change in the 
organisation’s approach to outcomes at the end of the first year and that this resulted in substantial 
job insecurity and demotivation: 
 
“I think they thought they were going to throw everything at the first year, I think that’s why 
they got so many lead workers in and the idea was give them one year contracts and maybe 
they thought they were going to have all these people in accommodation and then it would be 
a case of slowly introducing these peer mentors or volunteers, you know, to sustain them in 
there and it didn’t happen like that, and there were still lots of people out on the streets so 
they kind of focused on what they thought was going to happen and it didn’t…but I don’t 
know, it was maybe, is it, was it badly thought out? I don’t know, maybe they didn’t know 
what was going to happen, they protected themselves by giving one year contracts to people 
obviously but the communication, if they’d just said “We’re not sure what’s going to happen 
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next”, or you know, just given some people some idea of where they’re at rather than felt, 
people felt that maybe they didn’t care actually which was probably the worse way to do 
things isn’t it?” (A9) 
 
An organisational factor, outside of the control of the front line staff members, that affected service 
delivery was the managerial flux in Provider A.  The SIB team had four managers over the 41 months 
that the project operated.  One former-staff member cast the blame on an organisational hierarchy 
that was hollowed out and therefore needed to promote staff without necessarily having the time to 
build up their capacity as managers and team leaders.  The high levels of staff attrition and managerial 
flux had an adverse impact on staff motivation and crowded out staff’s motivation. 
 
“…lots and lots of good people were leaving [Provider A], and that’s created lots of spaces and 
they were just pushing people up very quickly to positions who obviously didn’t know how to 
manage, hiring new people in and then if you have the combination of fresh-faced frontline 
workers and managers that don’t really know what they’re doing it just creates a sort of 
perfect storm of inefficient services really, unfortunately.” (A11) 
 
One front line staff member was sharper in their criticisms of how the team was managed and the 
approach that the organisation took to engaging and motivating their team.  While this staff member 
reported having a high level of autonomy in their everyday work, they felt that there was a lack of 
structure within the team and certainty over job security which crowded out the personal enjoyment 
they derived from their work: 
 
“Looking back on it, you know, I don’t think that team was particularly well managed. I think 
there should have been a lot more structure and strategy there basically, because there really 
wasn’t.  We were very much just left to get on with everything in a very, um, (sighs) a very kind 
of just slightly aimless way. I think it was that, that aimlessness which ultimately led to two of 
the team falling apart because people were a bit like just sort of felt okay, well, what now. 
That was certainly how I felt and I was only there, you know, a year, I was just, like, okay, I feel 
like I’ve done this as well as I can do it – where am I going to go now, you know.” (A11) 
 
In another case, the long-term nature of the SIB outcomes was demotivating for a worker in Provider 
B as it became clear that the front line staff member was expected to continue trying with the same 
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clients throughout the intervention.  This was due to a decision to keep client relationships consistent 
over the three years of the contract: 
 
“…just having these 30 [expletive] people to deal with all the time just, how institutionalised 
they were and the trauma, getting threatened by a couple of them and… I was just yeah, just 
dealing with these people.  It was almost like the bit that was good, became the worst bit, you 
know, so for example, oh, that guy I’ve talked - to you about and lost the flat and shouldn’t 
have.  The thing is… I’ve tried, “Oh thank god he’s gone,” I’m like, “He’s still mine, I’ve still 
gotta visit him,” oh, and that, that was, that could be you know, what was the good positive 
about it was becoming a bit of an, oh [expletive], I can’t, I can’t just go, “Someone else deal 
with this guy, I’m a bit bored with him, a bit tired.”  (B9)  
 
For a small number of informants, front line staff reported that their intrinsic motivation to do their 
work was eroded by the introduction of incentives because they suggested that they would not have 
otherwise done their best for clients. ‘Crowding out’ was also the result of managerial choices that led 
to uncertainty or job instability where workers felt that they did not have a strong sense of autonomy 
over the conditions of their employment.  
 
8.4. Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter provides empirical evidence about the impact of direct and 
indirect financial incentive contracts on the intrinsic motivation of staff in non-profit organisations.  
This chapter examined the interactions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to understand 
whether there exists empirical evidence of a crowding in or crowding out effect on motivations 
following the introduction of financial incentives to a non-profit organisation.  In both case studies, 
staff indicated that they had high levels of intrinsic motivation in their work, particularly because it 
allowed them to both ‘do good’ and to ‘feel good’ about themselves.  Staff members demonstrated 
high levels of intrinsic motivation to do their work and was a strong contributor in their decisions to 
self-select into work with homeless people.  The role of extrinsic motivation was important in focusing 
staff on the organisation’s goals under the SIB project while fostering greater autonomy through the 
flexible nature of the SIB contract for staff.  It allowed many front line staff members to feel that they 
had greater control, and thereby authority, over their work while some staff reported that they 
enjoyed the freedom of the role but that they did not internalise the goals of the SIB so it was an 
enjoyable experience but not necessarily one that led to greater enjoyment of their tasks.  There was 
evidence that intrinsic motivation had the potential to be crowded out by the imposition of extrinsic 
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rewards.  In these cases, there was anecdotal evidence of an erosion of intrinsic motivation.  This 
chapter provides evidence that the introduction of incentives did not necessarily have negative 
implications for provider behaviour but supports existing work that suggests there is a ‘crowding in’ 
and ‘crowding out’ effect and that autonomy is an important contributing factor to the success of a 
p4p initiative.  
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 Conclusion 
 
9.1.  Introduction  
The aim of this thesis was to explore the impact of financial incentives on non-profit organisations 
delivering outcomes-based contracts in UK public services to understand how they affect intra-
organisational behaviour and the motivation of staff members.  The case studies in this thesis 
examined non-profit organisations and their experiences of the impact of the SIB’s direct financial 
incentives on each non-profit organisation and of the indirect financial incentives for managers and 
front line staff.  This discussion chapter summarises and discusses the findings of the research relative 
to this thesis’s aims and objectives, and considers the contribution of these findings to the literature 
in relation to health and social care policy, to public services financing, the framework for analysis, 
and other empirical studies.  This chapter discusses the strengths and limitations of the research 
methodology.  The chapter then explores the theoretical and empirical implications of these research 
findings.  This chapter closes by presenting the policy implications and identifying opportunities for 
further research in this area.    
 
9.2.  Thesis aims and objectives  
The aim of this research was to explore the relationship between financial incentives and 
organisational and team behaviour in two non-profit organisations.  This research focused on the 
impact of the incentives generated under two different SIB contracts on organisational, team, and 
staff behaviour, and how these changes were articulated at both the managerial and front-line level.  
This research addressed these objectives through case studies in two non-profit organisations 
delivering services through a SIB with the same outcomes goals.  
 
The objectives of this research were: 
1. To understand how new financial incentives were articulated and prioritised within a non-
profit organisation’s management and how this affected the way that the organisations 
planned and delivered SIB services. 
2. To understand how senior and team managers responded to extrinsic incentives and the 
impact that these had on staff structure, task allocation, service delivery, performance 
management and monitoring outcomes. 
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3. To understand how team managers and front line staff perceived incentives and outcome-
related rewards driven by the SIB, and how this affected their attitudes toward outcome 
targets.  
4. To understand the impact that incentives had on the intrinsic motivation of team managers 
and front line staff. 
 
Framework for analysis 
To meet these aims and objectives, this thesis has drawn on the framework for analysis presented in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.6. (see Figure 9.1. below) to consider the impacts that a SIB contract can have on 
the behaviours of managers and staff in non-profit providers.   
 
Figure 9.1  Framework for analysis  
 
 
 
This diagram illustrates the framework for analysis used in this thesis.  Firstly, there is provider 
motivation for staff in the non-profits, which includes the factors that drive an individual to work in a 
pro-social organisation, such as intrinsic motivation and professional ethos.  Second, there are the 
extrinsic rewards found in a SIB contract, such as the introduction of an outcomes-based contract or 
performance management.  Given that workers in non-profits are expected to be intrinsically 
motivated and serve multiple principals, the introduction of a SIB contract has the potential to change 
Client group
Provider motivations
Intrinsic Motivation (altruism, 
enjoyment of task itself, pro-social 
motivation, to ‘do good’), 
professional ethos, education or 
training, career concern, self-selection 
of staff into non-profit sector
Front line staff
Team managers
Middle managers
Senior managers
Direct incentives
Outcomes-based contract, repayment 
of loans with fixed interest rates, risk 
mitigation to organisation
Investors Commissioners
Crowding out of motivation Crowding in of motivation
Indirect incentives
Performance management/feedback, 
personalisation budgets, 
transparency, support for proactive 
behaviours, constructive supervision, 
perceived contingency of rewards
Mission drift, risk selection, 
attrition, creaming, parking, 
gaming
Positive social outcomes, improved 
pathways of care, personalisation, 
innovation, autonomy 
Provider behaviours
Non-profit organisation
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the agency relationship or erode intrinsic motivation.  Combined, these two categories may have a 
direct effect on the behaviours that determine outcomes for service recipients. 
 
  
 
9.3. Discussion of findings 
This section discusses the implications of the research findings for the theoretical literature and for 
policy.  Three areas are addressed in this section.  First, the discussion examines the implications of 
the impact of incentives on the agency relationship and intra-organisational provider behaviour.  The 
second area explores the theoretical and empirical literature about the impact of incentives on the 
intrinsic motivations of non-profit workers.  The third section discusses the complexity of SIBs and 
outcomes-based contracting with non-profit providers of public services.   
 
9.3.1.  Agency relationship and incentives  
The use of SIBs and outcomes-based contracts have been framed as a novel financing mechanism to 
incentivise improvements in accountability and efficiency through a focus on the achievement of 
predetermined outcomes as the main metric of successful public service delivery.  SIB advocates 
argue that SIBs are positive because they focus providers on successful outcomes, increase 
accountability, and improve performance management (Buse et al., 2012, Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 
2011, Callanan et al., 2012).  However, SIBs can be critiqued as an overly simplistic framing that 
neglects the potential impact of such contracts on the agency relationship of non-profit organisations, 
and can lead to perverse incentives associated with p4p, such as creaming, parking, or gaming.  There 
is an insufficient engagement in the pro-SIB literature with the potential implications of introducing 
new actors to the agency relationship and how direct and indirect financial incentives can diminish or 
erode a non-profit organisation’s social mission or commitment to service recipients (Fraser et al., 
2018b, Joy and Shields, 2013).   
 
This thesis examines the impact of the SIB contracts using economic theory about the agency 
relationship between the service provider and the public commissioner to consider the implications of 
a new principal on service delivery where the non-profit providers assume a high degree of financial 
risk.  These issues are rooted in agency theory, which assumes that incentives are needed to re-align 
the agent’s (non-profit staff) behaviours in such a way that the principal (government purchaser) can 
encourage them to contribute to, or pursue, certain societal outcomes.  In the case studies, the SIB 
contract introduced two new agency relationships between 1) the obligation to repay loans to 
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investors (Providers A and B) and 2) the investors on the non-profit (Provider A) or the SPV’s 
governance board (Provider B) to the organisation’s existing principal-agent relationships (details of 
this are presented in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1).  In both providers, it was important that the SIBs were 
successful, but Provider A placed more emphasis on mitigating financial risk than Provider B did.  Both 
providers expressed some ambivalence about the introduction of external monitoring in the form of 
investors to the non-profit or SPV’s board, but felt that it was ultimately a positive influence.  That 
being said, the strategic importance that the senior leadership, especially in Provider A, placed on 
satisfying the new principal influenced how team managers prioritised outcomes-achievement and 
communicated that to front line staff.   
 
It is insufficient to assume that the introduction of private investors will have no impact on the agency 
relationship between each non-profit organisation and their existing agency relationships with the 
following principals: 1) to their governance boards; 2) the public commissioner (as a source of 
funding); and 3) the organisations’ donors in the absence of the SIB contracts.  There is limited 
evidence about how actors choose between principals and prioritise between them. This can affect 
the agency relationship between the government purchaser and the service provider in unexpected 
or unintended ways.  This thesis finds senior managers were more sensitive to the pecuniary interests 
of their organisation while most front line staff, who faced no performance-based rewards, were 
more likely to be driven by altruism or pro-social motivations.  This is consistent with Besley and 
Ghatak’s (2005) findings that the agency relationship is complicated as agents have a mix of 
motivations that can be pro-social, while others are driven by pecuniary interests.   
 
Impact of incentives on teams 
This research finds that the ways that non-profit organisations reacted, or framed their approach, to 
risks was influenced by a range of factors related to the introduction of outcomes-based contracting 
where the providers were in a 100% p4p relationship with the government commissioner.  The 
contractual structures of each Provider’s SIB merits discussion because Provider B’s SPV meant that 
funds from commissioners were ring-fenced for the SIB intervention, while in Provider A, the 
outcomes-related payments went to the wider organisation before being dispersed to project teams.  
It was unsurprising that some staff in Provider A expressed some criticism of the fact that their work 
was generating financial rewards for the organisation but it was unclear where, and to what end, 
those resources were being distributed.  Whereas in Provider B, staff were aware that any funds 
generated by their work were used to pay for staff expenses or contributed to the personalisation 
budgets for their clients. To extend this analysis, it can be argued that the findings of this thesis 
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support evidence that the level at which rewards are distributed are important factors to improving 
the effectiveness of the p4p payments (Kristensen et al., 2016).   
 
The findings are mixed as to the impact of the indirect financial incentives on non-profit organisations 
with evidence that they can result in both improved outcomes, a more client centred approach, and 
the inequitable distribution of time and resources for the client group.  In both sites, the SIB 
interventions were well-supported, novel approaches to working with an entrenched group of 
homeless individuals.  There remains ambiguity as to whether this was indeed the best way to 
commission services.  It is helpful to draw out interesting insights about the impact of incentives in 
team-based work.  It was not possible to draw insights from Provider B about whether managers 
chose more able workers for certain clients in order to generate outcomes because their front line 
staff were responsible for a set group of clients throughout the intervention.  Staff reported that this 
only changed where a relationship broke down or a client needed to work with a male instead of a 
female worker for security reasons.  By contrast, in Provider A, there was a team-based approach to 
outcomes, with managers assigning particular front line staff to certain outcomes from the second 
year.  The front line SIB team in Provider A passed clients to one another as they progressed through 
the housing to employment or education pathway.  There was the possibility that this led front line 
workers to generate outcomes with the intent of passing clients away from their responsibility.  This 
was because the service delivery model at Provider A did not expect or encourage them to foster 
long-term relationships where they were accountable for the best interests of their clients.  There is 
evidence of this from the for-profit sector (Bandiera et al., 2006), but it was impossible to know 
whether this was the case without being able to shadow or observe the SIB team in their work for 
long periods of time.  This was not a possibility given the resources available with a sole researcher.  
The managers in Provider A may have adopted the same strategy seen in Bandiera et al.(2007) to 
assign the most able workers to certain outcomes while letting less outcomes-oriented or efficient 
staff to work on clients with the lowest likelihood of generating rewards (Bandiera et al., 2007).  There 
is also empirical evidence of this from a study of financial incentives in a public sector agency that 
managers selected more efficient staff for incentivised tasks (Burgess et al., 2010).   While the 
empirical evidence suggests that there is the potential for free-riding and more inefficient overall 
production in teams (Burgess and Ratto, 2003), there is no evidence of this in the case studies. 
 
This study finds that front line staff were either influenced by their team managers or a frontline 
worker’s inclination to pursue the best interests of their clients given concurrent pressures to meet 
outcomes, balance workload or pursue professional goals.  This exemplifies the difficulties embedded 
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in introducing direct and indirect financial incentives by contracting for outcomes in non-profit 
organisations, as it is difficult to contract for the full range of preferences and priorities that individual 
agents hold.  In the case studies, this was compounded by the flexible and personalised approach that 
each organisation took in implementing the SIBs, where staff had considerable freedom and flexibility 
in planning their work, which was delivered on a one-to-one basis.  For example, front line staff were 
trusted to be the main point of contact with clients and not subject to process measures, or 
intermediate process measures from managers, to assess their performance.  This is consistent with 
the inherent difficulties of monitoring agents where tasks are not standardised, and can lead to 
unplanned, or even, perverse outcomes (Prendergast, 1999).  
 
Impact of incentives on front line staff behaviour 
This research explores how non-profit staff responded to indirect financial incentives in their work 
with clients to understand if, and how, their behaviours changed in response to the potential for 
outcomes-related payments, compared with their inclination to do what was best for their clients.   
 
The findings suggest that the introduction of outcomes-related payments had many unintended 
consequences, such as managerial attrition and unintended behaviours, such as creaming and 
parking.  For example, in Provider A, it was possible that given the high importance placed on being 
seen as successful and entrepreneurial, senior managers communicated that they saw successful 
implementation as closely linked to profit-maximising behaviour.  In doing so, it was possible that they 
would condone of adverse behaviours that led to further changes in the agency relationship at the 
meso- and micro-organisational level.  By contrast, the team managers in Provider B stressed the 
importance of using a client- not outcomes-centred model.  However, this also led to unintended 
consequences in that front line staff fostered unsustainable levels of dependency with the client 
group to maintain outcomes, such as sustained accommodation.  The findings suggest that the 
introduction of a new principal, in the form of an investor, can change the agency relationships that a 
non-profit has, and can lead to a range of different behavioural responses by providers.  The 
qualitative findings presented in this thesis differ from those of the quantitative evaluation against a 
matched cohort which indicate that both SIBs had a positive effect overall (Spurling, 2017) because 
the qualitative approach to this study enabled a rich understanding about how individuals in the two 
provider organisations responded to the introduction of new agency relationships at the meso- and 
micro- levels of each non-profit organisation.     
 
Staff were forthcoming in offering examples of ‘grey areas’ where they chose between doing what 
was best for the client and what generated outcomes payments.  This study found that staff across 
178 
 
both case studies were aware of the many ‘grey areas’ that arise after the introduction of incentives 
and could articulate examples from their work of where they were responsible for making the ‘right 
call’ on behalf of their clients.  This is consistent with a small number of studies that explored gaming 
behaviours at the provider level.  One such study uses statistical methods to identify whether, and to 
what extent, gaming occurred in the UK’s QOF scheme.  It found that general practitioners took 
advantage of exception reporting (to exclude certain individuals as unsuitable for treatment or 
refused treatment in particular disease domains) to modify the denominator on which their 
performance payments were based (Gravelle et al., 2010).  Other studies using qualitative methods 
find that staff were forthcoming in explaining how, and in what ways, they engaged in small gaming 
actions.  These small actions have the potential to be pervasive if widespread, such as refusing to 
supply a dose of a particular medication to avoid running out of stock (which would be penalised), or 
the arbitrary and retrospective filling out of paperwork (Kalk et al., 2010).  These studies support this 
research’s finding that for the most part, p4p schemes can improve quality of care or achieve their 
stated goals, but that caution is needed as providers do find ways to exploit their circumstances in 
marginal ways.  While it can be argued that these findings suggest that p4p initiatives do more good 
than harm, particularly if the unintended behaviours were marginal, it does challenge the use of 
incentives and rewards as the preferred motivational tool amongst policymakers in public services 
contracting.  It is also possible that this highlights the need for better contract design, particularly 
when applied to non-profit providers.   
 
Significantly, staff reported that their conflict between what was right for their clients, and what 
generated outcomes, was more complex than being motivated by the potential for financial gain for 
their organisation.  This research found that a very small number of informants revealed that they 
engaged in the gaming of outcomes through the falsification or misrepresentation of data to evidence 
an outcomes-related payment.  This finding is consistent with empirical findings that there exists 
limited evidence of gaming.  However, it should be noted that one systematic review reports that this 
reflects limited contexts for comparison to prove gaming and suggests that more research needs to 
be done that monitors unintended consequences more carefully (Van Herck et al., 2010).   It is 
unsurprising that the introduction of highly geared incentives in the case studies led a small number 
of staff to engage in less than scrupulous behaviour.  This is consistent with both the theoretical and 
empirical evidence that p4p schemes have the potential to cause perverse behaviour.  The evidence 
from these providers suggest that the pro-social motivation of staff in non-profits to ‘do good,’ and 
not be motivated by pecuniary rewards does mitigate perverse behaviour.  However, it is not 
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sufficient to deter all agents from engaging in it, whether to appear positive in front of their peers and 
managers or simply to shirk responsibilities to the group.   
 
There was also evidence of positive unintended behaviours.  It is possible that there were positive 
spillover effects on other, non-incentivised areas for the SIB clients.  For example, staff report that the 
SIB enabled them to place clients in alcohol and substance abuse treatment and to follow them 
through to completion. In these cases, the outcomes-based approach enabled front line staff to assist 
clients as needed although their actions were not rewarded by outcomes payments.  This is consistent 
with evidence from the QOF program that there were positive spillover effects for non-incentivised 
targets (Sutton et al., 2010).  The findings of this thesis suggest that the SIB contracts resulted in a 
number of positive spillover effects that were related to, but not required for successful service 
delivery.  For example, it led to improved service pathways, longer-term personalised support, and 
evidence that a cross-borough approach is beneficial for clients and workers. It was also possible that, 
over the long-term, these actions potentially guided those same clients towards sustained 
accommodation.   
 
Overall, the introduction of the SIBs had a positive impact on provider behaviour in that it enabled 
more flexibility and personalisation for entrenched social issues, but there is evidence of perverse 
behaviour, such as creaming, parking or gaming.  Where these issues emerged, it appeared to be 
linked to the strategic importance placed on achieving outcomes by senior leadership that reflect the 
change to the agency relationship because of the introduction of a new principal, the investors.  
These findings support criticisms of SIBs as an overly simplistic approach to public services contracting 
because it is crucial to consider the potential implications of introducing new actors to the agency 
relationship because direct and indirect financial incentives can diminish or erode a non-profit 
organisation’s social mission or commitment to service recipients.   
 
9.3.2.  Effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation  
The impact of incentives on the intrinsic motivation of managers and front line staff is of interest to 
this thesis because p4p (and its variants) are often introduced to increase worker motivation through 
performance-related rewards.  However, the introduction of incentives can be met by both positive 
and negative behavioural responses by staff at the individual, team, and facility-based level that 
depend on the design of, and implementation process for, an incentives scheme  (Lohmann et al., 
2016).  Given that workers in the public and voluntary sectors are assumed to be intrinsically 
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motivated, it is important to critically consider the impact that the incentives introduced by the SIB 
contract had on the motivation of staff in the non-profit case studies.   
   
These findings provide evidence in support of Lohmann et al.’s (2016) conceptual framework that 
incentives can ‘crowd in’ an individual’s intrinsic motivation, so that the incentives provide intrinsic 
task enjoyment or personal meaningfulness where they reflect the individual’s goals and values 
(Lohmann et al., 2016).  For example, team managers and front line staff who supported the 
outcomes, and had the autonomy to pursue the outcomes as they saw fit, reported that the 
outcomes crowded in their intrinsic motivation.  For example, in Provider A, front line staff felt they 
were able to operate at a higher, more strategic level than in their previous roles in the sector 
because they were responsible for navigating new pathways to societal reintegration for their clients.  
For example, front line staff were now responsible for convening meetings with housing officials, or 
advocating for their client’s needs.  This was different from previous roles in the sector where they 
had a smaller remit (e.g., in the SIB, they coordinated care planning for clients across boroughs and 
services whereas they were previously restricted to helping a client in a temporary accommodation 
and required to refer them out to council-run services when they were ready to move on).  This 
suggests that front line staff’s sense of autonomy and competency in delivering the SIB service was an 
important factor in crowding in their motivations.  This supports the emphasis that Lohmann et al.’s 
(2016) framework places on to considering staff’s sense of autonomy under a particular incentive 
scheme and how work that is not intrinsically interesting can still ‘crowd in’ worker motivations and 
allow them to achieve a sense of self-efficacy26  and value in their work (Lohmann et al., 2016).  
 
The SIB incentives were effective in ‘crowding in’ the motivation of managers and front line staff 
when they were aligned with staff’s own best intentions for the client group while providing an 
opportunity to be creative, and foster better practice through personalised pathways into housing 
and improved health.  This sense of greater autonomy and authority to develop relationships with 
their clients was described as a very positive aspect of the outcomes-oriented approach that was 
enabled by both the SIB’s incentives and managerial decisions about service delivery and staff 
structure.  This research provides evidence that indirect financial incentives have the potential to 
crowd in staff’s intrinsic motivations if staff are able to use their best discretion to deliver services to 
                                                          
 
26 For example, “If nurses strongly value their patients’ comfort and health and understand the importance of 
doing their share of the unpleasant tasks for the patients’ well-being, the nurses would feel relatively 
autonomous while performing such tasks (e.g., bathing patients), even though the activities are not intrinsically 
interesting.” (Gagne and Deci 2005 p.348) 
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clients in ways that were not previously possible (e.g. process measures that curtailed 
personalisation) or in the absence of incentives.  Most front-line staff reported that the SIB’s 
outcomes gave them an extra sense of focus on their work.  This is consistent with empirical research 
that found staff reported that the introduction of incentives ‘awakened’ their approach and 
motivation to work (Bhatnagar and George, 2016) and the incentives provided extra motivation to 
persist in working towards goals (Shen et al., 2017).   
 
By contrast, where staff reported that incentives felt imposed and infringed on their autonomy, there 
were reports that intrinsic motivation was ‘crowded out.’  Staff that reported a change in intrinsic 
motivation in Provider A expressed frustration that they had limited control over the direction of their 
work. For example, one front line staff member reported being told to prioritise clients that could 
generate outcomes and referring others that would not generate outcomes back into conventionally-
funded services.  This front line staff member reported being caught between doing what was right 
for their clients and what was best for the non-profit, which ultimately reduced their intrinsic 
motivation to ‘do good.’  This suggests that the introduction of incentives is not always 
straightforward and can lead to divergent behaviours, and is echoed by one study from Afghanistan 
finds that the use of direct financial incentives requires a more finely tuned understanding of human 
motivation and more sophisticated approaches for managing organisations and individuals beyond 
performance payments (Engineer et al., 2016).  While the empirical evidence provided interesting 
insights into intrinsic motivation among non-profit workers, there was no strong evidence from this 
research that direct or indirect financial incentives are the most effective policy tool available to 
persuade workers to do certain tasks.  The use of incentives to correct for issues of motivation and 
behaviour as an agency issue oversimplifies the difficulties inherent in public services contracting.   
 
Staff are understood to select into the non-profit sector for a variety of reasons, such as pro-social 
motivation, a sense of altruism, or a desire to ‘do good.’  In practice, this desire to ‘do good’ can be 
impeded by institutional constraints or subsumed by organisational priorities, where they may not be 
free to act in the best interests of their clients.  In Provider A, senior management’s choice to 
emphasise the importance of outcomes may have inadvertently sanctioned the use of sharper 
managerial techniques to push middle managers and front-line staff to meet outcomes. While there 
was no explicit evidence of this, interview data revealed that Provider A’s lower than projected 
performance in year one resulted in direct consequences for how the project was funded and staffed 
in subsequent years.  The pressure that team managers reported placing on their staff had the 
potential to undermine their front-line staff’s autonomy over their clients by reducing personalisation 
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budgets and reallocating the client group among front line staff.  This may have impeded front line 
staff’s ability, or sense, that they could do everything they could for their clients, as opposed to doing 
what would generate outcomes payments.  In some cases, this crowded out intrinsic motivation and 
led to demotivation or staff attrition.  This interpretation of the impact on crowding out was 
supported by Benabou and Tirole’s (2003, 2006) work that finds high powered incentives can backfire 
when workers are altruistic (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).   
 
There was evidence from a small number of interviews with staff who said the pressure to generate 
outcomes was externally imposed (particularly via pressure from managers to generate outcomes).  
These informants felt it crowded out their intrinsic motivation.  The staff who reported this sense of 
‘crowding out’ were the only ones that expressed discontent with the low rates of pay in the sector, 
with one suggesting that individual targets or rewards could have been a more valuable management 
tool.  This supports the theoretical literature about workers in non-profits that argues they are willing 
to trade off financial gain for the positive feelings derived from altruism or ‘doing good.’  This 
literature suggests that there are limits to donative labour, as there exists a negative relationship 
between intrinsic motivation and worker pay (Hansmann, 1980, Preston, 1989, Rose-Ackerman, 1996, 
Frank, 1996).  This trade-off is often described as the compensating wage differential where workers 
in non-profit firms will work for lower wages because they gain additional, intrinsic benefit from their 
work (Frank, 1996, Benz, 2005).  This study suggests that while it is likely that non-profit staff were 
motivated by a desire to do good, it is possible that the compensating wage differential changed 
where intrinsic motivation was crowded out by a lack of autonomy over their role.  For example, this 
might have occurred where managers infringed on a front line staff member’s best judgement or 
preferred pathways for clients.   
 
The findings of this research move away from previous work by Frey and Jegen (2001) that frames 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as a diametrically opposed continuum of behaviour (Frey and Jegen, 
2001).  This dichotomisation of motivation is an insufficient explanatory theory because it fails to 
capture the range of actions and preferences held by individual agents in both case studies.  For 
example, some front line staff supported the cross-borough approach to service delivery and reported 
positive relationships with managers and autonomy over their work with clients, which crowded in 
their motivation.  By contrast, another front line staff member reported some resentment at the 
suggestion that incentives were necessary to motivate her/him to do their work.  In this case, the staff 
member supported the goals of the outcomes, had autonomy to pursue the outcomes as they saw fit, 
but felt that the imposition of outcomes still crowded out their intrinsic motivation because it 
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suggested that they would not do what was best for clients in the absence of incentives.  This 
suggests that incentives can have both positive and negative effects at the individual level because 
front line staff make decisions and trade-offs as to how they see, and interpret indirect financial 
incentives, that are more complex and varied than the earlier theoretical work predicts. 
 
This study finds that the introduction of incentives did not necessarily have negative implications for 
provider behaviour.  Instead, it argues that autonomy is an important contributing factor in 
understanding whether incentives to crowd in intrinsic motivation, rather than eroding it.   These 
findings support the use of Lohmann et al.’s (2016) conceptual framework about the importance of 
autonomy in understanding whether, and how, incentives can affect the intrinsic motivation of 
workers delivering public services through performance-based funding contracts.  The findings of this 
thesis challenge the theorisation of motivation as a diametrically opposed continuum (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2003, Frey and Jegen, 2001) by considering the impact of incentives on an individual’s sense of 
competence and autonomy to understand the impact of incentives.  While this framework has only 
previously been applied in LMIC settings in mixed methods studies using a psychometric survey 
alongside semi-structured interviews (Lohmann et al., 2018, Lohmann et al., 2017), it has value as an 
analytical tool in understanding motivation composition for intrinsically motivated workers delivering 
p4p schemes.  This study extends what is known about motivation crowding theory by exploring how 
the incentives introduced in the SIB contract ‘crowded in’ most staff’s intrinsic motivation while 
‘crowding out’ motivation for a small number of staff.   
 
9.3.3.  Pay for performance and outcomes-based contracting in public services 
In Providers A and B, the SIBs entailed an outcomes-focused approach that focused staff on achieving 
long-term outcomes and enabled the development of personalised pathways to reintegrate a group 
of entrenched homeless individuals into more stable lifestyles.  While the high-level view of the 
intervention appears positive, it is important to note that the SIBs were both better funded, longer-
term and able to work across boroughs, unlike conventionally commissioned services.  Moreover, 
they were both prominent policy pilots.  As a result, it is all the more important to consider the 
potential shortcomings of this trend toward outcomes-based contracting for public services to the 
non-profit sector in principle, and the implications if applied at scale.  
 
First, the use of such outcomes-based SIB contracts is problematic in principle because they treat the 
government purchaser solely as the payer of outcomes.  In doing so, SIB contracts enable government 
to abdicate their stewardship role over public services because they are not responsible for 
monitoring or performance management of the services that they commission.  In the case studies, 
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the government purchaser was not responsible for contract management, but relegated to the payer 
of outcomes.  For example, in Providers A and B, the government was unable to monitor the finances 
and operational activities of each non-profit.  As the SIBs were outcomes-based contracts, the 
government purchaser held quarterly progress meetings with the providers to track progress but had 
no oversight over service specifications (e.g., that a site maintained minimum staffing levels) or 
contract management activities, such as ensuring that all clients received support.  As such, it was not 
possible to intervene when Provider A implemented a more cautious approach to service delivery by 
reducing staff costs in comparison with Provider B.  This supports the literature that argues that the 
use of non-profits as delivery arms of the government can be suboptimal  (Mullins et al., 2011, Alcock 
et al., 2013) because  governments have little oversight over the non-profit organisations they work 
with.  That is problematic because non-profits can be unstable due to a lack of asset ownership, ability 
to borrow funds, and investment capacity (Mullins et al., 2011).  It should be noted that despite 
Provider B’s higher staff costs and higher fixed interest rate (of 6.5% compared to Provider A’s 4%), 
they repaid their investors for the full sum of the investment at the close of the project.  While 
Provider B incurred higher staff costs and were liable to investors for a larger loan over the course of 
the intervention than Provider A, their overall performance in terms of actual versus projected 
income from the SIBs was similar (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. for details of actual and project 
performance).  This suggests that there appear to be many ways to achieve similar results despite 
variations in service delivery.  For example, Provider A engaged in cost-cutting actions, such as 
reducing the number of paid staff, and encouraging staff to pursue free activities rather than relying 
on personalisation budgets for clients.  It is possible that non-profit contractors will pursue an 
equitable, client-centred approach when implementing a 100% p4p contract but it should not be 
considered the norm for delivering such outcomes based contract in future.  
 
The shift towards contracting out, and the use of the third sector as a service delivery arm of the 
government is also problematic in principle because it contributes to a sense of growing resource 
scarcity in the non-profit sector among staff in the case studies.  Although a shift to contracting out 
should imply that more service contracts, and therefore future revenue, will be made available by 
government, Providers A and B felt this would occur in a climate of reduced public services where 
non-profits are being urged to do more with fewer resources.  The research found that one provider 
placed more strategic importance on generating outcomes to ensure that the project team, and the 
wider organisation, were sustainable.  This is consistent with the theoretical evidence that non-profits 
that perceive an environment of resource scarcity face more pressure to meet outcomes, so their 
staff might be more susceptible to perverse behaviour (Anheier, 2005).  By contrast, in Provider B, the 
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larger organisation, the outcomes-based contract was a small part of their overall remit and managers 
stressed the importance of ensuring equitable, client-centred pathways.  This is consistent with the 
findings of a report on the third sector that organisations with more secure funding are likely to face 
less pressure to alter their behaviour because the risks associated with low performance are smaller 
(Alcock et al., 2013). The use of such public services contracts necessitates a discussion about the 
actual, rather than perceived, risk of failing to deliver on contracts.   
 
Public services contracting differs from other forms of outsourcing in the private sector as the 
government is ultimately responsible, and has an interest in having third sector contractors that can 
deliver services.  It is telling that when it was not possible to attribute or evidence the health outcome 
(to reduce the number of unplanned admissions to A&E), the government purchaser paid the 
Providers A and B based on projected performance, as an act of good faith in the positive progress 
each were making.  While no other study in the nascent SIBs literature found that the commissioner 
paid out on projected outcomes when attributable outcomes data were inaccessible, there is 
evidence that the commissioners felt that they faced reputational implications if their SIB was to be a 
high-profile policy pilot failure.  For example, an evaluation of five SIBs in UK Health and Social Care 
found that the government purchaser was unlikely to let service providers become insolvent if they 
could not repay their loans to private investors (Fraser et al., 2018a).  This is because government is 
obliged to consider the implications for service users if third providers were to become insolvent and 
withdraw from the area.  
 
While SIBs are intended to foster accountability and better outcomes, they do not appear to fully 
transfer the risk of failure to non-profit organisations because of the government’s ultimate 
responsibility.  This is consistent with the evidence from a literature review about alliance-, prime- 
and outcomes based contracting that questions whether it is feasible or advisable to transfer 
responsibility away from government when it is ultimately accountable for services (Sanderson et al., 
2017).  This is also found to be true in the PPP and PFI literature where the UK government was 
ultimately accountable to honour long contracts for the design, build, and operation of hospitals 
(Hellowell, 2013).  However, the world’s first SIB at HMP Peterborough was cut short because it was 
not consistent with a nationwide initiative to change probation service for medium and low risk 
offenders, so the government withdrew from the contract after two years (Disley and Rubin, 2014).  
Given the potential for mission drift or perverse incentives, the government purchaser’s choice to 
uphold Provider A and B’s contracts as a sign of good faith in the work delivered with a vulnerable 
client population was perhaps a positive finding that motivated Providers A and B to carry on with 
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planned services.  This is encouraging in principle but ultimately problematic if outcomes-based 
contracting is expanded at scale across public services because the government is ultimately 
accountable.   
 
Beyond the concerns about contracting out on principle, such as the potential to fragment public 
services (Rees et al., 2012), or insufficient evidence that non-state providers deliver better services 
(Allen et al., 2011), there are reasonable concerns that the use of outcomes-based contracts at scale 
may have negative implications for collaborative, cross-sectoral work in the non-profit sector.  This 
has the potential to exacerbate concerns about fragmentation in public services.  There is evidence of 
this from Providers A and B who differed in their views about collaboration with other agencies or 
providers in their sector.  Provider A felt that any outcomes achieved were due to their efforts 
because the rest of the sector had failed to intervene effectively for these clients through existing 
services.  There was reluctance and, at times, hostility to the idea of sharing outcomes-related 
payments with other services whose work helped the SIB ‘Navigators’ generate outcomes.  This is 
consistent with evidence that the focus on securing competitive contracts can lead to less 
collaborative inter-organisational behaviour between actors in the sector (Buckingham, 2009).  
Conversely, with Provider B, there was more confidence about their ability to attract future funds 
given their role as a leader in the homelessness sector.  They were open to sharing their resources 
through collaboration to coopt the resources and expertise available from competing service 
providers.  This sense of resource scarcity led providers to act in different ways that had important 
implications for service delivery and implementation for the client group.   
 
The focus on outcomes enabled both providers to deliver more personalised pathways for societal 
integration than existing services for the homeless in London.  Informants in both sites said the focus 
on outcomes enabled them to follow clients through services that otherwise operated in silo, rather 
than refer clients outwards, only to follow up when clients passed through their services again.  While 
this is a positive result of the SIB, it is important to note that substantial fragmentation of public 
services between local authorities in the UK contributes to these weaknesses in pre-existing 
homelessness services.  A reliance on third sector contractors can inhibit collaboration and fragment 
existing services because actors are no longer working toward a single goal, or mission for society, 
that might be found in more centralised public services provision.  There is no evidence that SIBs and 
outcomes-based contracts are required to facilitate improvements in client pathways that better 
contract and grant management by public commissioners could not accomplish.  Further, if public 
commissioners were to have the capacity to focus on improved contract management for outsourced 
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services, it could improve services while allowing government to take a stronger stewardship role.  
Moreover, it removes the potential for changes to the agency relationship associated with the 
introduction of a new principal, in the form of investors. 
 
SIBs merit critical consideration because they purport to transform public services through 
performance measurement and accountability.  This suggests that service interventions can be 
segmented into outcomes with a financial value and that interventions that deserve to be scaled up 
should be both measurable and demonstrate value for money. It is important to consider these SIBs 
within the context of the ‘financialisation’ of social policy, where public services exist to support, 
stabilise, or expand the economy in the era of austerity (Lake, 2015).  This is problematic because 
governments with social welfare systems are committed to providing services with inherent market 
failures (e.g. healthcare).  This treatment of social problems as an issue that can be solved via 
incentivisation is problematic because it conflates the solution to structural societal problems with a 
lack of accountability and efficiency in the public, and non-profit, sector.  The use of highly-
personalised interventions for ‘problematic’ social groups neglects the structural drivers of inequity 
and social inequality that contribute to homelessness, such as a lack of housing support for 
adolescents leaving residential care, shortcomings in access to mental health or substance abuse 
services, and a lack of options to combat recidivism among prison leavers.  This is compounded by 
austerity measures and the fragmentation caused by the wider trend of contracting out public 
services to the private and non-profit sector. 
 
The fact that policymakers have taken such a keen interest in SIBs and outcomes-based contracts as 
‘transformative’ financing mechanisms for public services is perhaps an indictment of past decades of 
competitive tendering for public services.  The use of competitive tendering has inhibited integrated 
public services planning and have instead delivered fragmentation in public services, a winnowing of 
the pool of potential providers (Mullins et al., 2011, Alcock et al., 2013) and a resistance to 
collaboration between actors rather than innovation in public services.  This thesis finds that the use 
of SIBs and outcomes-based contracts did not absolve government purchasers of risk while requiring 
that they trust non-profit providers to do the right thing, but to also step in if they fail to do so.  Given 
the potential for unintended consequences, mission drift, and less collaboration among non-profits, 
these issues remain of interest.  This is particularly true since the UK’s current Conservative 
government (2015-2017; 2017-present) remains interested in expanding the use of payment by 
results, personalisation, and outcomes-based contracting (e.g. through Social Impact Bonds).  The 
DCMS has continued to foster the development of the SIB market through the Life Chances Fund, 
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through which the government has committed to spend £80 million on locally developed project 
using PbR (Cabinet Office, 2018).  This is alongside a pledge in the 2017 Conservative Manifesto to 
expand the use of Housing First initiatives to combat homelessness (Conservative Party, 2017).    
 
 
9.4.  Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis sought to understand the impact of financial incentives on provider behaviour and 
motivation in two non-profit organisations.  There is limited empirical evidence about the impact of 
incentives on organisations and the behaviour and motivations of staff.  This research addresses this 
area of the literature to make a unique contribution to the literature in three ways.  
 
Firstly, this research study is the first known effort to understand the impact of direct and indirect 
financial incentives in non-profit organisations where the service provider is delivering a 100% p4p 
outcomes-based SIB contract, using comparative, qualitative case studies.  This study is unique 
because it looks at the implications of the financial and contractual relationships underpinning the SIB 
contracts and the impact for provider behaviour.  There have been many p4p experiments in the UK 
drawing on routine administrative data to examine organisation-based rewards such as the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in primary care (Doran et al., 2011, Gravelle et al., 2010) or 
Advancing Quality (AQ), a hospital-based, tournament style p4p scheme (Sutton et al., 2012, Kreif et 
al., 2016).  It appears that no other qualitative study has taken place in a setting where government 
payments to non-profit providers were on an entirely outcomes-based approach.  While there are a 
small number of studies that examine the impact of the outcomes-based payments to providers, such 
as the PbR drugs recovery pilot in the UK (Mason et al., 2015) and the DWP’s Work Programme (Rees 
et al., 2014), this study is the only one with a p4p relationship between the government purchaser 
and service provider.  In these case studies, the provider was liable to an external investor for the 
start-up costs of contract implementation with fixed interest rates.  This is particularly notable given 
the non-contingent nature of the loans.  As such, this research offers a unique approach.  
Furthermore, the case studies in this thesis were among the world’s first SIBs and offer a unique 
opportunity to compare and, where they diverge, contrast how managers and front line staff respond 
to the indirect financial incentives set out in the SIB contracts.  This approach differs from the current 
empirical literature available about the case studies where one evaluation did not distinguish 
between the two sites in their findings (Mason et al., 2017) and another focused on one site (Cooper 
et al., 2016).  Two studies compared the experiences of the two SIB providers to a limited degree 
alongside other SIBs but differed in scope from this study.  The first focused on the role of private 
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capital in outcomes-based commissioning (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2018) while the second focused on 
the SIB as a financing mechanism in UK Health and Social Care (Fraser et al., 2018a).  The data in this 
thesis was collected as part of the evaluation reported in Fraser et al.(2018a) and is presented here in 
its entirety (See Chapter 4, Methods for further details of the contribution of this candidate to the 
thesis). This study’s unique contribution to the nascent literature about SIBs is its focus on the 
implications of the financial and contractual relationships on provider behaviour.   
 
Secondly, this research expands what is known about the application of incentives, how they are 
articulated through an organisational hierarchy, and the impact that this has on provider behaviour.  
This study does so by providing empirical evidence about how front line workers in both case studies 
responded to extrinsic rewards and how that affected how work was prioritised relative to other 
competing objectives that workers in non-profit firms face, such as career progression.  In doing so, it 
builds on existing theoretical work about the use of incentives in non-profit or public sector settings 
(Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008, Besley and Ghatak, 2003).  There is a gap in the empirical literature 
about how incentives are transmitted and communicated through organisations and how this affects 
organisational behaviour (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).  This research extends the limited 
empirical work about the impact of incentives within organisations, particularly as they relate to intra-
organisational dynamics between managers and their staff.  There are a small number of studies that 
examine this topic that are of limited relevance because they examine the application of direct 
financial incentives in teams.  Two are drawn from the for-profit sector.  One describes the 
implementation of relative rewards compared with individual ones and how they led to cooperative 
norms and lower levels of efficiency (Bandiera et al., 2006).  The other is about how managers select 
more able workers for incentivised tasks (Bandiera et al., 2007).  Two other studies examined the 
impact of team-based performance related pay in the UK government’s tax collection agency (Burgess 
et al., 2010) and in the UK government employment agency (Burgess et al., 2017).  These studies are 
helpful in that they provide evidence that relative rewards for teams may lead to less efficient output 
than individual level rewards but are of limited relevance to the findings of this research because the 
staff in Providers A and B faced indirect financial incentives.  This study contributes empirical evidence 
that explores the ‘black box’ of p4p in organisations by presenting detailed case studies about how 
direct and indirect incentives are communicated and operationalised by front line staff.   
 
Thirdly, this thesis provides empirical evidence about the impact of incentives on provider motivation 
and adds to the literature about intrinsic motivation.  The theoretical literature describes motivation 
in two ways: first, as a continuum between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations along which workers 
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move (Frey and Jegen, 2001); or second, that an individual’s autonomy in responding to incentives 
was an important determinant of how intrinsically motivated staff are (Gagné and Deci, 2005, 
Lohmann et al., 2016).  This study provides empirical evidence from both case studies that supports 
Lohmann et al.’s (2016) theoretical framework that incentives can have positive and negative effects 
on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in different ways that vary with the design and implementation of 
the p4p scheme and how worker’s respond to it.  This framework has been tested in two mixed-
methods studies in Burkina Faso (Lohmann et al., 2017) and Malawi (Lohmann et al., 2018) but this is 
the first application of this framework using qualitative methods in a high income setting.  This 
research adds to a small but growing empirical literature about intrinsic motivation that is derived 
from field experiments about the impact of both direct financial rewards on individuals and teams 
and indirect rewards, such as new equipment on workers in the public sector (primarily health 
related) in LMIC settings (Lohmann et al., 2017, Bhatnagar and George, 2016, Bertone et al., 2016).  
There are a small number of studies from high income settings on this topic.  These are an 
examination of the impact of pay on job satisfaction (as a proxy for motivation) among UK GPs (Allen 
et al., 2017) and an ethnographic study of the impact of incentives in two general practices on GPs 
and nurses (McDonald et al., 2007).  While McDonald et al.(2007) is one of the most cited UK-based 
papers about motivation and draws on two comparative case studies as this thesis does, it differs in 
that there is no model of change regarding motivation crowding, instead the researchers draw 
inferences about motivation based on their observations of behaviour in the case studies.  This thesis 
differs in that it applies the findings from the two case studies to new theoretical work about 
motivation crowding (Lohmann et al., 2016) that argues that the same incentives can have positive 
and negative effects on intrinsic motivation depending on design, implementation and whether staff 
support them.  Among front line staff in both providers, this study found that indirect incentives 
crowded in motivation for staff members with autonomy over how service delivery was implemented, 
although there was some evidence of crowding out among staff who were ambivalent about the 
outcomes-related incentives or were demotivated by managerial decisions.  These findings add to the 
current body of evidence about how indirect incentives affect the intrinsic motivation of non-profit 
staff and whether incentives ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’ motivation. 
 
9.5.  Strengths and limitations of the methodology used 
This section considers the strengths and limitations of the research methodology.  The research 
questions were addressed through a comparative case study design that focused on how direct and 
indirect financial incentives were communicated through an organisational hierarchy and filtered 
through to front line staff.   
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As explained in Chapter 4 (Methods) a case study approach was selected as a comprehensive research 
strategy that allowed this researcher to conduct an empirical inquiry that “investigate[d] a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2013 p.8). The case study approach was 
a strength of this research.  It enabled the use of documentary analysis (i.e. contractual documents) 
and interview data.  This approach was key to the collection and contextualisation of the impact of 
organisation-level, extrinsic, non-financial incentives (where the staff did not benefit financially even 
though there were financial incentives placed on their work) for managers and front line staff in two 
organisations.  This method generated insights about the impact of different approaches to 
implementing a SIB on two organisations.  The comparative case study approach enabled me to 
contextualise emerging patterns about how staff responded to the extrinsic rewards created by the 
SIB at a larger scale.  This approach enabled me to draw out potential differences in intra-
organisational behaviour.  The comparative case study approach was a strength of this thesis as the 
use of two sites meant project findings were based on a wider range of data (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
A further strength of this study was the access I obtained to contractual documents to verify the 
incentives described in the interviews.  This study was able to identify and set out the incentives 
created by each SIB to understand the potential benefits and risks to each provider.  This enabled a 
more thorough understanding of the financial obligations introduced by the SIB contracts.  This 
allowed me to contextualise how the senior leadership understood and valued the potential earnings 
accrued through the SIBs, and how that affected the way they transmitted those priorities through to 
team managers and front line staff.  The wider literature on public sector contracting is relevant for 
academics interested in understanding the benefits and disadvantages of SIBs as an outcomes-based 
contracting mechanism.  However, this topic was outside the direct remit of this study and its focus 
on understanding the impact of financial incentives on provider behaviour and motivation.   
 
This study relied on qualitative data to understand what the impact of incentives were for individuals 
working in a non-profit organisation.  This was explored using semi-structured interviews about their 
experiences in the SIB project and their reflections about the use of direct financial incentives on the 
organisation and indirect financial incentives for their work.  The interviews provided rich descriptive 
data about how staff approached their work, particularly how front line staff viewed and prioritised 
the client group.  For example, front line staff described how they determined whether a client was 
ready for housing, and if that decision was influenced by the potential for outcomes payments, 
because their managers said it was a priority, or when it was a mutual decision based on the client’s 
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best interests.  This data enabled a detailed, contextualised account of the experience of direct and 
indirect financial incentives within the ‘black box’ of a non-profit organisation delivering services 
through an outcomes-based p4p contract.  Those respondents who had since left their employment 
in Providers A and B may have been more critical of their experiences, but they might also have been 
less defensive about their experiences.  It is possible they shared different perspectives about their 
time with an organisation they no longer worked in.  Efforts were made to triangulate findings 
between informants.  I drew on published primary research to contextualise these findings to mitigate 
the influence of informants that provided ambiguous or unclear information for any reason.  The 
analysis of intrinsic motivations relied on interview data with staff in the case studies.  The 
conclusions drawn from a single interviewer may be limited however, it should be noted that even if a 
robust and agreed tool to measure motivation had existed, the very small sample of available staff 
(n=33 interviews with 26 informants across two sites) would have prohibited any meaningful 
quantitative analysis.   
 
This study was concerned with understanding the impact of incentives on the agency relationship and 
relied on data from semi-structured interviews to analyse whether, and to what degree, staff felt 
compelled to meet the goals of a new principal (the investors).  While this research was unable to 
measure or monitor how staff valued different principals, or tasks, in order to derive a conceptual 
model of the impact of new incentives on the agency relationship, the strength of the qualitative 
observations may enable further theoretical research about the impact of a profit-seeking investor on 
the agency relationship.  Further, a strength of this study is that the framework for analysis provides a 
model as to how the introduction of incentives had the potential to change the agency relationship.  
Interview data were thematically analysed based on themes from the framework for analysis so that I 
was able to reflect on what the theory predicted, compared to what was empirically found.   
 
The comparative case studies sought to develop a rich account of the experiences of two non-profit 
organisations.  It is important to note that this research gained analytical generalisability using the 
insights from the theoretical literature.  Criticisms of the case study approach focus on their lack of 
generalisability and their bias towards verification (Flyvbjerg, 2006) but these can be mitigated in two 
ways.  First, it is possible for this study to be replicated on a wider scale with more operational SIB 
contracts.  Since the outset of this research, there have been several other SIBs commissioned using 
the same outcomes targets so it is possible for another researcher to conduct the study and thereby 
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expand the generalisability of these findings27.  Second, a comparison of the research findings with 
other concurrent published work indicates that my observations were consistent with other academic 
researchers at these sites (See Chapter 5, Section 5.4. for a summary of the empirical evidence about 
these case studies and Section 9.4. for the contribution of this thesis to the existing empirical 
literature).   
 
The fieldwork that formed the empirical data used in this study was collected as part of a wider 
evaluation of nine SIB ‘Trailblazers’ in Health and Social Care in England (Fraser et al., 2018a, Tan et 
al., 2015).  The data collection was also constrained by the evaluation’s timeframe for data collection 
and ethical approval.  The fieldwork did not begin until the Summer of 2014, by which point the SIBs 
had been operational for almost two years so it was not possible to collect data over the life of the 
SIBs.  Instead, semi-structured interviews were held with all staff working in both SIBs sites at regular 
intervals over the remaining 18 months of the contract period, with follow up interviews held again 
toward the end of the fourth year.  Every effort was made to contact staff who were no longer with 
the organisations.  This was more successful with former front-line staff who were happy to speak 
over the phone or in person as they were still engaged in the same sector or in similar work (e.g. 
those who had since been promoted or sought other opportunities at similar organisations).  It was 
more difficult to contact senior leadership team members who had since left the organisation.  For 
example, the Chief Executive and Finance Director in Provider B were not available to speak as they 
had since retired.  There was organisational flux within Provider B’s senior leadership team and it 
proved impossible, despite many attempts, to contact successive finance directors.  Despite these 
challenges, there were several reasons to be confident in the findings: first, the senior leadership 
representative interviewed spearheaded the decision to bid for the SIB and oversaw all staffing and 
service delivery decisions; and second, there were no changes in the SIB’s management during the 
intervention so there was consistency in the narrative presented to the interviewer across all 
informants in this site.  
 
In summary, the limitations of this study were, first, that much of the fieldwork was collected toward 
the latter half of the intervention so it was impossible to gather observational data about the service 
intervention at the outset or to compare staff accounts to their actions in practice.  Second, it was 
                                                          
 
27 There are some caveats to any replication of this study particularly that it has been extremely rare to see 
100% p4p contracts where the investors bear no risk of success or failure.  In many ways, the case studies 
operated as proof of concept pilots so it is possible that there were unique aspects to the implementation and 
operationalisation of these sites that might not be captured in subsequent work.   
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impossible to determine the potential surpluses or losses that each provider may have accrued to 
better understand the impact of the contractual risks on service delivery.  The strengths of this 
research were, first, the use of a comparative case study approach enabled the identification of the 
direct and indirect financial incentives in the SIB contracts and an in-depth analysis of their impact as 
they were filtered through an organisation.  Second, the interviews provided rich descriptive evidence 
about how incentives are understood and impact upon service delivery.  Third, the focus on the 
impact of incentives on motivations enabled an analysis of how incentives impacted team managers 
and front line staff’s intrinsic motivation.   
 
9.6.  Summary of findings 
This study has argued that the use of financial incentives through outcomes-based contracts for 
public services had complex effects because the introduction of highly geared direct incentives for 
non-profit organisations can change the agency relationship and staff behaviour and motivation.  
Further, this study finds that the use of non-profit organisations as service providers did not mitigate 
the potential for unintended consequences associated with p4p schemes.  The comparative case 
study approach revealed that the introduction of outcomes-based payments for service delivery 
influenced how each non-profit organisation planned and delivered services in both beneficial, and 
occasionally, detrimental ways.  The impact of the indirect financial incentives on provider behaviour 
was influenced by the priority that the senior leadership placed on the direct financial incentives for 
each organisation.  This influenced how team managers were able to plan and deliver services in the 
two SIB contracts.  The strategic importance of the SIB-related incentives for each organisation 
impacted how staff were then organised and the way that service delivery was structured.  This in 
turn affected provider behaviour in relation to their approach to service delivery with the client group 
and their motivations to do their work.  Most team managers and front line staff felt the incentives 
were aligned with actions that were in the best interests of the client group.  For most staff, the 
introduction of incentives for specific outcomes was positively received and crowded in their 
motivations, but there was clear evidence that for a minority of staff, the implementation of the SIBs 
also resulted in staff attrition, unintended behaviours, and the crowding out of intrinsic motivation.  
 
This section outlines the findings of this thesis as they relate to the objectives of this research. 
 
The first objective of this research was to understand how financial incentives were articulated and 
prioritised by a non-profit organisation’s management and how this affected how each organisation 
planned and delivered services. To do so, documentary analysis was conducted to understand what 
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incentives existed and how financial risk was transferred between parties in the SIB contracts.  The 
structure of the SIB contracts in each case study was analysed to identify the risks held by the 
different parties involved in the SIB, to assess the degree to which each provider prioritised the 
success of the SIB.  This analysis found that both providers held more financial risk than they would 
under a conventional SIB contract where the investor was liable for any financial losses; instead, both 
providers were wholly responsible for repaying their investors with fixed interest rates regardless of 
performance.  In both case studies, the providers held 100% outcomes-based contracts with the 
government.  Provider B’s parent organisation was shielded from organisational risk through an SPV 
while it was not in Provider A.  Interviews with senior and team managers in the non-profit case 
studies revealed how the senior leadership viewed the SIB’s incentives, the introduction of a new 
principal (the investor), and how they prioritised them relative to the organisation’s strategic 
priorities.  Both organisations felt there were financial and reputational implications associated with 
failing to deliver a successful intervention, but Provider A appeared to internalise this more than in 
Provider B because the SIB represented a very high contract value relative to organisational finances 
and any previous contract value held with the government purchaser.  By contrast, Provider B were 
confident about their positive reputation in the sector.  Senior and team managers at Provider B said 
that any case of poor performance could reflect poorly on the pilot financing mechanism rather than 
their organisation’s capacity to deliver a successful intervention.  The interviews provided empirical 
insights about how senior managers viewed the SIB projects relative to the wider strategic vision of 
each organisation.  Provider A prioritised the SIB as important to raising the organisation’s profile and 
for the potential to attract new revenue, while Provider B framed it as a promising intervention that 
may or may not succeed, implemented alongside other concurrent projects.   
 
The second objective of this research was to understand how senior and team managers responded 
to extrinsic incentives and the impact this had on staff structure, task allocation, service delivery, 
performance management, and the monitoring of outcomes.  Interviews with the senior leadership 
team and team managers discussed the SIB incentives, team structure, task allocation, financial 
resources available, and performance management.   Team managers at both sites instructed their 
staff to act as ‘navigators’ to guide their clients along a pathway for societal integration where they 
had access to personalisation funds, and staff were allocated to particular client sub-groups, e.g. 
elderly clients, Eastern European clients.  This research found that there was a pervasive sense of 
resource scarcity in Provider A that influenced how the intervention unfolded while Provider B felt 
their long-term approach enabled an equitable, client-centred approach to implementation.  The 
importance senior leadership placed on outcomes filtered throughout the organisational hierarchy, 
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and influenced how team managers implemented the intervention, the number of staff available, and 
the resources at hand for personalisation budgets or administrative help.  For example, senior 
management’s perception of financial risk limited the autonomy that team managers had over 
financial resources and the size of the service delivery team.  This was evident after the first year 
when structural differences emerged regarding staff size and access to personalisation budgets.  
While Providers A and B missed their projected outcomes targets, and therefore generated 
substantially less outcomes-related payments in the first year, the two providers responded in 
different ways.  When Provider A reported lower than projected income after the first year, they cut 
back on staff costs, personalisation budgets, and drew on volunteers to support clients.  By contrast, 
Provider B’s team remained the same size over three years.  The introduction of an outcomes-based 
contract using sharp financial incentives resulted in unintended consequences and, in some cases, the 
inequitable distribution of time and resources to the client group.   
 
The third objective of this research was to understand how team managers and front line staff 
perceived the indirect financial incentives driven by the SIB and to explore how this affected their 
attitudes towards outcome-related rewards and their attitudes toward targets.  To answer this, 
interviews were held with team managers and front line staff to understand whether they supported 
the outcomes, how they influenced the way that staff approached their work with clients, and to 
what extent they guided staff’s choices when working with the client group.  In both providers, staff 
understood and supported the use of direct and indirect financial incentives.  The interviews 
suggested that managers at Provider A emphasised the financial aspect of the SIB contracts, with an 
emphasis on the amount of money associated with each outcome to press front line staff to deliver 
outcomes.  Here, team managers emphasised the need to mitigate financial risk and to focus on 
generating as many outcomes as possible.  They did not engage with the concept that the SIB’s 
incentives had the potential to generate unwanted behaviours and said that their staff were too 
altruistic to act otherwise.  By contrast, managers in Provider B identified that the SIB’s outcomes-
based approach had the potential to encourage perverse incentives if staff focused on actions to 
achieve outcomes-related payments to the detriment of the client’s pathway into societal 
reintegration.  Instead, managers advocated a longer term, client-centred approach to outcomes 
generation.  This manifested in three, sometimes divergent, ways: first, the self-selection of staff that 
were highly motivated to pursue outcomes and who associated outcomes achievement with positive 
team morale and working; second, high levels of staff attrition at the managerial and front line level; 
and lastly, evidence of unintended behaviours such as parking and creaming, along with anecdotal 
evidence of gaming through the falsification of documents.    
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The fourth objective of the research was to understand the impact that incentives had on the intrinsic 
motivation of team managers and front line staff.  The literature review identified a gap in the 
evidence about the impact of p4p in non-profit (and where relevant, public) providers, particularly 
how organisations and teams respond to direct or indirect financial incentives, and how this affects 
their relationship with service recipients.  Little is known about how workers in the non-profit or 
public sectors respond to incentives and the impact that this has on their intrinsic motivation.  The 
qualitative interview data indicated that the impact of financial incentives on the motivation of staff 
working in the non-profit case studies mainly led to a crowding in effect, and in a small number of 
cases, a crowding out of intrinsic motivation.  This research found that staff members demonstrated 
high levels of intrinsic motivation to do their work and that this was a strong contributor to their 
decisions to self-select into work with homeless people.  The majority of staff, at all levels of the 
organisations, reported that the incentives were aligned with their own best intentions for the client 
group.  The imposition of indirect financial incentives, through the SIB contract, played an important 
role in focusing front line staff on the organisation’s goals.  For front line staff, the SIB fostered 
greater autonomy to act in the best interests of their clients because of the focus on longer-term 
outcomes compared with conventionally funded services that were characterised by service silos and 
process measures.  There was some evidence that for a small number of front line staff, the outcomes 
goals did not resonate with their intrinsic motivations and they reported ambivalence about the 
introduction of indirect financial incentives. While these staff supported the cross-borough approach 
to service delivery, a small number reported pressure to deliver outcomes and frustration with 
organisational flux.  Most of these staff members left the SIB team to work in conventionally funded 
services.  A small number stayed with the SIB because they wanted to continue to work with their 
clients.  One front line staff member reported some resentment at the suggestion that they would not 
do everything they could for their clients in the absence of indirect incentives.  These findings 
provided evidence that for staff who supported the outcomes and had autonomy to pursue the 
outcomes as they saw fit the outcomes ‘crowded in’ their intrinsic motivation.  However, for a smaller 
number of staff, some of whom had autonomy and others who did not, reported that the indirect 
financial incentives ‘crowded out’ their intrinsic motivations.   
 
This thesis explores the relationship between financial incentives and organisational and team 
behaviours in two non-profit organisations to understand how managers and front line staff respond 
to the use of direct and indirect outcome-related financial incentives.  The analysis of the SIB 
contracts identified the potential for unintended consequences and suboptimal allocations of 
resources.  The strategic importance senior leadership placed on direct financial incentives influenced 
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how team managers organised staff structure and service delivery.  Front line staff understood and 
prioritised the preferences of their team managers in their choices to apply a client- or outcomes-
centred approach to the client group.  Incentives ‘crowded in’ intrinsic motivation for staff that 
supported the outcomes targets and had autonomy over their work.  This study finds that the 
introduction of incentives can affect provider behaviour in predictable ways that have both positive 
and negative implications.  These vary with individual’s preferences, how they respond to, or 
prioritise, different principals in their agency relationships, and how organisational priorities are 
communicated and ranked relative to each individual’s goals and objectives.  By exploring the 
relationship between financial incentives and intra-organisational behaviour, this thesis finds that the 
highly-geared incentives in these outcomes-based contracts had complex effects on provider 
behaviour and intrinsic motivation that impacted service delivery in the case studies.    
   
9.7.  Policy Implications and further research 
The last section of this discussion chapter considers the implications of this research for health and 
social care financing and suggests directions for further research. 
 
Policy implications 
This study expands the current literature available about how incentives influence provider behaviour 
or attitudes towards risk.  For policymakers, the findings of this thesis suggest that the use of 
outcomes based contracts with non-profit organisations is insufficient to mitigate the potential for 
perverse incentives associated with p4p schemes. There are three important policy implications for 
those seeking to expand the use of SIBs and outcomes-based contracts in public services.  These apply 
to UK Health and Social Care and further afield where SIBs and outcomes-based contracts are of 
interest for policymakers, and other actors interested in expanding the use of SIBs, or other forms of 
outcomes-based payments in the UK.   
 
SIBs and outcomes-based contracts should be approached with caution about the appropriate 
allocation of risk 
It is important that policymakers exercise caution in how risk is contractually allocated between 
service providers and investors so that non-profit organisations remain able to prioritise their social 
mission over mitigating financial risk, whether it is to serve the public interest or the needs of a 
particular social group.  Given that policymakers are unable to shift the risk of failure away from 
government because of its ultimate responsibility for public services, they must consider why the use 
of SIBs is more appropriate than alternative financing arrangements, such as outcomes-based 
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contracts with conditional grants instead of private investors.  Policymakers must also consider what 
objectives SIBs might serve that cannot be met under alternative approaches, such as better contract 
management of public services.   
 
The introduction of SIBs and outcomes-based contracts are intended to deliver greater accountability 
among non-profit providers and enable governments to only pay for successful programming.  SIBs 
are unique among outcomes-based contracts and PbR schemes in that they introduce new actors, in 
the form of private, social or philanthropic investors.  These actors hold distinct roles that are 
separate from that of non-profits and public commissioners in SIB contracts.  This is because they are 
not ultimately accountable to serve the public good or a social mission but are expected to take on 
the financial risk of failure if the interventions fail.  While social investors or philanthropic investors 
may be motivated to do good with their funds, SIB investors must be seen as distinct from other, 
grant-focused sources of financing because they enter the SIB contract with the intention of 
recouping their investment.  This was true of the two case studies where the investors bore no risk of 
financial losses.  As noted in Section 9.3.3, governments and public commissioners retain ultimate 
responsibility for public services, and the populations served by those services.   
 
Policymakers should note that the two case studies were separate interventions with different 
contractual structure and risk allocations between the providers and investors that affected service 
delivery when considering whether to scale up similar interventions.  The contractual structure of 
Provider B featured an SPV that served to financially insulate Provider B’s wider organisation from the 
financial risk of failure, and so the senior leadership and managers in Provider B did not stress the 
strategic importance of the SIB’s success to the wider organisation’s financial viability.  This was an 
important contributing factor to how Provider B implemented the service.  It should be noted that 
there were two additional factors that contributed to the differences in how incentives were 
communicated through the organisation: first, there was not an external performance manager or 
intermediary involved in the SPV so the non-profit had greater autonomy and organisational oversight 
over their strategic approach to service delivery, and second, policymakers should note Provider B’s 
larger size, role in the homelessness sector and greater financial stability. 
 
Non-profit management and leadership are important contextual factors for service delivery and 
implementation because providers are susceptible to the perverse incentives associated with p4p 
schemes 
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The focus on outcomes for service beneficiaries has the potential to improve public service delivery 
for non-profit organisations whose pro-social missions are aligned with the objectives of a SIB.  The 
application of incentives to non-profit organisations, who are altruistic and socially-minded, is 
expected to mitigate the potential for the perverse incentives associated with p4p schemes.  This 
thesis finds that leadership style and the choice of managerial staff for the SIB interventions are 
important contextual factors that can moderate the impact of financial incentives on provider 
behaviour.  However, there is also anecdotal evidence of unintended behaviours, such as creaming 
and parking.  While the unintended consequences were highly varied, policymakers should note that 
in a small number of reported cases, the SIBs’ incentives did result in perverse incentives and that the 
altruism and pro-social motivation of non-profit staff appears to have been insufficient to entirely 
avoid such incidents..   
 
The case studies provide evidence that that the financial expectations of the SIB held by the senior 
leadership team affected how Providers A and B interpreted and prioritised financial incentives and 
that this, in turn, affected how front line staff understood and framed their approach to service 
delivery in positive, and sometimes unintended ways.  The SIBs enabled greater flexibility in service 
delivery by enabling managers and front line staff to overcome institutional inertia and develop 
innovative new solutions for service delivery in both case studies through personalisation budgets and 
the ability to work across different London boroughs.  Policymakers should also be conscious that the 
case studies provide evidence that leadership style and managerial choices can have unintended 
consequences.  For Provider A, this resulted in strong managerial pressures to meet outcomes, the 
parking of difficult cases, and a small number of gaming incidents that involved the falsification of 
outcomes achievement.  In this case, Provider A perceived an environment of resource scarcity, and 
so the pressure to meet outcomes was emphasised.  In Provider B, there was evidence that the team 
managers were conscious of the potential for perverse incentives and guarded against that by 
focusing front line staff on a client-centred approach to moderate the impact of financial incentives.  
However, an unintended consequence of the client-centred approach was that front line staff 
fostered unsustainable levels of dependency with the client group to maintain outcomes, such as 
sustained accommodation.  While Provider B did not emphasise the strategic importance of 
generating outcomes to support the organisation’s viability because the SIB was a small part of their 
overall remit; this was an unintended behaviour whereby the provider obtained outcomes-related 
payments for unsustainable service delivery.   
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Policymakers should note that the application of highly geared incentives in non-profit organisations 
can result in a range of different behavioural responses by providers that can improve service delivery 
through greater flexibility and opportunities to break through institutional inertia.  Managerial and 
leadership styles are an important moderating factor that can mitigate the potential for unintended 
or adverse consequences.   
 
SIBs have the potential to exacerbate fragmentation in public services 
The introduction of outcomes-based SIB contracts where the public commissioner only pays when 
successful, predetermined outcome metrics are met belies the complexity of public services provision 
for government.  SIBs are a variant of contracting out in public services and as such, have the 
potential to fragment public services, because they encourage competition between non-profit 
providers for service contracts.  SIB interventions are premised on delivering innovation by freeing 
providers from process and target measures to do what is best for their target population.  However 
the focus on highly personalised interventions has the potential to fragment public services because 
local non-profit providers are not required to work in conjunction with, or in pursuit of a nationwide 
strategy.  It also requires non-profit providers to compete against other providers for service delivery 
contracts that may ultimately impede collaborative working, or the development of joint practice, in 
the non-profit sector.  
 
In practice, the non-profit case studies appeared to deliver better outcomes from a qualitative 
perspective for individual service recipients based on staff accounts about how difficult it was to 
reintegrate entrenched homeless individuals into secure accommodation.  The DCLG’s quantitative 
analysis (discussed in Chapter 5, Study Setting, Section 5.4) found that the two SIBs had a significant 
positive impact on moving the group into long term accommodation (Spurling, 2017).  Taken at that, 
it appears that the SIB was beneficial in meeting its stated goals and policymakers may be tempted to 
scale up similar interventions as a tried and tested mode of service delivery.  However, it is important 
to consider the broader impact of these SIB schemes on the non-profit sector working to combat 
homelessness, and to question the sustainability of these highly-personalised interventions on a wider 
scale.   
 
The use of SIBs to target a subset of entrenched homeless individuals demonstrates that cross-
borough pathways to housing and sustained accommodation are possible but such a targeted 
approach to social problems simultaneously neglects the structural drivers of inequity and social 
inequality that leads to homelessness.  While the SIBs were effective in targeting a specific group of 
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individuals in the case studies, their implementation process did not require either provider to work 
collaboratively with other providers, or to find long-term solutions to existing silos or blockages.  
Provider B chose to subcontract and work collaboratively with other providers but Provider A did not, 
leading to similar overall performance results.  For some providers looking to take on such SIB 
contracts, this might suggest that positive results can be achieved without collaboration from others, 
so there may be few incentives for inter-sectoral working for better practice.  This highlights the 
importance of government stewardship over the direction of policy travel if these projects are scaled 
to wider contract values to deter fragmentation.  Where policymakers choose to proceed with SIBs, 
they should be cautious to retain a degree of stewardship over the direction of policy and best 
practice, alongside a plan for how to proceed in the case of failure given their ultimate responsibility 
as the payers for public services.   
 
Further research 
The analysis above suggests that there are a number of areas in this research space that require 
further empirical evidence. 
 
First, further analyses of contractual relationships and risk allocation between parties in SIBs is 
necessary.  There are no established norms or processes for the different actors involved in SIB 
development.  It is important to examine the impact of shifting contractual structures and ownership 
models on non-profit service delivery given the introduction of outcomes-focused service models.  
The allocation of risk between actors is also an important consideration that requires further 
examination because the degree of financial risk that a non-profit assumes can change the agency 
relationship between the non-profit and the public commissioner.  Research is needed that compares 
and contrasts the implications of different contractual models and allocations of risk between actors 
in SIBs and outcomes-based contracts for public services.  It is also unclear what the impact of greater 
competition for public services contracts will be on the non-profit sector.  Further work should 
contribute to understanding whether a more competitive climate for contracts can foster more 
innovative services delivery and collaborative working, or whether it will deter non-profits from joint 
working to achieve shared social goals, such as a reduction in homelessness.   
 
Second, the strength of the qualitative observations may enable further theoretical research about 
the impact of a profit-seeking investor on the agency relationship.  While there is an established 
theoretical literature that seeks to model the agency relationship in non-profit organisations in 
contrast to other sectors, there is also scope to use qualitative economics analysis to lend greater 
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insights and specificity to theoretical work, particularly in complex areas such as the intra-
organisational impact of p4p incentives and outcomes-based contracting.  For example, further 
qualitative research about the application of p4p financing mechanisms to non-profit organisations 
can provide important insights about the priorities and preferences of agents delivering public 
services that can contribute to the development of better models about incentives and intrinsic 
motivation.  This can contribute to the development of new theoretical approaches in areas where 
current explanatory models are lacking.   
 
Thirdly, more work is required that seeks to understand the impact of incentive schemes on provider 
behaviour.  There are few studies that expressly seek to examine this, and those that do draw on 
routine administrative data to identify patterns of behaviour that differ from other, non-incentivised 
work (Doran et al., 2008, Gravelle et al., 2010, Carter and Whitworth, 2015).  A strength of this work 
was the use of detailed comparative case studies that delved inside the ‘black box’ of p4p in an 
organisation.  This would be a valuable addition to future work on p4p schemes.  To complement this 
work, more work is needed that uses mixed-methods research design to identify how providers 
respond to incentives, to measure in some quantifiable way the extent of the p4p or SIB effect, and to 
provide contextual data within which to situate findings.  More robust study design is needed to 
ascertain the impact of incentives and whether, and in what ways, it leads to unintended 
consequences.   
 
Lastly, further research is needed to understand the impact of incentives on motivation within 
organisations using agreed tools and definitions of motivation. At present, this is an emerging area of 
work that blends economics and social psychology but more work is needed that explicitly looks at the 
impact of direct and indirect financial and non-financial initiatives on intrinsic motivation.  This study 
is the first to apply Lohmann et al.’s (2016) framework in a high income setting using qualitative 
methods and more such work is needed to test this new approach (Lohmann et al., 2016).  This can 
contribute to better p4p design where incentives schemes can be tooled in such a way to maximise 
the potential benefits for those involved while mitigating the pitfalls associated with the crowding out 
of motivation.   
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.  Request for contractual documents  
 
 
Dear [insert name], 
 
I am writing to you to ask for your cooperation in the Department of Health commissioned Evaluation of Social 
Impact Bonds (SIBs) in Health and Social Care.  This research is being conducted by the Policy Innovation 
Research Unit, led by Professor Nicholas Mays, and is a collaboration between the London School of Hygiene & 
Tropical Medicine and RAND Europe.  
 
This evaluation has followed the progress of the original nine Trailblazer projects which received funds from the 
Social Enterprise Investment Fund in 2013 to investigate the feasibility of applying SIB mechanisms to Health 
and Social Care. At present,  five of the original nine Trailblazers have successfully progressed to become active 
SIBs (THE SITE NAMES HAVE BEEN READACTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY). 
 
We are contacting you, as a commissioner for one of the five projects listed above, to request that you share 
any relevant service contracts with the research team in order to help them complete one of their central 
research objectives. This is to describe and characterise the signed SIB contracts in order to unpack the 
implications in terms of incentives and risk-sharing arrangements for the different parties.  This is a crucial 
element of the research programme which will enable greater understanding of the potential role and effects of 
SIBs compared to other approaches to paying for public services. It will also provide key policy lessons for other  
 
The research team will treat all disclosed contracts and documents with the strictest regard for confidentiality 
and anonymity. The analysis of theses contacts will be used to extend the understanding of the contractual 
relationships between relevant parties with the aim of producing a thematic summary of the similarities and 
differences in the five contracts.  No findings or contractual detailed will be attributable to any of the five sites.  
All findings will be subject to internal quality assurance processes and peer review from the Department of 
Health prior to any public dissemination of any findings.  We understand that it might be necessary to redact 
some details of these contracts due to commercial confidentiality.   
 
Your cooperation with this request is much appreciated and will be of crucial importance in helping the 
Department of Health understand the potential benefits and drawbacks of using Social Impact Bonds in 
financing new services in Health and Social Care.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Mylene Lagarde 
Senior Lecturer in Health Economics 
 
Policy Innovation Research Unit, Department of Health Services Research and Policy 
Health Economics and Systems Analysis Group, Department of Global Health and Development 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH 
Tel. +44 (0)20 7927 2653 
SIBs contracts request letter, v 14 July 15  
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Appendix 2.  Interview topic guide 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE, LONDON ROUGH SLEEPING SIBS 
FOR USE WITH SERVICE PROVIDERS AND FRONT LINE STAFF 
About the SIB and your role 
 Can you give me an overview of this project and your role in it? 
o Time involved? 
o Who you work with? 
 Why do you think your organisation took part in it? 
(Senior and team managers specific)  
How does the SIB operate and how is it managed? 
 How did your organisation approach this SIB?  
o How partnership was negotiated? 
o How is the project managed? How has this changed over time? 
 How were service managers and frontline staff identified and recruited to this initiative? 
o How many are voluntary/paid? 
o How are staff and volunteers trained? 
o How was caseload assigned? How was target population dispersed among team? 
 What issues did you feel might arise as a result of the SIB; what if anything was done to 
manage these; what issues have arisen in practice?  
 What agencies do you work in partnership with?  
o How strong are your links with those partner agencies?  
o Are there any incentives to develop further partnerships? 
o How do referrals work? 
Impact of incentives on work 
 Describe the performance monitoring arrangements for you/for frontline staff? 
 Are staff and volunteers aware of performance monitoring? 
o How are expectations/cases managed? 
o What mechanisms are used for database monitoring and outcomes measurement? 
 What, if anything, would you change about the way this intervention is delivered? 
 How and in what ways do the regular outcomes payment schedules affect the work of 
provider organisations? 
 What are the incentives involved for staff/managers/(sub)-contracting organisations? 
 What issues did you feel might arise as a result of the SIB; what if anything was done to 
manage these; what issues have arisen in practice? 
 What is different/has anything changed from the early stages of implementation? 
Impact of the SIB on users and service recipients 
 How and in what ways does the SIB change the services received by users?  
 (for managers/front-line) Can you walk us through a typical day or week in your work? 
 What is different for you? 
 What were your concerns about working in a p4p/outcomes based contract? 
 How quickly are you able to respond to client needs? 
 How flexible can you be in responding to client needs? 
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o How much of this is because of the SIB? 
 Have you worked in similar services without incentives?  
 How if at all do performance management requirement affect the way you provide your 
service, select your clients, etc.? 
 What is your strategy for engagement with client groups?  
 How regularly will you seek to engage service users? What do you do if users will not engage?  
Motivations 
 How has working on the SIB affected your work? 
o Motivations to work in this sector? 
o Why were you drawn to this sector? 
o What concerns, if any, did you have about working under an outcomes-based 
contract? What experiences did you have of this? 
 How has your performance been monitored? 
o How has this affected your work? Enabling factors or obstacles? 
 What concerns, if any, do you have about using p4p when working with vulnerable 
populations?  
o Impact on the sector? Positive direction? 
 What impact, if any, will there be on your next steps? How has this experience helped or 
hindered your career progression? How will was role different from others? 
Ending a SIB 
 What actions have you taken to prepare for the end/wind down of the SIB in November? 
 How would you like to see the project wind down? How much oversight do you have in how 
funds are allocated at the end of this project? How much staff will you keep/would you keep? 
 What are the best and worst case scenarios for the target population? 
o Concerns about how they will fare with less support? 
o Impact on how you see/define long term success? 
Key lessons and closing questions 
 If you could share 2-3 key lessons from your experience with this SIB, for those considering 
SIBs in the future, what would these lessons be? 
 If you could change one thing about the process or working on this project, what would it be? 
 Is there anything else you would like to comment on that we have not discussed today? 
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Appendix 3.  Participant information sheet 
 
Information sheet – Service provider             v 21 March 2014 
 
EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND TRAILBLAZERS 
 
Participant information sheet – service provider interviews 
 
Introduction 
You are invited to take part in an evaluation of the of the social impact bond trailblazers being 
conducted by researchers from the Department of Health-funded Policy Research Unit in Policy 
Innovation Research (PIRU). Before you decide whether to accept this invitation it is important for you 
to understand why the evaluation is taking place and what it will involve. Please take the time to read 
the following information, and feel free to discuss the evaluation with colleagues if you wish. Do not 
hesitate to contact us if you have any questions about the evaluation. 
 
Context 
Social Impact Bonds (SIB) have been introduced recently as a new form of contract to fund the delivery 
of public services. These contracts involve three parties: public sector commissioners, social investors 
and service providers. In a nutshell, in a SIB contract, public sector commissioners partner with private 
for-profit or Third Sector social investors to fund interventions that seek to tackle (usually complex) 
social problems (e.g. rough sleeping, frail older people with multiple long term conditions, youth 
offenders, etc.). More specifically, charities and/or private investors cover the upfront costs necessary 
to set up the interventions implemented by service providers, while the commissioner commits to pay 
rewards if pre-defined desired outcomes are later reached.  
 
Currently, there are nine projects in the area of health and social care that have received seed funding 
so that they can analyse whether they wish to provide services through a SIB. The Department of 
Health’s Policy Research Programme has commissioned an independent evaluation of these projects 
from the Policy Innovation Research Unit at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to 
explore their potential benefits and costs. 
 
The purpose of the evaluation 
The specific objectives of this evaluation are as follows: 
(1) To describe and assess the development of the nine SIB trailblazers in order to identify 
obstacles and enabling factors in finalising SIB contracts. 
(2) To describe and characterise the signed SIB contracts in order to unpack the implications in 
terms of incentives and risk-sharing arrangements for the different parties. 
 
Evaluation design 
The evaluation comprises: 
 Semi-structured, qualitative interviews of key stakeholders from each of the three parties 
involved in the preparatory phase of SIBs (private investors, service providers and 
commissioners).  
 document review of project documents and contractual documents signed by all parties 
 
The evaluation also includes a literature review and set of interviews with experts involved with similar 
schemes in other countries that will be used to develop a typology of the different possible ways in 
which SIBs can be designed, and the implications for providers, investors and service commissioners.  
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Why have I been chosen to participate? 
You are being invited to take part in the evaluation because your organisation is, or has been, participating 
in discussions to provide health and social care services funded through a Social Impact Bond. If you do 
agree to be interviewed, you will be offered a consent form to sign before the interview. You will be able 
to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is entirely up to you whether you participate in this evaluation or not, and if you do not wish to 
participate, you do not need to give a reason. 
 
Are any risks involved? 
The study has been reviewed by anonymous peer-reviewers, policy experts at the Department of Health, 
the relevant NHS Research and Development offices and the research ethics committee at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. This study involves no personal risk; interviews should cause no 
distress or discomfort to any participant. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree, we will ask you to take part in one interview with a trained researcher over the telephone or 
in person. The interview will last for about one hour and will be recorded so that we do not miss anything 
important.  The interview will be arranged to take place at a time and date that is convenient for you. 
 
In the interview you will be asked a number of questions about the Social Impact Bond, including why your 
organisation decided to consider funding services through this mechanism; what you think are the potential 
benefits of this type of contract; what you identify as the potential challenges of such an approach ; what 
the negotiations have involved (e.g. selection of performance outcomes, valuation of outcomes, data 
to be used to measure the performance, population targeted, etc.) and what aspects were 
important to you in the discussions ; what were the technical challenges faced by your organisation 
during the design of the SIB and discussions with the other parties; reasons why decisions were eventually 
made [to launch  a SIB / not to proceed with a SIB]. 
 
You may also be invited to participate in a brief follow-up interview in about six months’ time. It is entirely 
up to you whether you participate in the follow-up interview. You can limit your participation to just one 
interview if you wish to. 
 
Why should I take part? 
The overall aim of this evaluation is to describe the potential benefits and challenges associated with 
the use of Social Impact Bonds in health and social care.  Although there may not be any immediate 
benefit to you from taking part in this evaluation, we believe that this evaluation will contribute to an 
understanding of the practical and financial issues of this innovative alternative funding mechanism and 
inform future similar initiatives.  
 
Confidentiality and dissemination of data 
Information derived from interviews and documents will be used for study reports, conference 
presentations and articles in research journals. The study report will be submitted to the Department of 
Health, and will be available to participating organisations. Findings will be reported without identifying 
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peoples’ names, and treated as completely confidential within the research team. If interviewees agree to 
be tape-recorded and agree that quotes may be used, this will be done in confidence for illustrative 
purposes in the report or any research papers/ conference presentations. All data will be securely stored 
in an anonymous form and will only be accessible to the research team. The report is likely to be available 
summer 2015 and will be available online www.piru.ac.uk 
 
Who is organising the evaluation? 
The evaluation is being funded by the Department of Health and is being conducted by a research team 
based at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
 
Who has reviewed this evaluation? 
The study has been reviewed by the National Department of Health, policy experts at the Department of 
Health, the relevant NHS Research and Development offices and the research ethics committee at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the interviews, you can speak to the researcher who will do her 
best to answer your questions. During the interview, you can stop at any time and decide not to continue.  
If you could like to make a complaint, please contact either investigator listed below. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet.  
 
Nicholas Mays 
Professor of Health Policy and Director, Policy Research Unit in Policy Innovation Research 
nicholas.mays@lshtm.ac.uk 
Chief Investigator  
 
If you have any questions about the evaluation or require further information, please contact us. If you 
phone and do not get an answer, please leave a message and we will be happy to call you back. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Contact for further information: 
Principal Investigator: 
Mylene Lagarde – phone 020 7927 2653, email Mylene.Lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4.  Consent form 
 
Consent form – Service provider               v 9 January 2014 
 
EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND TRAILBLAZERS 
 
CONSENT FORM – SERVICE PROVIDER INTERVIEW 
 
Name of Researcher: [Stefanie Tan] 
If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below  
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read the Participant Information Sheet concerning this study 
and I understand what will be required of me and what will happen if I participate 
in this interview 
 
2. Any further questions concerning this study that I had have been answered by 
[Stefanie Tan] 
 
3. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study without giving a 
reason  
 
4. I consent to the interview being recorded  
5. I agree to share SIB contracts or documents and understand that they will be 
used unnamed to inform the evaluation report. 
 
6. I do/do not agree to be quoted unnamed in any reports or publications arising 
from this study (please delete as appropriate) 
 
 
I agree to take part in this study 
 
 
 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
 
_________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
1 copy for participant; 1 for researcher, v 9 January 2014  
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Appendix 5.  SIB outcomes targets and schedules for repayment  
 
NB: There is a maximum of £17, 200 that can be collected per individual through this intervention 
Outcome  Definition  Eligibility criteria How payments are 
validated  
How many times 
payments can 
be claimed  
How long these 
outcomes are 
paid 
Primary outcomes      
Reduction in bedded 
down sightings  
Service providers receive an 
outcome payment for each 
individual not seen bedded 
down during that quarter 
above a baseline figure1 
If clients2 are not recorded bedded down rough 
sleeping by street outreach teams across 
London on the CHAIN database. 
CHAIN database. No limit, 
quarterly  
November 2012-
October 2015; 
quarterly 
Move into settled 
accommodation  
Client enters eligible  
accommodation  
Settled accommodation is defined as: 
 
1. General needs social housing, supported 
housing, private rented sector, or tied 
accommodation.  This should be one of the 
following tenure types: assured tenancy 
(periodic or fixed term); assured shorthold 
tenancy (periodic or fixed term); or a 
secure tenancy.  
2. Living with friends (not as a tenant) or living 
with family provided the cohort member 
has exclusive access to a bedroom with 
their own be. 
3. A Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
registered care home providing social care 
or nursing care for life. 
4. Hospice until the end of life, or for respite 
care while maintaining stable 
accommodation.   
 Submit, or have a copy 
of, the signed tenancy 
agreement. 
 Standard GLA template 
to certify exclusive 
occupation and provide 
the address 
 The occupancy 
agreement issued by the 
care home and a copy of 
the aims and objectives 
statement of the care 
home 
 Evidence of a written 
agreement that an 
individual is in lodgings 
(for at least 6 months), 
or a mobile home or 
board with a fixed site. 
This payment 
will only be 
made one time. 
October 2015 
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5. Lodgings, in a room of their own, with a 
landlord for at least 6 months 
6. Written agreement that the individual is on 
a fixed site (e.g. mobile home in caravan 
park or boat on mooring)  
 
The following are not considered eligible for 
payment: where the local authority has 
accepted a duty under homelessness legislation 
and accommodated a household in temporary 
accommodation; any temporary 
accommodation under a non-secure tenancy; a 
license; assured shorthold tenancy; 
rehabilitation or treatment facilities; with 
family and friends if sleeping in a communal 
living area; stays in prison if convicted of an 
offence3.  Stays in hospital or in custody are not 
eligible if stable accommodation is not 
maintained. 
 
If the client is already in accommodation at the 
point of first contact, then this payment cannot 
be claimed. 
Sustainment in 
settled 
accommodation for 
12 months 
Client remains in an eligible 
settled accommodation for 
12 months 
See criteria for move into settled 
accommodation. 
 
The client cannot have more than one recorded 
bedded down sighting in the 6 month period 
prior to a claim being made; the individual is 
permitted to move up to 3 times in the first 12 
months, but any more is not considered stable 
accommodation for this period.  The period of 
sustainment would be reset from the start at 
Standard GLA template to 
certify where individual is 
living at the time of the 
claim, and evidence of any 
moves during the stability 
period. 
 
Providers must supply 
evidence of any moves, in 
the form of a tenancy 
Not specified October 2016; 
this outcome will 
only be paid if the 
client is in 
sustained 
accommodation 
for 11 months at 
October 2015. 
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the time of the fourth move into stable 
accommodation.   
 
If the client is already in accommodation at the 
point of first contact, then this is the first 
payment that can be claimed.  The sustainment 
period will begin from the latter of the point of 
first contact or the start of the contract. 
 
If the individual is moving between one type of 
stable accommodation to another, a gap is 
acceptable unless it is longer than two weeks, 
or cannot be verified.  In such cases, the period 
of sustainment would be reset from the 
moment the individual re-enters stable 
accommodation.  
agreement or a 
certification that the 
individual has been with 
family or friends.   
Sustainment in 
settled 
accommodation for 
18 months 
Client remains in an eligible 
settled accommodation for 
18 months 
See criteria for move into settled 
accommodation and sustainment to 12 
months. 
 
The client cannot have more than one recorded 
bedded down sighting in the 6 month period 
prior to a claim being made 
 
The individual is permitted to move up to 2 
times between the 12 to 18 month period, but 
any more is not considered stable 
accommodation for this period.  The period of 
sustainment would be reset from the start at 
the time of the third move into stable 
accommodation.   
 
Standard GLA template to 
certify where individual is 
living at the time of the 
claim, and evidence of any 
moves during the stability 
period. 
 
Providers must supply 
evidence of any moves, in 
the form of a tenancy 
agreement or a 
certification that the 
individual has been with 
family or friends.   
Not specified October 2016.  
This outcome will 
only be paid if an 
individual has 
been in sustained 
accommodation 
for 12 months 
prior to October 
2015.   
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If an individual abandons accommodation 
between the 12 to 18 month period, and is 
moved back into stable accommodation, they 
must remain there for a further 6 months to 
obtain the 18 month sustainability payment.   
Reconnection with 
home country 
The client has voluntarily 
moved back to a destination 
outside the UK, such as their 
home country of origin.  The 
provider may also be 
involved in reconnecting 
those when enforcement 
action has been taken by the 
UKBA.   
The provider must show it engaged with the 
individual over the reconnection, but 
arrangements can be made through another 
service or the UK Border Agency.   
 
 
The evidence submitted 
should use a standard GLA 
template and must 
demonstrate:  
1. Evidence of travel to a 
destination outside the 
UK, such as copies of 
the individual’s travel 
documentation. 
2. Evidence of sustainable 
accommodation at 
destination.  
Acceptable 
documentation 
includes: letter from 
family or friend 
confirming a place to 
live, or a landlord 
confirming an 
agreement was made.  
No tenancy evidence 
agreement is necessary 
is but will be accepted. 
3. Evidence the individual 
has moved into 
accommodation.  Can 
be verified by a 
telephone call to 
Not specified October 2015 
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family, friends, or a 
landlord, or the 
individual. 
Sustained 
reconnection in 
home country 
The client remains out of 
the country for 6 months 
after initial reconnection 
If clients are not recorded bedded down rough 
sleeping in the 6 months following their date of 
departure from the UK by street outreach 
teams across London on the CHAIN database. 
CHAIN database. Not specified April 2016 
Secondary outcomes      
Supporting 
employment, 
education or training 
To increase the number of 
individuals that achieve: 
 an NQF level 2 or 
equivalent qualification;  
 sustained volunteering 
or self-employment (for 
13 weeks and for 26 
weeks); 
  sustained part time 
employment (for 13 
weeks and for 26 
weeks); or 
 sustained full time 
employment (for 13 
weeks and for 26 weeks) 
To qualify for a payment, the NQF level 2 or 
equivalent (as defined by the government) 
commencement must follow the point of first 
contact of contract start date. 
 
Volunteering is defined as at least 8 hours per 
week (which can be averaged over the 13 and 
26 week period provided the minimum is met).   
- This can include work experience provided 
the placement has a clear role description, 
supervision by a paid member of staff and 
paid expenses.   
 
Self-employment is defined as 8 hours per 
week as self-employed (which can be averaged 
over the 13 and 26 week period); if the number 
of hours cannot be established, the income 
equivalent of at least 8 hours at the minimum 
wage will be used as payment threshold.   
 
Part time work is defined as 8-16 hours per 
week and full time work is defined as more 
than 16 hours per week. 
 
Certificate of qualification 
 
To claim work experience 
as volunteering, the 
provider must submit 
evidence work experience 
provided the placement 
has a clear role 
description, supervision by 
a paid member of staff and 
paid expenses.   
 
Self-assessment tax return 
for self-employment or 
HMCR tax statement, or 
receipts and invoices for 
the self-employed work 
carried out.    
 
Evidence provided as 
proof of employment 
should be a payslip or 
employment contract. 
Maximum of 1 
time per 
outcome sub-
metric (e.g. 
payment can be 
made for 
volunteering (13 
and 26 weeks), 
then full time 
employment (13 
and 26 weeks) 
and part time 
employment (13 
and 26 weeks). 
After October 
2015, providers 
can claim for the 
next outcome but 
no further claims 
can be made ( 
e.g. if an 
individual has 
been in part time 
work for 8 weeks, 
a claim for 13 
weeks can be 
made in 
December 2015 
but the provider 
cannot claim a 
payment for 26 
week 
sustainment. 
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If the client is already in employment at the 
start of the contract then the 13 and 26 week 
periods the commencement period will begin 
from the latter of the point of first contact or 
the start of the contract (unless the individual 
was employed for longer than 26 weeks). 
 
Employment payments cannot be made for 
individuals that were reconnected abroad.  
 
The 13 and 26 week periods can be cumulative 
so there is no need to account for gaps in 
employment or volunteering. 
 
Employment and volunteering payments can 
be claimed concurrently but part time and full 
time employment cannot be claimed 
concurrently. 
Improved health A reduction in A&E episodes 
associated with the cohort 
compared to a baseline5.   
 Not specified beyond 
suggestions they will 
compare it to data from 
the NHS information 
centre. 
  
Not specified Not specified 
1 The historic baseline figure is based on CHAIN data for historic cohorts generated with the same criteria. The baseline figure is based on the adjusted historic performance for the first four 
quarters after cohort generation, which was averaged to produce an average yearly figure for quarterly use.  This was 31% (n=108) in year 1, 16% (n=55) in year 2 and 11% (N=38) in year 3. 
2 This applies to any bedded down sighting, so outcome payments are only made for clients not seen rough sleeping (clients seen bedded down once or every night of the quarter are ineligible 
for payments) 
3 The provider must fill in a standard GLA template with details if a cohort member is convicted of an offence. 
4 The point of first contact is not clearly defined in the contract so it is unclear what qualifies (first contact ticked off in CHAIN?  No evidence needs to be submitted to validate that this occurs.  
5 The baseline was to remain constant throughout the intervention.  The baseline was expected to be generated after the contracts were awarded and it is unclear how soon they ran into issues 
with establishing the baseline for use in this metric.
 
